Market misconduct
The 26th of December 2019
The Bank of Russia has established facts of multiple manipulations at the exchange in the markets for fourteen issuers’ shares (hereinafter, the Shares) during the period from 13 November 2014 to 23 March 2015 (hereinafter, the Period) by employees of CJSC Leader (TIN 5018026672) Andrey Siluyanov and Anton Chvirov, responsible for the management of assets of CJSC Leader’s clients and that of the assets of a client of LLC Management Company Severyanka (TIN 7713502214) (hereinafter, collectively the Management Companies).
The investigation has established that Andrey Siluyanov and Anton Chvirov, abusing their positions, conducted transactions with the Shares using the funds of the Management Companies’ clients in trust and their own funds in Andrey Siluyanov’s brokerage account.
In these transactions, they employed the following scheme: using the funds of the Management Companies’ clients transferred in trust, Andrey Siluyanov and Anton Chvirov conducted transactions to purchase or sell the Shares, inducing either a rise or a drop in their price. The market conditions resulting from such actions were used to close the position earlier opened on the Shares in Andrey Siluyanov’s brokerage account with a profit from transactions with the Management Companies. This trading behaviour entailed significant deviations in the trading volumes of the Shares.
Pursuant to Clause 2, Part 1, Article 5 of Federal
The Bank of Russia took administrative measures against the persons involved in market manipulation in order to prevent similar violations in the future.
The materials of the investigation have been submitted to law enforcement authorities.
4th of December 2019
The Bank of Russia has established facts of manipulation during trading at the exchange in the markets for units of Closed-end Rental Unit Investment Fund Holy Land (ISIN: RU000A0JVUU7) and Closed-end Rental Unit Investment Fund Kottedzhio Park (ISIN: RU000A0JUUC7) managed by Asset Management Solutions LLC (hereinafter collectively, the Units and the Funds) during the period from October 2014 to July 2018 (hereinafter, the Period).
Trading in the market for the Units during the Period was mostly carried out by concluding transactions in collusion between two unrelated groups of entities and individuals.
The first group (Group 1) included entities and individuals related in various ways: LLC Canopus Finance (TIN 5406771420; previously — LLC Krasoil Finance), LLC Cataris Capital (TIN 7733224572), LLC Managing Partner Cross Finance Group (TIN 7718309373), LLC Investment Company Energyiya Sintez (TIN 7702626754) and its legal successor Investment Company Averazh Ltd (TIN 2635107776), HAYFOLD COMPANY LTD (HE 313274), Viktor Oparin, Yury Sokolov, Alexandr Shakirov, Vadim Shakirov, Nikita Bushuev, Eduard Golubovich, Andrey Grishin, Alexandr Margolis, Alexey Shchepelev and Alexey Yakovlev.
The investigation has established circumstances evidencing that the most probable intentiom of transactions in the Units conducted by the above entities and individuals during the Period was to simulate trading activity and maintain acceptable prices for and trading volumes of the Units. These transactions caused significant deviation of the price for the Units.
The second group (Group 2) included related persons Dmitry Malakeev, Arsen Movsesyan and Roman Volkov who conducted Unit transactions in collusion during the period from November 2015 to November 2016. These transactions caused significant deviation of the price for the Units.
The Bank of Russia has also established signs of distortion in the price stated by appraisers when compiling reports on the valuation of the real estate being part of the Funds’ asset portfolios. In particular, the Bank of Russia has established that the land plots for sale offers used as comparables in the valuation were posted in the internet using the IP address of a valuation company employing the appraiser who had prepared and signed the valuation report.
Pursuant to Clause 2, Part 1, Article 5 of Federal
The above entities and individuals breached the ban imposed by Part 2, Article 6 of the Federal Law.
The Bank of Russia has sent orders to avoid similar violations in future to the individuals and operating legal entities who conducted the above transactions with the Units.
27th of November
The Bank of Russia has established facts of manipulation in the market for PJSC Seligdar’s ordinary shares (ISIN: RU000A0JPR50; hereinafter, the Shares) during the period from 18.09.2017 to 27.09.2017 (hereinafter, the Period) in exchange trading.
The Bank of Russia’s investigation revealed transactions conducted undercollusion, as a result of which LLC Insurance Company TIT (TIN 7714819895) had sold a large block of the Shares during the Period to LLC Management Company RFC-Capital (TIN 7444036805) that had acted using pension savings of the Pension Fund of the Russian Federation (PFR) in anonymous exchange trading.
Overall intra-day amounts of offsetting orders to buy the Shares from LLC Management Company RFC-Capital using the PFR’s funds and to sell the Shares from LLC Insurance Company TIT were identical for three trading days and similar in volumes for the remaining five trading days. Moreover, prices in the said entities’ orders for purchase and sale of the Shares were identical during seven out of eight trading days.
The above counterparties’ transactions whose share in the aggregate trading volume of the Shares exceeded 92% during the Period resulted in a significant deviations in the Shares trading parameters.
Along with that, the Bank of Russia analysed demand for the Shares in exchange trading during the Period and established that it would have been impossible to sell a large block of the Shares to numerous investors if there had been no demand on the part of LLC Management Company RFC-Capital that acted using the PFR’s funds.
In accordance with Clause 2, Part 1, Article 5 of Federal Law No.
The Bank of Russia took administrative measures against the persons involved in market manipulation in order to prevent similar violations in the future.
22th of November
The Bank of Russia has established facts of manipulation in the market for units of Real Estate CUIF Arshin (ISIN: RU000A0JUN16; hereinafter, the Units and the Fund) managed by CJSC Diana Management Company (hereinafter, the Management Company) in on-exchange trading from 27 August 2014 through 27 June 2016 (hereinafter, the Period).
The Bank of Russia has further established that the market for on-exchange trading with the Units is formed by trades by customers of Russian professional securities market participants: Agro Capital LLC (TIN: 5007058270), PJSC Montazh (TIN: 5056000107), Teplo-Service LLC (TIN: 7721781963) and OZP LLC (TIN: 7704255819) hereinafter, the Unit Market Participants).
The investigation revealed multiple ties between the Unit Market Participants and the Management Company. In addition, the Unit Market Participants and the associated appraisal company misled Unit market participants and misstated the cost of the Fund’s assets when it had been created and in on-exchange Units trading.
The Bank of Russia has established that the Unit Market Participants, in collusion with one another, conducted offsetting trades with the Units having identical price and volume parameters. This helped form and maintain the price of the Units in on-exchange trading. In addition, trades of the Unit Market Participants caused significant deviations in the trading parameters of Unit during the Period.
Pursuant to Clause 2, Part 1, Article 5 of Federal Law No.
Thereby, these entities violated the ban imposed by Part 2, Article 6 of the Federal Law.
The Bank of Russia sent instructions to Agro Capital LLC, PJSC Montazh, Teplo-Service LLC and OZP LLC aimed at preventing similar violations in future.
25th of October
The Bank of Russia has established facts of manipulation on an organised trading venue (hereinafter, the Exchange) executed in the market for ordinary shares of PJSC IDGC of Centre (hereinafter, the Shares) on 13 July 2018 and 29 August 2018 by Andrey Balushkin and Svetlana Balushkina who have family relations.
During the investigation, the Bank of Russia established that, in collusion with S. Balushkina, A. Balushkin conducted matched trades with the Shares in the main trading mode on the Exchange on the basis of anonymous buy orders. Orders placed by A. Balushkin and S. Balushkina had identical price and volume parameters and were placed using the same PC with the minimum time lag.
This trading behaviour led to considerable deviations in the Shares trading parameters.
In accordance with Federal Law No.
The Bank of Russia took measures against the said individuals aimed at preventing similar violations in future, including the measures stipulated by the Russian Federation Code of Administrative Offences.
25th of October
The Bank of Russia has established facts of manipulation in the market for units of rental closed-end unit investment fund Key Business Model — Alfa (hereinafter, Units) on an organised trading venue in 2015.
Transactions qualified as Unit market manipulation were conducted in July 2015 by VIP Universal Ltd, a foreign company incorporated under the law of Seychelles, in collusion with a number of Russian legal entities subsequently liquidated. Following the applicable trading scheme, Russian companies regularly purchased Units from the sole counterparty VIP Universal Ltd. Thereby, they diverted money to its bank accounts outside the Russian Federation. The investigation revealed that the participants in the said scheme might have centralised decision-making. The actions of these entities caused a significant deviation in the volume of Unit trades.
The Unit market was also manipulated by GM Realt LLC and the affiliated management company Interfinance MC LLC which used funds of the Mixed CUIF Clean Energy and Real Estate CUIF Optimal (hereinafter, the Management Company).
The Bank of Russia has established that GM Realt LLC in collusion with the Management Company carried out Unit transactions from 13 August 2015 through 7 September 2015, which had a considerable effect on Unit prices. As a result of these transactions, GM Realt LLC purchased from the Management Company a significant block of Units at an artificially reduced price to the detriment of unit holders of unit investment funds managed by the Management Company.
The actions of VIP Universal Ltd and its counterparties, as well as of GM Realt LLC and Interfinance MC LLC are qualified as Unit market manipulation under Clause 2, Part 1, Article 5 of Federal Law No.
The Bank of Russia took administrative measures with respect to the persons engaged in market manipulation, aimed at preventing such violations in the future.
24th of October
The Bank of Russia has established facts of manipulation in the markets of ordinary and preferred shares of PJSC Mechel and the market of ordinary shares of PJSC Irkutskenergo (hereinafter collectively, the Stock) at on-exchange trading in February — May 2017.
The investigation performed by the Bank of Russia has revealed that the clients of the same professional securities market participant (hereinafter, the Broker) Roman Sinitsin, Andrey Sinitsin and Anna Sinitsina carried out transactions in collusion in the main Stock trading mode. Moreover, in a number of cases, Roman Sinitsin conducted similar Stock transactions using a brokerage account opened with another professional securities market participant.
The analysis of the said persons’ trading behaviour has shown that the Stock transactions between Roman Sinitsin and Andrey Sinitsin, as well as between Roman Sinitsin and Anna Sinitsina were made based on orders submitted with a minimum time difference and having identical price and volume parameters. In addition, these Stock transactions were carried out solely to achieve the trading goals of the above persons and their actions were not related to the Stock issuers.
In the absolute majority of cases, the said transactions caused substantial deviations in the Stock trading volume.
Pursuant to Clause 2 of Part 1 of Article 5 of Federal Law No.
As of the moment of the above Stock transactions, Roman Sinitsin was controller of the market of the Broker’s securities, which enabled him to conceal these facts when preparing the reporting to be submitted to the Broker’s management bodies and the Bank of Russia.
The Bank of Russia has taken measures in relation to Roman Sinitsin, Andrey Sinitsin and Anna Sinitsina aimed at preventing similar actions in future.
The Bank of Russia has also made the decision to invalidate the qualification certificates of a financial market specialist issued to Roman Sinitsin.
27th June
The Bank of Russia has established that Tatiana Grigorievna Anodina and Aleksandr Petrovich Pleshakov conducted transactions with ordinary shares of OJSC TRANSAERO AIirlines (hereinafter, the ‘Issuer’ and the ‘Shares’) illegally using insider information.
From September to December 2016, A.P. Pleshakov, being one the founders, a shareholder, a member of the board of directors, an insider of and a controlling person with respect to the Issuer, transferred 63,733,508 Shares (41.4% of total voting Shares) from his account to the account of T.G. Anodina based on several share donation agreements.
The information about the termination of grounds for control by A.P. Pleshakov with respect to the Issuer, about the decrease in his share in the total number of voting shares of the Issuer and the increase and subsequent decrease in the share of T.G. Anodina in the total number of voting Shares is insider information of the Issuer and was subject to disclosure.
It is highly likely that disclosure of information about the exit decision from the Issuer’s capital taken by A.P. Pleshakov would have caused sharp changes in the price of Shares.
This insider information was not disclosed, which allowed T.G. Anodina to sell Shares at anonymous exchange trading at current market prices from her own account to a wide range of investors as soon as Shares were credited to the account.
In view of the above, operations to sell the majority of the block of Shares from the account of T.G. Anodina were conducted illegally using insider information, which is a violation of the prohibition set out in Clause 1, Part 1, Article 6 of Federal Law No.
The Bank of Russia established that the total amount of losses that A.P. Pleshakov and T.G. Anodina had avoided using insider information to sell Shares exceeded 200 million rubles.
The sale of such a significant block of Shares amid a decrease in their trading volume and falling prices due to, among other things, the cancellation of the Issuer’s Air Operator’s Certificate, was also made possible thanks to statements made by the Issuer’s management in the media suggesting a possible resumption of the Issuer’s principal activity. These statements supported investors’ speculative sentiment, offset the price drop due to the sale of Shares from the account of T.G. Anodina, and supported the prices at the level that was comfortable for the misuse of insider information. The market responded to the above-mentioned publications with a surge in the price and trading volume of Shares resulting in substantial deviations of trading parameters.
After the disposal of the whole block of Shares from the account of T.G. Anodina, the Issuer no longer disseminated information about a programme for the Issuer to resume its principal activity. By the ruling of the Court of Arbitration of Saint Petersburg and the Leningrad Region, the Issuer was declared bankrupt in 2017.
Therefore, considering the activities of A.P. Pleshakov, being the major shareholder of the Issuer, it is highly likely that the information disseminated by the Issuer was misleading and the activities of the Issuer and its officials who disseminated the above-mentioned information qualify as manipulation in the market of Shares in accordance with Clause 1, Part 1, Article 5 of the Federal Law.
The materials have been submitted to law enforcement agencies.
27th June
The Bank of Russia has established facts of manipulation in the market for ordinary shares of OJSC TRANSAERO Airlines (hereinafter, the ‘Shares’) in
The Bank of Russia paid attention to the deals conducted between customers of two professional securities market participants.
In the period under review, Jeimbo Cyprus Limited (registered in Cyprus) and Otkritie Advisory Services Limited (registered in the Islands of Bermuda) regularly conducted transactions with the Shares, which resulted in substantial deviations in their trade parameters, almost single-handedly forming the market of the Shares. In addition to exchange transactions, Jeimbo Cyprus Limited and Otkritie Advisory Services Limited entered into reverse OTC transactions.
Instructions to perform transactions on the part of Jeimbo Cyprus Limited were submitted by employees of OJSC TRANSAERO Airlines who were also employed by Jeimbo Cyprus Limited.
Taking into account the financial situation of OJSC TRANSAERO Airlines in the period under review, it was necessary for OJSC TRANSAERO Airlines to create an illusion of trading activity and maintain prices of Shares further used as collateral to borrow funds, which was also conducted through its subsidiary, Jeimbo Cyprus Limited.
Therefore, in accordance with Clause 2 of Part 1 of Article 5 of Federal Law No.
The circumstances, in which the deals with Shares were made, were established thanks to the cooperation between the Bank of Russia and financial market regulators from the UK (Financial Conduct Authority), the Republic of Cyprus (Cyprus Securities and Exchange Commission), and the Islands of Bermuda (Bermuda Monetary Authority) in line with the Multilateral Memorandum of Understanding of the International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO MMoU).
The Bank of Russia has taken measures to prevent market manipulation in further activities of Jeimbo Cyprus Limited. Otkritie Advisory Services Limited is no longer operating.
13th June
The Bank of Russia has established facts of manipulation in the market for ordinary shares of PJSC Best Efforts Bank (hereinafter, ‘Shares’) in organised trading from December 2016 to May 2018.
The operations consisting in manipulation of the market of the Shares were conducted by two independent groups of individuals.
The first group (Group 1) comprised Gennady Sergeevich Stefanov, Boris Vladimirovich Kaminsky, Oksana Vladimirovna Tolda, Anton Yurievich Logachev, Irina Nikolaevna Vishnyakova, Egor Vladimirovich Kapitanov, and Elena Nikolaevna Surzhikova.
Transactions without a clear economic sense among Group 1 participants were conducted at PJSC Moscow Exchange (hereinafter, the ‘Exchange’) from 31 October 2017 to 21 May 2018 based on instructions with identical price and volume parameters, while counterparties’ orders were entered into the trading system at minimum intervals. The circumstances surrounding the transactions and the nature of trading behaviour are indicative of a collusion between the above-mentioned persons. The actions of Group 1 participants were meant to give the impression of trading activity and led to anomalous Share price growth. As a result, other Share market participants were misled as to the price of the Shares.
The above-mentioned trades over accounts of Group 1 participants were made by G.S. Stefanov, who had entered into an information service agreement (hereinafter, the ‘Agreement’) with a major securities market participant (hereinafter, the ‘Company’). As part of the Agreement, G.S. Stefanov, among other things, provided the Company with such services as finding clients who would be ready to enter into a service agreement with the Company and advising them on Company activities. In particular, within the framework of the Agreement, the Company entered into service agreements with individuals comprising Group 1. Moreover, the Company provided G.S. Stefanov with compensation in the form of a percentage of the commission paid to it by clients brought by G.S. Stefanov.
To conduct transactions over Group 1 participants’ accounts, G.S. Stefanov used the software provided to one of Group 1 participants. Trading accounts were connected to the software based on standard powers of attorney executed by Group 1 participants. At the same time, G.S. Stefanov conducted transactions over his own account opened with another professional securities market participant.
The investigation of trades in the Shares market on the Exchange also revealed Shares market manipulation transactions conducted in collusion between Igor Muratovich Takoev and Snezhana Aleksandrovna Zhdanova (Group 2). These persons’ trading accounts were opened with different professional securities market participants. Instructions to conduct mutual transactions from 22 December 2016 to 22 May 2017 were given by I.M. Takoev who obtained a positive financial result from trades with S.A. Zhdanova. These transactions resulted in a significant deviation of the price of Shares.
Operations conducted by Group 1 in the Shares market are classified as market manipulation under Clause 2 of Part 1 of Article 5 of Federal Law No.
The Bank of Russia has taken a set of measures to put an end to the violations of the Federal Law by persons involved in the Shares market manipulation, including in line with the provisions of the Russian Federation Code of Administrative Offences.
30th May
The Bank of Russia has established facts of market manipulation in 17 low-liquid securities (including shares and bonds) in the period from 2011 through 2017 committed by Vladislav V. Fedorin via the unscrupulous use of assets in other persons’ broker accounts.
Being a staff member and a representative of large broker organisations in Chelyabinsk, and possessing experience in transactions with financial instruments, V.V. Fedorin obtained passwords to broker accounts from two individuals (hereinafter, the Principals) having trust-based relations with them. V.V. Fedorin used the Principals’ assets to conduct transactions in organised trading in the markets of 27 low-liquid securities.
As a result of deliberate transactions concluded in organised trading between the Principals’ broker accounts, on the one hand, and his own broker account, as well as the broker account of his spouse, Olga A. Averyanova, on the other hand, V.V. Fedorin bought the securities of his Principals at underestimated prices on several occasions. Further on, he derived income from the sale of these securities at overestimated prices; and he also sold securities to the Principals at higher prices compared to the market ones.
According to the Bank of Russia’s calculations, the above-mentioned securities transactions led to losses totalling over 5.5 million rubles for the Principals. This being the case, it was impossible for the damaged persons to independently find out that the transactions with their assets had been beneficial for V.V. Fedorin and his spouse because of the anonymous nature of trading.
Transactions between the said persons in the markets for 17 out of 27 securities, which have caused significant deviations in trading parameters, are categorised as market manipulation under Clause 2 of Part 1 of Article 5 of Federal Law No.
The Bank of Russia has submitted the investigation materials to law enforcement authorities. It has also taken measures against the persons involved in bond market manipulation to prevent similar violations in future. The Bank of Russia decided to cancel the qualification certificates of a financial market specialist issued to V.V. Fedorin.
22th May
The Bank of Russia has established facts of manipulation in/during organised trading (hereinafter, the Exchange) in the market for ordinary shares of PJSC ASKO-STRAKHOVANIE in
Transactions with the Shares were conducted on the Exchange across the broker accounts of OK—Finance LLC (TIN 7453268383), Gleb A. Ivanov, Artem A. Kryukov, Arseniy V. Bakaev, Mikhail A. Del, Mikhail A. Dobrovolskiy, Sergei Ye. Grigoriev, Elena A. Zhuravleva, Ivan I. Fait, Igor O. Zvonarev, Svetlana V. Ivanova, and Alexander N. Chernyshov (hereinafter, the Group).
The operations were coordinated by A.A. Kryukov, employee of OK—Finance LLC, a company affiliated with Aleksey D. Ovakimyan, a member of the Supervisory Board and an insider of PJSC ASKO-STRAKHOVANIE, who, among other things, used special software allowing similar trade operations to be conducted across several accounts. Individuals’ trading accounts were connected to the software provided by A.A. Kryukov on the basis of powers of attorney issued by a professional securities market participant.
Over the period from 11 July 2017 through 27April 2018, transactions involving this Group represented over 50% of the total Shares trading volume. Shares transactions conducted inside the Group repeatedly led to considerable deviations in the trading volume and Shares price on the Exchange. Besides, the transactions conducted by A.A. Kryukov, G.A. Ivanov and OK—Finance LLC maintained the Share price at a level that differed considerably from the level that would have been otherwise achieved in the absence of such transactions. As a result, other Shares market participants were misled as to the Share price, and the mechanism of fair pricing on the Exchange was distorted.
The established relations between these persons, including those with the Share issuer, as well as the mechanism of executing trades on the Exchange in the period following the Shares’ placement, shows that the Group’s operations were aimed at the artificial creation and maintenance of trading activity in the Shares market.
These operations, conducted by the Group in the Shares market, are qualified as market manipulation under Clause 2 of Part 1 of Article 5 of Federal Law No.
The Bank of Russia has taken a set of measures to put an end to the violations of the Federal Law by persons involved in the Shares market manipulation, inter alia in line with the provisions of the Russian Federation Code of Administrative Offences.
The Bank of Russia calls for close control of clients’ operations by professional securities market participants in order to eliminate all and any chance of quasi-trust management on the basis of powers of attorney and the associated risks of violating the Federal Law.
22th May
The Bank of Russia has established facts of manipulation in organised trading (hereinafter, on the Exchange) in the market for ordinary shares of PJSC ChZPSN-Profnasteel, PJSC OGK-2, PJSC RAZGULAY Group, PJSC Ashinskiy Metzavod and PJSC Tuchkovskiy KSM (hereinafter, jointly the Securities) in
Securities transactions were conducted on the Exchange across the broker accounts of the clients of a professional securities market participant: by Nadezhda A. Karabintseva, Konstantin V. Izvekov, Yapi Trade LLC (TIN 7453268320), Dmitry A. Karabintsev and several individuals related to them (hereinafter, the Individuals).
The Bank of Russia revealed similar-in-type colluded operations with the Securities, whereby the Individuals’ transactions affected the Securities’ prices in trading on the Exchange and created favourable conditions for buying/selling considerable blocks of the Securities by N.A. Karabintseva and K.V. Izvekov with profit.
As a result of 27 series of such operations, N.A. Karabintseva and K.V. Izvekov managed to derive a total income exceeding 120 million rubles. Eventually, the Individuals may highly likely have incurred comparable losses due to the fact that their assets had been involved in the said operations.
As part of the mentioned series of operations, over 400 Securities transactions conducted between N.A. Karabintseva and K.V. Izvekov, on the one side, and the Individuals, on the other side, caused considerable deviations in the trading volume of Securities .
In the course of its investigation, the Bank of Russia found out that, in all probability, it was D.A. Karabintsev who was behind the coordinated submission of instructions by the mentioned persons to make transactions, because the Individuals entrusted him with passwords to their own online broker accounts.
The investigation also revealed that D.A. Karabintsev made transactions with the ordinary shares of PJSC ChZPSN-Profnasteel and PJSC OGK-2 between his own broker account and the account of Yapi Trade LLC he controlled. These transactions led to considerable deviations in trading parameters of the Securities.
The mentioned Securities transactions conducted across the accounts of Yapi Trade LLC, D.A. Karabintsev, N.A. Karabintseva, K.V. Izvekov and the Individuals are categorised as Securities market manipulation under Clause 2, Part 1, Article 5 of Federal Law No.
The Bank of Russia has forwarded the findings of the investigation to law enforcement agencies.
The regulator calls attention to serious risks of violating the Federal Law, associated with third parties gaining access to broker accounts thanks to the key information they receive.
30th April 2019
The Bank of Russia has established facts of repeated and continuous market manipulation on an organised trading venue(hereinafter, the Exchange) for ordinary shares of PJSC RPC UWC (hereinafter, the Shares) conducted by non-resident companies GorTec Management Ltd (incorporated in Belize) and GTCP TRADING LTD (incorporated in the Republic of Cyprus) from 3 October 2016 to 2 May 2017.
The mutual purchase and sale transactions with the Shares, concluded between GorTec Management Ltd and GTCP TRADING LTD (hereinafter, the Companies), were devoid of clear economic sense and aimed at maintaining certain level of price and trading volume of the Shares. On the days of absence at trading sessions of major Shares market participants, including the ones interconnected with the Shares’ issuer, the proportion of the Companies in total trading volume averaged 30% to 50%. According to the Exchange, during the Period, the Companies conducted 275 transactions with the Shares with a significant deviation in trading volume.
In the course of its investigation, the Bank of Russia obtained technical and other data pointing to the fact that trading accounts of both Companies were managed by Aleksei S. Dokuchaev who offered market-making services via controlled Gorod Tekhologiy LLC and the website.
These transactions of the Companies in the Shares market are classified as the market manipulation and the violation of the ban under Clause 2 of Part 1 of Article 5 of Federal Law No.
However, the existence of a bilateral agreement between GTCP TRADING LTD and Otkrytie Broker JSC, a professional securities market participant, on the role of GTCP TRADING LTD in maintaining the Shares prices/quotes in both directions (buy/sell) does not create any legally important grounds allowing this company to act as a market-maker, and, therefore, prevents it from using the exemption set forth by Clause 3 of Part 3 of Article 5 of the Federal Law.
Over the Period, the Shares were actively purchased by several management companies operating for the account of non-governmental pension funds at the price formed at organised trading. The Bank of Russia has every reason to expect that the Share prices during the Period were maintained via manipulations in part for the purpose of improving the Shares’ investment appeal and supporting the long-term holding of the blocks of Shares by management companies within the assets of non-governmental pension funds.
The Bank of Russia also established the case when the additional issue of Shares was bought by a management company using the pension savings of a non-governmental pension fund for over 5 billion rubles via the intermediation of several non-resident companies, including UNITED WAGON PLC (Jersey) affiliated with PJSC RPC UWC. The difference between the prices for Shares purchased by non-resident companies to place them further and the prices for Shares sold to the management companies of a non-governmental pension fund made it possible for these intermediaries to derive 328 million rubles in income.
The well-coordinated activities of participants in these transactions, as well as the return thereon of non-resident companies ranging from 444% to 499% p.a., suggest a possible scheme aimed at diverting a part of non-governmental pension funds’ assets to the accounts of non-resident companies. Upon placing the Shares of the additional issue at a considerable discount, PJSC RPC UWC in turn did not receive a part of its funds invested in the Shares.
The Bank of Russia has submitted the investigation materials to law enforcement authorities.
25th April 2019
The Bank of Russia has established manipulation of bond markets during organised trading under the scheme aiming to illegally withdraw pension savings from INPF AKVILON OJSC managed by TRINFICO Asset Management JSC.
The Bank of Russia’s investigation has established operations in the bond markets of 68 issuers allegedly conducted in collusion during the period from 10 March 2015 through 22 December 2015 (hereinafter, the Period) by KIT Finance Trade (LLC) and TRINFICO Asset Management JSC, acting as the trust manager of pension savings of INPF AKVILON OJSC (hereinafter, the Fund).
The bond transactions were conducted between the said persons in the main trading mode on the Moscow Exchange brokered by professional securities market participants KIT Finance (JSC) and CJSC TRINFICO on the basis of anonymous buy orders. It was established that during the Period the counterparties recurrently employed a well-coordinated scheme aimed at illegal funds withdrawal from the Fund.
Under this scheme, operations to buy/sell bonds were conducted, as a result of which KIT Finance Trade (LLC) systemically derived income from price differences as the management company concluded transactions unprofitable for the Fund.
Transactions with the bonds of 13 issuers, which have caused significant deviations in the price and trading volume, are qualified as market manipulation under Clause 2, Part 1, Article 5 of Federal Law No.
The Bank of Russia estimates that the total income of KIT Finance Trade (LLC) derived from the said operations with TRINFICO Asset Management JSC during the Period reached at least 57 million rubles, including 6 million rubles from the operations qualified as market manipulation. Due to the systemic sale of bonds at prices below the purchase price, the Fund may in turn sustain comparable losses.
The trade behaviour patterns of TRINFICO Asset Management JSC in the course of the management of the Fund’s assets when conducting operations with other counterparties differed from the said operations with KIT Finance Trade (LLC) (there were no scheme actions). As a result, during the same Period of the management of the Fund, the total financial result of operations with other counterparties, excluding KIT Finance Trade (LLC), was positive.
The Bank of Russia established that operations with the bonds under investigation had been conducted by Vadim G. Dorofeev, the head of the Division of Broker Operations at KIT Finance (JSC) and another employee of the said Division, who acted on the instruction of V.G. Dorofeev. The said employees of the broker acted on the basis of the power of attorney when conducting operations on behalf of KIT Finance Trade (LLC).
On the part of TRINFICO Asset Management JSC, instructions to conduct operations with bonds for the account of the Fund’s pension savings were submitted by Farit Kh. Zakirov, who headed the pension savings management division, UIF and NPF asset management at TRINFICO Asset Management JSC and the sales unit (broker services) at CJSC TRINFICO.
During the Period, F.Kh. Zakirov was also Chairman of the Investment Committee of TRINFICO Asset Management JSC. As proposed by F.Kh. Zakirov, this body made decisions to reduce the share of bonds in the Fund’s portfolio and to establish stop-loss limits on the Fund’s bonds. Being in charge of controlling limits and closing positions, F.Kh. Zakirov performed bond operations which were loss-making for the Fund.
The Bank of Russia decided to cancel the qualification certificates of financial market specialists issued to F.Kh. Zakirov and V.G. Dorofeev. Additionally, the Bank of Russia is conducting the assessment of activity of TRINFICO Asset Management JSC.
The materials of the investigation have been submitted to law enforcement authorities.
25th December 2018
The Bank of Russia has established multiple cases of manipulation in the market for ordinary shares of PJSC GC TNS energo (hereinafter, the Shares) conducted by the clients of OJSC Brokerage House UNITY TRUST from 23 April 2017 to 15 November 2017.
It was established that OJSC Brokerage House UNITY TRUST, being the market maker in the Shares market, engaged its clients, Glestimon Management Limited (incorporated under the Cyprus law) and CJSC Management Company UNITY TRUST, to perform market maker functions. Mutual transactions conducted between the two companies, interconnected with OJSC Brokerage House UNITY TRUST, caused substantial deviations in the Shares trading parameters and allowed them to maintain price and trading volume of the Shares at the artificially created level.
It should be noted that the provisions of Clause 3, Part 3, Article 5 of Federal Law No.
Thus, transactions by Glestimon Management Limited and CJSC Management Company UNITY TRUST, coordinated by their interconnected company, OJSC Brokerage House UNITY TRUST, which did not exercise due internal controls over its clients’ operations, are qualified as manipulation in the Shares market, breaching Part 2 of Article 6 of the Federal Law.
The Bank of Russia reminds that it is prohibited to engage in such practices when executing market maker agreements.
The Bank of Russia took administrative measures with respect to the persons engaged in market manipulation, aimed at preventing such violations in the future.
6th December
The Bank of Russia has established multiple and lasting cases of manipulation of markets for 50 securities during the period from 3 February 2014 to 26 January 2017 conducted by Dmitry Eduardovich Berger, an employee of management company JSC Sberbank Asset Management.
D.E. Berger, who was authorised to perform securities transactions on behalf of JSC Sberbank Asset Management, systematically conducted collusive trades with a narrow range of corporate counterparties (hereinafter referred to as Counterparties) for the account of JSC Sberbank Asset Management as well as unit investment funds, the Pension Fund of the Russian Federation and FGKU ROSVOENIPOTEKA.
D.E. Berger also conducted similar transactions on behalf of the management company LLC UK Pensionnye Nakopleniya within the context of managing pension savings and pension reserves of JSC NPF of Sberbank.
These transactions were conducted during the period in question in accordance with the following scheme. A Counterparty made a purchase or a short sale transaction with a certain amount of securities at market prices and afterwards placed a limit order to close this new position with a profit. Usually, an Iceberg order was placed (an order with a hidden amount). After a short period of time (usually, less than a minute), D.E. Berger, acting on behalf of JSC Sberbank Asset Management or LLC UK Pensionnye Nakopleniya, placed one or several orders at prices that would ensure closing the Counterparty’s position with a profit.
This trading practice resulted in short-term substantial fluctuations in the prices of financial instruments as well as significant deviations in their trade parameters, and allowed Counterparties to receive a positive financial result.
According to Clause 2, Part 1, Article 5 of Federal Law No.
As a result of conducting over 1,000 of series of such transactions, Counterparties received an income of more than 150 million rubles, which, in accordance with the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation, is qualified as excessively large. At the same time, both JSC Sberbank Asset Management and entities managed by JSC Sberbank Asset Management and LLC UK Pensionnye Nakopleniya suffered losses of at least comparable size.
The Bank of Russia has sent the investigation materials confirming direct involvement of D.E. Berger in market manipulation to law enforcement authorities.
27th August
The Bank of Russia established the fact of manipulation in the market for investment units of Closed-end Equity Unit Investment Fund Finam — Information Technologies managed by LLC Management Company Finam Management (hereinafter, the Units) during trading at PJSC Moscow Exchange (further referred to as the Exchange) in
The operations, qualified as manipulation of the Unit market, were conducted in collusion by BROFAM ASSETS LIMITED (currently VERFARM HOLDING LTD), GOSTEMISO TRADING LTD (both foreign companies incorporated under the law of the Republic of Cyprus), Vionmane Ltd (incorporated under the law of the Seychelles), Alexander Aleksandrovich Lebedev, Tatiana Leonidovna Zemlyanskaya, Alexander Nikolaevich Zemlyansky, Nadezhda Mikhaylovna Arshinova, Alexey Ivanovich Belevtsev, Svetlana Alekseevna Dyatlova, Alexey Sergeyevich Mineev, Evgeny Viktorovich Filippov, Georgy Aleksandrovich Obukhov, Vyacheslav Viktorovich Sitkov, Valery Gennadievich Sukhanov, Alexander Aleksandrovich Semenyak, Alexander Vladimirovich Shandula, Dmitry Valeryevich Mamonov.
Registered were repeated mutual purchase and sale transactions with the Units which made no economic sense and which as a rule occurred on the basis of orders with identical price and volume parameters, with the purpose of creating misleading appearance with respect to the price of the Units. The actions taken by the above persons brought about artificially maintained Unit market, with the purpose of creating a desired quote the Exchange subsequently recorded at the time the market price was being calculated.
Meanwhile, acting as a market maker with regard to the Units based on agreements with the management company was JSC FINAM, which assigned these functions to some of its customers including those of the second level. The market price of the Units, resulting from the above group of persons’ actions, was used by JSC FINAM and JSC Bank FINAM to record the cost of the Units in the balance sheet as their equity.
Some of the above individuals authorised JSC FINAM employees to make transactions with the Units. Transactions with the Units (purchase and sale with a minimum income) for some JSC FINAM customers were funded by transfers from a bank account held in LLC Investment Company FINAM (the name of the latter was then changed to LLC Investment Company PRIME CAPITAL) to JSC FINAM Bank.
Pursuant to Clause 2, Part 1, Article 5 of Federal Law No.
The above-mentioned persons violated the breach of the prohibition set out in Part 2, Article 6 of the Federal Law.
The Bank of Russia took relevant measures with respect to the persons engaged in manipulation of the Unit market, aimed at preventing such violations in the future.
27th August
The Bank of Russia established the fact of manipulation in the market for investment units of Closed-end Rental Unit Investment Fund Finam — Capital Investment managed by B&N FINAM Group Asset Management LLC (hereinafter, the Units) during trading at PJSC Moscow Exchange (further referred to as the Exchange) in
The operations, qualified as manipulation of the Unit market, were conducted in collusion by Evgeny Vladimirovich Agapov, Viktor Anatolievich Stavitskiy, Aleksey Aleksandrovich Pechenikin, Yulia Aleksandrovna Zubtsova, Vladimir Vladimirovich Bondarenko, Emil Aslanovich Babaev, Vladimir Olegovich Tishin, Vladimir Viktorovich Fomichev, BROFAM ASSETS LIMITED (incorporated under the law of Cyprus, currently VERFARM HOLDING LTD), Vionmane Ltd (incorporated under the law of the Seychelles), KIT Finance Invest (LLC), KIT Finance Trade (LLC) and EFNS-GROUP LLC.
The Bank of Russia registered multiple mutual purchase and sale transactions with the Units which lacked clear economic sense and were closed on the basis of orders with similar price and volume parameters. The above persons’ actions were meant to give the impression of running trading activity and liquidity in the market of the Units, with the purpose of, inter alia, attracting third-party investors, artificially shaping and maintaining the price of the Units.
Meanwhile, acting as a market maker with regard to the Units based on agreements with the management company was JSC FINAM, which assigned these functions to some of its customers including those of the second level. The Bank of Russia’s investigation established that trading in the market of the Units by the above persons was coordinated by JSC FINAM employees Aleksey Anatolievich Lysogor and Igor Sergeevich Belyasov.
Pursuant to Clause 2, Part 1, Article 5 of Federal Law No.
The above-mentioned persons violated the breach of the prohibition set out in Part 2, Article 6 of the Federal Law.
The Bank of Russia took relevant measures with respect to the persons engaged in manipulation of the Unit market, aimed at preventing such violations in the future.
27th August
The Bank of Russia established the fact of manipulation in the market for shares of the foreign issuer United Company RUSAL Plc (hereinafter, the Shares) during trading on PJSC Moscow Exchange (hereinafter, the Exchange) in 2015.
The operations, qualified as manipulation of the Share market, were conducted in collusion by BROFAM ASSETS LIMITED (currently VERFARM HOLDING LTD) and EVELSIA TRADING LTD (both foreign companies incorporated under the law of the Republic of Cyprus) in 2015. Meanwhile, acting as a market maker with regard to the Shares based on agreement with the Share issuer was JSC FINAM, which actually assigned these functions to some of its customers, including those of the second level.
The mutual purchase and sale transactions with the Shares, which had no economic sense, were executed by the above persons on the basis of orders with identical price and volume parameters, and a small time lag between the said orders. The actions taken by these entities gave the impression of running trading activity and liquidity in the Share market, inter alia, in order to attract investors and shape and maintain the prices of the Shares.
Pursuant to Clauses 2 and 6, Part 1, Article 5 of Federal Law No.
The above-mentioned entities violated the breach of the prohibition set out in Part 2, Article 6 of the Federal Law.
The Bank of Russia took relevant measures with respect to the entities engaged in manipulation of the Share and Securities market, aimed at preventing such violations in the future.
27th August
The Bank of Russia established the facts of manipulation in the market for shares of foreign issuer Polyus Gold International Limited, and the markets for ordinary shares of PJSC Platform UTINET.Ru and PJSC TPG AESSEL (hereinafter jointly referred to as the Shares) during trading at PJSC Moscow Exchange (hereinafter, the Exchange) in
The operations, qualified as manipulation of the Share market, were conducted in collusion by BROFAM ASSETS LIMITED (currently VERFARM HOLDING LTD), EVELSIA TRADING LTD (both foreign companies incorporated under the law of the Republic of Cyprus) and Vionmane Ltd (incorporated under the law of the Seychelles). Meanwhile, acting as a market maker with regard to the Shares based on agreements with the Share issuers was JSC FINAM, which actually assigned these functions to some of its customers including those of the second level.
The mutual purchase and sale transactions with the Shares, which had no economic sense, were executed by the above persons on the basis of orders with identical price and volume parameters and a small time lag between the orders. The actions taken by these persons gave the impression of running trading activity and liquidity in the Share market, inter alia, in order to attract third-party investors and shape and maintain the prices of the Shares.
The Bank of Russia’s investigation also revealed that in
Pursuant to Clause 2, Part 1, Article 5 of Federal Law No.
According to Clause 2, Part 1, Article 5 of the Federal Law, the actions taken by I.A. Ivanov and V.A. Ivanov qualify as market manipulation of ordinary shares of PJSC TPG AESSEL.
The above-mentioned persons violated the breach of the prohibition set out in Part 2, Article 6 of the Federal Law.
The Bank of Russia took relevant measures with respect to the persons engaged in manipulation of the Share market, aimed at preventing such violations in the future.
27th August
The Bank of Russia established the fact of manipulation in the market for ordinary shares of Public Joint-stock Company Mediaholding (hereinafter, the Shares) during trading at PJSC Moscow Exchange (hereinafter, the Exchange) in
The operations, qualified as manipulation of the Share market, were conducted in collusion by Artur Yuryevich Arutyunov, Dmitry Viktorovich Annenkov, Sergey Aleksandrovich Odintsov, Nikolay Konstantinovich Solovyov, Vladimir Vyacheslavovich Pantserny and STREAMBALL TRADING LTD (incorporated under the law of the Republic of Cyprus). All the above individuals were connected with the Share issuer; some of them authorised employees of JSC FINAM (which was acting as the market maker with regard to the Shares) to make transactions with the Shares.
The mutual purchase and sale transactions with the Shares, which had no economic sense, were executed by trading couples on the basis of orders with identical price and volume parameters, and a small time lag between the said orders. The actions taken by the members of the group were meant to give the impression of running trading activity and liquidity in the market of the Shares, with the purpose of, inter alia, attracting third-party investors, artificially shaping and maintaining the price of the Shares.
Pursuant to Clause 2, Part 1, Article 5 of Federal Law No.
The above-mentioned persons violated the breach of the prohibition set out in Part 2, Article 6 of the Federal Law.
The Bank of Russia took relevant measures with respect to the persons engaged in manipulation of the Share market, aimed at preventing such violations in the future.
27th August
The Bank of Russia established the fact of manipulation in the market for ordinary shares of OJSC Levenhuk (hereinafter, the Shares) during trading at PJSC Moscow Exchange (hereinafter, the Exchange) in
The operations, qualified as manipulation of the Share market, were conducted in collusion by Maksim Eduardovich Kleshchunov, Maria Anatolievna Kaminskaya, Andrey Aleksandrovich Gusev, Irina Ivanovna Guseva, Denis Ivanovich Maryechkin, LLC Levenhuk, OJSC Smart Broker, LLC EXPERT RELATION and Triolima Corporation (incorporated under the law of the Seychelles). The above group of persons was formed out of the issuer’s and its controlled companies’ staff, its listing agent and related parties. Some members of the group issued powers of attorney with respect to transactions with the Shares for employees of JSC FINAM, which was acting as the market maker with regard to the Shares.
Registered were repeated mutual purchase and sale transactions with the Shares which had no economic sense and which as a rule occurred on the basis of orders with identical price and volume parameters, with the purpose of creating misleading appearance with respect to the price of the Securities. The operations of the above-mentioned group of persons accounted for over 75% of trading in the Shares at the Exchange in the above period. This gave the impression of running trading activity and liquidity in the market of the Shares aimed at, among other things, attracting investors. Meanwhile, the price of the Shares was maintained at the level sufficiently different from the level which could have been formed without these transactions.
Pursuant to Clause 2, Part 1, Article 5 of Federal Law No.
The above-mentioned persons violated the breach of the prohibition set out in Part 2, Article 6 of the Federal Law.
The Bank of Russia took relevant measures with respect to the persons engaged in manipulation of the Share market, aimed at preventing such violations in the future.
27th August
The Bank of Russia established the fact of manipulation in the market for ordinary shares of OJSC GlavTorgProduct (hereinafter, the Shares) during trading on PJSC Moscow Exchange (hereinafter, the Exchange) in
The operations, qualified as manipulation of the Share market, were conducted in collusion by Vionmane Ltd (incorporated under the law of the Seychelles), Omega Trade LLC, Premium Media Group LLC, Igor Zotovich Losik, Tatiana Viktorovna Solgalova, Alexey Sergeyevich Lashkov, Tatiana Yakovlevna Sergienko and Maxim Anatolyevich Morozov. The above mentioned individuals were connected with the Share issuer; some of them authorised the employees of JSC FINAM (that was acting as the market maker with regard to the Shares) to make transactions in the Shares.
The Bank of Russia registered multiple mutual purchase and sale transactions with the Shares which lacked clear economic sense and were closed on the basis of orders with similar price and volume parameters. Transactions conducted by the above persons brought about artificially maintained Share market with the purpose of creating a desired quote the Exchange recorded at a time the market price of the Shares was being calculated.
Pursuant to Clause 2, Part 1, Article 5 of Federal Law No.
The above mentioned persons violated the breach of the prohibition set out in Part 2, Article 6 of the Federal law.
The Bank of Russia took relevant measures with respect to the persons engaged in manipulation of the Share market aimed at preventing such violations in the future.
27th August
The Bank of Russia established the fact of manipulation in the market for ordinary shares of Public Joint-stock Company VTORRESURSY (hereinafter, the Shares) during trading at PJSC Moscow Exchange (hereinafter, the Exchange) in
The operations, qualified as manipulation of the Share market, were conducted in collusion by LLC SKYINVEST Securities, LLC Investment, LLC Sfera, LLC Demish, LLC San Production, LLC StalProm, LLC SMART Company, by Andrey Aleksandrovich Gusev, Denis Ivanovich Maryechkin, Alexey Borisovich Yashin, Tatyana Evgenyevna Chertkoyeva, Tatyana Vladimirovna Stolyarova, Andrey Aleksandrovich Shumilov, Stanislav Dmitriyevich Kurnayev, Stanislav Evgenyevich Tereshchenko and Sergey Sergeyevich Lebedev. The above group of persons was formed out of the issuer’s and its controlled companies’ staff, its listing agent and related parties. Some members of the group issued powers of attorney with respect to transactions with the Shares for employees of JSC FINAM, which was acting as the market maker with regard to the Shares.
Registered were repeated mutual purchase and sale transactions with the Shares which had no economic sense and which as a rule occurred on the basis of orders with identical price and volume parameters, with the purpose of creating misleading appearance with respect to the price of the Securities. In
Transactions conducted by the group of persons brought about artificial volatility in the Share market with the purpose of attracting market participants that followed a speculative strategy. Meanwhile, the price of the Shares was maintained at the level sufficiently different from the level which could have been formed without these transactions. The resulting quotation of the Shares was subsequently used by one of the participants involved in market manipulation in order to attract loans from third persons as collateral to the Shares.
Pursuant to Clause 2, Part 1, Article 5 of Federal Law No.
The above mentioned persons violated the breach of the prohibition set out in Part 2, Article 6 of the Federal Law.
The Bank of Russia took relevant measures with respect to the persons engaged in manipulation of the Share market, aimed at preventing such violations in the future.
29th June
The Bank of Russia established the fact of manipulation of Public Joint-stock Company Uniform Techno Systems ordinary shares (hereinafter, the Shares) during trading on PJSC Moscow Exchange (hereinafter, the Exchange) in
The Bank of Russia’s investigation established that several persons related with each other and with PJSC ETS, i.e. Denis A. Litvinov, Aleksey S. Lashkov, Denis S. Zelenya, Andrey Yu. Yakovlev, LLC Omega-Trade, during trading on the Exchange, acting on the basis of a preliminary agreement, conducted trades in the Shares which did not have clear economic sense.
In course of simulation of trades the Bank of Russia established that the mentioned persons made a significant influence on the Shares price on the Exchange. This influence aimed at misleading other participants as to the market situation and the Shares price, and at creating misliding trading activity and increasing the demand among a wide range of investors.
According to the data provided by the Exchange, the trades conducted by D.A. Litvinov, A.S. Lashkov, D.S. Zelenya, A.Yu. Yakovlev and LLC Omega-Trade in the main trading mode on the Exchange resulted in a substantial deviation in the Shares trading parameters.
The actions taken by D.A. Litvinov, A.S. Lashkov, D.S. Zelenya, A.Yu. Yakovlev and LLC Omega-Trade are qualified as manipulation for the Share market according to Section 2 and 6 of Part 1 of Article 5 of Federal Law No.
Besides, in the course of a comprehensive examination of the activities of PJSC ETS, it was established that the Shares of the main issue were mainly paid by a 100% stake of LLC Amkodor-Optim Saint Petersburg (hereinafter, the Company). Upon considering the market value assessment report of the stake totalling 100% of the authorised capital of LLC Amkodor-Optim Saint Petersburg, the Bank of Russia identified signs of misuse committed during the reporting, which mislead as to the financial standing of the Company and the reliability of calculations. Therefore, the true financial standing of PJSC ETS and the actual value of the Shares were misrepresented.
Another objective of PJSC ETS was to place an additional issue of Shares, which were to be paid by the stakes of LLC Group of Companies Mir Privoda, LLC Sila Tekhniki and LLC Korporatsiya Aktiv (hereinafter, the Companies), which had not been properly evaluated.
The Bank of Russia requested the self-regulatory organisation of appraisers (hereinafter, the SROA) to examine the evaluation activities of the appraiser which had prepared reports on the evaluation of the market value of stakes in the share capitals of the Companies. Besides, the SROA was to provide its professional judgement about the quality of reports, their compliance with the requirements of Federal Law No.
As a result of measures taken, the shares of the additional issue of PJSC ETS were not placed and the securities issue was recognised void.
The Bank of Russia took appropriate measures regarding the persons engaged in market manipulation aimed at preventing similar violations in future, including the blocking of their trading accounts.
The SROA applied disciplinary sanctions against the appraiser which had committed material misstatement in the appraisal reports on assets value.
1th October
In the follow up of the investigation of insider trading in the FX market the Bank of Russia received additional information from Ronin Europe Ltd, a non-resident investment company. According to this information, the transactions mentioned in the press release of 29 May 2018 were conducted by Ronin Europe Ltd solely on behalf and at the expense of its client Takra Management Limited, the company registered in the British Virgin Islands, to which Kirill Semeshkin was an authorized representative.
The Bank of Russia draws the attention of persons conducting transactions at organised trading in the Russian Federation, including non-residents, that they should ensure maximum transparency of their trading activity to the Bank of Russia and any financial market regulator providing assistance in the Bank of Russia investigation.
The Bank of Russia thanks and acknowledges the kindest assistance of the Cyprus Securities and Exchange Commission (CySEC) in the investigation.
29th May
The Bank of Russia revealed the unlawful use of insider information in transactions with FX instruments USDRUB_TOD and USDRUB_TOM (further referred to as the FX instruments) during trading at PJSC Moscow Exchange (further referred to as the Exchange) in December 2015.
The investigation revealed that during the said period Kirill Semeshkin acting on behalf of Ronin Europe Ltd, a non-resident investment company, repeatedly made transactions with FX instruments using insider information.
This was the information on the orders to sell FX revenue of PJSC Lukoil, including the sale price, amount of foreign currency and the time of order placed in the trading system of the Exchange. The insider information was available to Aleksey Bessonov, head of trade and financial treasury operations at PJSC Lukoil. He placed orders for foreign exchange sales to the bank and was able to determine the price and amount of the order and its execution.
The insider information received by Kirill Semeshkin allowed Ronin Europe Ltd to buy foreign currency at a lower price to close transactions with PJSC Lukoil. As a result of the unlawful use of insider information, Ronin Europe Ltd gained excessive income of no less than 146 million rubles. At the same time, the activity of Aleksey Bessonov inflicted similar damage to PJSC Lukoil. The Bank of Russia is not aware of whether Ronin Europe Ltd closed these transactions in its own or its customer’s interests.
The unlawful enrichment scheme forced PJSC Lukoil to sell more foreign currency at dumping prices. Given the short-term but considerable impact on the market price of FX instruments, other trading participants and their customers could also suffer losses.
The Bank of Russia submitted the respective investigation materials to law enforcement agencies and has taken measures aimed at preventing similar situations in the activity of organisations mediating transactions with FX instruments at the Exchange.
18th April
The Bank of Russia has established that a client of JSC FINAM (AO Finam), Elvis T. Marlamov, systematically used insider information of JSC FINAM to perform trades in the markets of 29 liquid securities at the Moscow Exchange within the period from 8 June 2016 to 22 February 2018.
During the investigation, the Bank of Russia established that E. Marlamov is the author of a number of trading strategies used by JSC FINAM’s clients as part of the ‘Autofollow’ service.
Using the information in his subscribers’ orders on price parameters and order direction (buy/sell) that would affect the market price of securities and analysing the market reaction to such orders, E. Marlamov repeatedly conducted trades across his own isolated accounts (the accounts without subscribers opened mostly with JSC FINAM) with the same securities. From 8 June 2016 to 22 February 2018, this activity allowed E. Marlamov to receive a substantial profit.
In accordance with the the legislation of the Russian Federation on countering the misuse of insider information and market manipulation, the information used by E.Marlamov to conduct such trades was qualified as insider information of the professional securities market participant JSC FINAM. E. Marlamov systematically violated the prohibition set forth in Article 6, Section 1.1 of Federal Law No.
In accordance with the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation, the profit gained by E. Marlamov from securities transactions conducted using insider information is qualified as excessively large profits, which creates prerequisites for a criminal qualification of E. Marlamov’s activities as provided by law.
The Bank of Russia also notices that E. Marlamov’a activities can be viewed as misconduct with respect to subscribers to his trading strategies who took a decision to join the service expecting it would comply with legal and ethical standards.
In line with the Bank of Russia order, to prevent illegal activity, E. Marlamov was suspended from conducting securities transactions at the Exchange.
The Bank of Russia will send relevant investigation materials to the law enforcement authorities and impose other enforcement measures with respect to E. Marlamov.
11th April
The Bank of Russia established the fact of market manipulation of PJSC IC Rosgosstrakh ordinary shares (further referred to as the Shares) during trading at PJSC Moscow Exchange (further referred to as the Exchange) in the period from 10 December 2013 through 28 April 2016 (further referred to as the Period).
The Bank of Russia’s investigation established that transactions in the Shares at the Exchange were conducted on the basis of a preliminary agreement, resulting in a substantial deviation in the trading parameters of the Shares. The following individuals were involved: Artyom I. Perkin, Kafiya A. Davlyatshina, Filipp A. Khomenok and Alexei S. Denisov.
The above-mentioned individuals’ actions facilitated continuous artificial maintaining of the price level of the Shares, in which considerable investments of non-governmental pension funds and individuals were made.
Importantly, within the Period, Artyom Perkin placed orders to trade the Shares based on an agreement concluded with a professional securities market participant officially acting as a market maker for the Shares.
However, the exemptions stipulated in Article 5, Section 3.3 of Federal Law No.
The actions taken by Artyom I. Perkin, Kafiya A. Davlyatshina, Filipp A. Khomenok and Alexei S. Denisov are qualified as manipulation for the Share market in accordance with Article 5, Sections 1.2 and 1.6 of Federal Law No.
Starting from April 2016, the professional securities market participant acting as a market maker was the most active Share market participant. Moreover, the above period saw a sharp increase in the number of transactions involving a wide range of individuals, a large part of whom was brought in by organisations related to the issuer. The market maker’s actions alongside the increased number of the Share market participants facilitated maintaining the Share prices at the stable level.
Market manipulation including actions aimed at substantial deviations in trading parameters, as well as those to maintain trading parameters at a level otherwise unattainable is a gross violation of the requirements set forth by the legislation of the Russian Federation. Furthermore, it does not comply with the standards of professional conduct of financial market participants. With regard to the persons involved in market manipulation of the Shares, measures have been taken to prevent such actions in the future.
26th March
The Bank of Russia established facts of market manipulation by Alexey P. Grishin and Denis P. Grishin in a number of bonds, during trading on PJSC Moscow Exchange in the period from 21 January 2016 through 12 February 2016.
The investigation established a series of transactions conducted between Alexey P. Grishin and Denis P. Grishin in the main trading mode on Moscow Exchange on the basis of matched orders with their price and volume being mainly identical, time lags between the orders being minor This trading behaviour is evident of collusion between Alexey P. Grishin and Denis P. Grishin.
Alexey P. Grishin and Denis P. Grishin concluded transactions with the bonds of the following entities: LLC DeloPorts Series 01, LLC Kuzbassenergo-Finans Series 02, JSC PKT Series 01; with exchange-traded bonds of the following entities: LLC RSG Finans Series БО-01, PJSC Irkut Corporation Series БО-04; government bonds of the Smolensk Region issued in 2013 (further jointly referred to as the Bonds). These transactions resulted in substantial deviations in dealing in the Bonds.
According to Federal Law No.
The Bank of Russia took a set of measures to put an end to the violations of the Federal Law by Alexey P. Grishin and Denis P. Grishin, including the blocking of their trading accounts until all circumstances and causes of their unlawful acts have been investigated.
31th January
The Bank of Russia established the fact of multiple manipulation in the market for ordinary shares of PAO MRSK Tsentra (IDGC of Centre, PJSC) and PAO Samaraenergo (Samaraenergo, PJSC), as well as preferred shares of PAO Samaraenegro and PAO KSK (KSK, PJSC) (hereinafter jointly referred to as the Shares) during trading on PAO Moscow Exchange (Moscow Exchange, PJSC) over the period from 10 July 2014 through 9 December 2015 conducted by Vladimir V. Moskovkin and Irina Yu. Moskovkina related to each other.
During the investigation, the Bank of Russia established that V. Moskovkin as agreed upon beforehand with I. Moskovkina made reciprocal trades in the Shares in the main trading mode on the Moscow Exchange on the basis ofanonymousorders. The orders had identical price and volume parameters and were made from one PC and, in the majority of cases, with minimum difference in time. Most trades had no economic sense.
This trading behaviour led to substantial deviations in the securities trading parameters.
According to Federal Law No.
The Bank of Russia took a set of measures to put an end to the violations of the Federal law by V. Moskovkin and I. Moskovkina, inter alia blocking of their trading accounts until all circumstances and causes of their unlawful actions are established.
13th December
The Bank of Russia established the fact of manipulation of 46 securities markets during trading on the PJSC Moscow Exchange (the Exchange) in the period between 24 July 2014 and 21 March 2017 by a group of individuals including Evgeniy Tarubarov, managing director of Bonum Capital LLC, professional securities market participant, and his spouse Svetlana Tarubarova.
The Bank of Russia established that Mr Tarubarov conducted transactions both across the accounts held by Bonum Capital LLC and a brokerage account held by his spouse with one of the major professional securities market participants.
These transactions employed the following scheme. Mr Tarubarov used the brokerage account of Mrs Tarubarova to bid for an arm’s length purchase of securities on the Exchange. Then Mr Tarubarov placed a sell order to close the position at a higher price (above the highest demand price). After that, Mr Tarubarov used the accounts of Bonum Capital LLC to place a matching buy order with similar parameters that was largely covered by the bid previously placed through the account of Mrs Tarubarova.
This trading conduct led to substantial deviations in the securities trading parameters.
Thus, Mr Tarubarov could buy and sell securities across the account of Mrs Tarubarova almost without losses and generated excess income amounting to more than 10 million rubles while inflicting a comparable detriment to Bonum Capital LLC and its clients under trust management. The Criminal Code of the Russian Federation qualifies the amount of the illegally obtained income as large.
According to Federal Law No.
It should be noted that Mr Tarubarov was not authorised to conduct transactions on the Exchange on behalf of Bonum Capital LLC, and the above illegal actions proved possible as a result of insufficient control provided by authorised officials of Bonum Capital LLC.
The Bank of Russia will take appropriate corrective measures regarding individuals involved in securities market manipulation, including measures aimed at improving the internal control systems of Bonum Capital LLC.
The materials of the investigation have been submitted to the law enforcement authorities.
The Bank of Russia draws the attention of professional securities market participants to the fact that it is necessary that they effectively control the actions of their employees, create a mechanism to prevent and settle conflicts of interests; inter alia, for the purpose of excluding the possibility of unauthorised access, provided by unauthorised employees, to the software that enables conducting Exchange transactions.
6th December 2017
The Bank of Russia established the fact of manipulation in the market for ordinary shares of PJSC GC ‘TNS energo’ (hereinafter the Shares) during trading on PJSC Moscow Exchange over the period from 17 June 2015 (start of trading) through 21 October 2016 conducted by a group of individuals / legal entities comprising Yury L. Ivlev, LLC GARANT ENERGO, LLC Voronezhsbyt and Dmitry V. Raskopin.
This group was engaged in coordinated actions aimed at misleading investors as to the true liquidity of and the demand for the Shares. Yu. Ivlev, LLC GARANT ENERGO, LLC Voronezhsbyt and D. Raskopin eventually conducted more than 50% of the total volume of trading in the Shares, which caused an increase in the price from 1,185 to 2,000 rubles per Share during the mentioned period.
The coordinated actions of the group were based on the fact that Yu. Ivlev, being the advisor on investment and shareholders relations at PJSC GC ‘TNS energo’, placed orders from his own trading account, as well as on behalf and for account of LLC GARANT ENERGO, LLC Voronezhsbyt and D. Raskopin. However, Yu. Ivlevwas not properly authorized to conduct trading on behalf and for account of LLC GARANT ENERGO, LLC Voronezhsbyt and D. Raskopin. D. Raskopin was also an employee of the Shares issuer; and the main party to the Shares trading, LLC GARANT ENERGO, was interrelated with PJSC GC ‘TNS energo’ and LLC Voronezhsbyt.
According to Federal Law No.
At the same time, the actions performed by these persons were not aimed at deriving revenue directly from trading in the Shares on the Moscow Exchange.
According to the outcome of the investigation and explanations given by the Shares issuer, the company sought to increase capitalisation and expand the Shares trading in order to improve its ranking position of a listed company, which in turn could help attract funds of private investors and pension savings to reduce the debt burden of PJSC GC ‘TNS energo’.
It should be noted that trading activities across the accounts of the mentioned individuals and legal entities terminated during the period when the Bank of Russia initiated its requests to PJSC GC ‘TNS energo’, which caused a considerable decrease in the Shares price.
Market manipulation is a gross violation of the requirements set forth in the legislation of the Russian Federation. Besides, it does not comply with the standards of professional conduct of financial market participants. With regard to the persons invoved in market manipulation with the Shares, measures will be taken to prevent such actions in future.
23th November
The Bank of Russia has established facts of repeated market manipulation on the Moscow Exchange (hereinafter the Exchange) with regard to trades in the ordinary shares of PJSC Human Stem Cells Institute (PAO ISKCh), PJSC Rostelecom (PAO Rostelecom), PJSC Chelyabinsk Profiled Steel Decking Factory (PAO ChZPSN-Profnastil), JSB AVANGARD (PAO AKB Avangard), PJSC Volgogradenergosbyt (PAO Volgogradenergosbyt), PJSC Uniform Techno Systems (PAO ETS), PJSC Vladimirenergosbyt (PAO Vladimirenergosbyt) and also preferred shares of PJSC Volgogradenergosbyt (hereinafter the Shares) during the period from 3 August 2015 through 25 December 2015 by Viktor G. Prokhor and Alpari LLC (TIN: 3904602244, Kaliningrad).
Transactions with the Shares conducted by V. Prokhor and Alpari LLC resulted in significant deviations in their trading parameters.
The analysis of the trading behaviour of V. Prokhor and Alpari LLC in the securities market established that series of transactions were executed in the main trading mode of the Exchange according to the following scheme. As the result of one or several trades, V. Prokhor bought a certain block of the Shares from Alpari LLC; that was followed by one or several trades with the same number of the Shares at a higher price conducted in the opposite direction. These trades were conducted against matching orders having similar parameters and with minimum difference in time, being placed from the same personal computer.
It is important to note that during the period under investigation, V. Prokhor and Alpari LLC acted as key counterparties in the trades with the Shares.
In the course of the investigation, the Bank of Russia established that V. Prokhor, being the authorised representative and beneficial owner of Alpari LLC, was individually conducting transactions in the main trading mode of the Exchange across the account held by Alpari LLC and his own account.
As a result of these transactions, V. Prokhor achieved positive financial result by inducing comparable damage to Alpari LLC. These actions were able to optimise the tax burden of the company. Information about the actions of V. Prokhor and Alpari LLC was forwarded to the Federal Tax Service.
These actions are qualified as the Share market manipulation in accordance with Article 5, Section 1.2 of Federal Law No.
Based on the outcome of the investigation, the Bank of Russia took measures to prevent market manipulation by V. Prokhor and Alpari LLC.
Professional securities market participants are recommended to consider the probability of the above actions being performed by their clients when implementing internal control compliance procedures, as well as to inform their clients about the inadmissibility of such transactions.
16th November
The Bank of Russia has established multiple and continuous facts of market manipulation on MICEX SE for ordinary shares of OJSC MMK (hereinafter, the Stock) in 2015 and 2016 committed by a group of individuals consisting of Danila M. Sheinin and Irina V. Mulyavko.
As an employee of IC MMK-Finance LLC, D. Sheinin simultaneously conducted transactions across the account of the above-mentioned company and the personal brokerage account of another employee of IC MMK-Finance LLC — I. Mulyavko held with another professional securities market participant.
Performing his professional responsibilities and acting for the account and on behalf of IC MMK-Finance LLC, D. Sheinin consistently offered sell/buy bids for the Stock, which led to the drop or rise in the Stock price. He used the situation created by these actions in order to buy/sell the Stock for the account and on behalf of I. Mulyavko at minimum/maximum prices; the difference between these prices was used to generate profits. The said scheme could reiterate several times during one trading day.
This trading conduct resulted in short-term substantial fluctuations in the prices of the Stock, as well as significant deviations in their trade characteristics and allowed D. Sheinin and I. Mulyavko to achieve positive financial result totalling dozens of millions of rubles. This amount is qualified as exceptionally large profits by the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation.
To conceal the true nature of his actions, D. Sheinin used the market maker’s services provided by IC MMK-Finance LLC with regard to the Stock.
In the course of the investigation it was established that D. Sheinin was involved in similar actions, though to a lesser degree, with other securities.
The Stock market situation conducive to the implementation of the above-mentioned illegal scheme was created at the expense of IC MMK-Finance LLC which eventually caused direct and indirect losses to the company.
According to Federal Law No.
The Bank of Russia will take relevant corrective measures regarding individuals involved in securities market manipulation, including measures aimed at improving the internal controls -of IC MMK-Finance LLC.
The Bank of Russia will submit the relevant investigation materials to the law enforcement authorities.
11th October 2017
The Bank of Russia established multiple and continuous facts of market manipulation, on MICEX, in 31 securities in the period from 18 March 2011 through 9 December 2016.
Mr Artem Kh. Lyulinsky in his capacity as PJSC AK BARS’s employee and being authorised by JSC Investment Company AK BARS Finans, acting pursuant to an agreement on the fiduciary management of this credit institution’s assets, simultaneously conducted transactions across the said organisations’ accounts and his own brokerage account held with one of the major professional securities market participants.
To execute the above transactions, the following arrangements were used. Mr Lyulinsky opened a buy or an unsecured sell position on certain securities. Within a short time, he placed an order witha hidden volume to close this position at a beneficial price. Following this, on behalf of the credit institution or its trustee, Mr Lyulinsky initiated transactions with the same securities in the direction which ensured a price level beneficial to him. Most of Mr Lyulinsky’s orders were fulfilled by orders he submitted on behalf of PJSC AK BARS or JSC Investment Company AK BARS Finans. In this way, Mr Lyulinsky had the opportunity to sell and buy the securities within several minutes, incurring profits in his own brokerage account.
This trading behaviour resulted in short-term substantial fluctuations in the prices of financial instruments, as well as significant deviations in their trading parameters, and allowed Mr Lyulinsky to gain dozens of millions of rubles in profits by having caused detriment to PJSC AK BARS in the amount equivalent to the profits.
The transactions in securities conducted by Mr Lyulinsky in the above period for his own account as well as on behalf of the credit institution and its trustee, which resulted in a substantial deviation in the securities trading parameteres, are qualified as market manipulation, and thus, constitute a breach of the prohibition set forth by Article 6, Section 2 of Federal Law No.
In accordance with the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation, the illegal profits earned in the above period from market manipulation with the said securities is classified as exceptionally large profits.
The Bank of Russia will take appropriate action regarding Mr Lyulinsky to prevent similar violations in the future..
The Bank of Russia will send the relevant investigation materials to the law enforcement authorities.
27th September 2017
The Bank of Russia detected multiple and lasting cases of manipulation, on MICEX, in the units of Closed-end Annuity Fund Kolchuga managed by LLC UNIVER Management, Closed-end Hybrid Fund Tekhnologia Rosta, Closed-end Equity Fund Universalnye Strategii, Closed-end Equity Fund Otraslevye Investitsii managed by CJSC Management Company EMERALD GROUP (further jointly referred to as the Units) between 4 July 2012 and 5 November 2015 (further referred to as the Period) by a number of LLC UNIVER Capital clients: LLC UNIVER Management, LLC Asset Management Agency Impuls, LLC Investment Company D C Capital, LLC Centrum Depository, LLC Custody Technology and LLC HeliosGroup (further referred to as the Clients).
Trading of the Units in the Period was irregular, with the proportion of cross trade between LLC UNIVER Capital and the Clients in the total trading amounts of each of the Units at
The bidding practices between LLC UNIVER Capital and the Clients (the same for each financial instrument) bear testament to prior agreement.
The resulting transactions, aiming to sustain the appropriate Unit price and traded value, recognised as capital by several professional securities market participants (including LLC UNIVER Capital, LLC Centrum Depository and LLC Investment Company D C Capital) failed to result in any substantial profit (or often resulted in a loss). However, they secured the appropriate value of the respective entity’s investment.
Moreover, found were diverse and multiple interrelations between LLC UNIVER Capital, CJSC Management Company EMERALD GROUP Clients, CJSC Management Company EMERALD GROUP, their staff, founders and beneficiaries.
In this way, the investigation established facts suggesting prior agreement was in place between LLC UNIVER Capital and the Clients on the execution of Unit transactions, resulting in substantial deviation in price and traded value in the trading of the Units on MICEX in the Period. These actions are qualified as Unit market manipulation under Article 5, Section 1.5 of Federal Law No.
Importantly, in the period the above transactions were being conducted, LLC UNIVER Capital was a market maker as regards trading of the Units. For this reason, its actions are covered by statutory exemptions as per Article 5, Section 3.3 of the Federal Law; their actions cannot therefore be recognised as market manipulation in and of itself.
The bidder’s behaviour in the course of transactions, consisting in the use of a market maker status for its own and its clients’ benefit, will be subject of a separate Bank of Russia investigation for compliance with fair trade practices.
Following the investigation, the Bank of Russia decided to revoke professional licences from LLC UNIVER Management and LLC Asset Management Agency Impuls (a professional securities market participant’s licence and investment / unit investment / non-governmental pension fund management licence respectively).
Furthermore, regulatory action is being considered against other individuals including executives who were involved in market manipulation.
22th August
The Bank of Russia established that Kirill Yu. Kotov and Yulia A. Kotova who have family relations were involved in manipulating the market for shares listed on PJSC Moscow Exchange during trading on 27 July 2015.
The investigation revealed that K. Kotov in collusion with Yu. Kotova made transactions with ordinary shares of PAO MRSK Severnogo Kavkaza and preferred shares of PAO Permskaya Energosbytovaya Kompaniya (hereinafter referred to as the Shares) to transfer securities between their accounts in the anonymous trading mode on the PJSC Moscow Exchange. These actions resulted in considerable deviations in the trading volume of the Shares.
The said actions are qualified as market manipulation in the Shares under Article 5, Section 1.2 of Federal Law No.
The Bank of Russia took measures against the said individuals aimed at preventing similar violations in future.
In order to prevent market manipulation, the regulator draws market participants’ attention to the following.
For the purpose of executing trades between certain counterparties during organized trading there are specific trading regimes provided that include placing ‘address’ market orders.
. In compliance with Article 5, Section 1.2 of the Federal law, transactions with financial instruments, made between trading participants and (or) persons for whose account or on whose behalf they are made, may be qualified as market manipulation in the event the said trades are conducted at the agreed-upon conditions through anonymous orders addressed to all participants of organised trading.
The Bank of Russia urges trading participants to notify their clients about inadmissibility and consequences of such actions.
20th July 2017
The Bank of Russia has established the fact of market manipulation for bonds of GazpromKO4, ALROSA BO1, ALROSA BO2, Alpha BO-7, Alpha BO-9 and Bashneft07 (further referred to as the Bonds) during trading on PAO Moscow Exchange in
Within the above period, numerous trades of similar nature were conducted between OAO MSP-72 and ZAO ZAKAZCHIK-L, suggesting market manipulation in as many as 22 bonds. The said trades were concluded against matching orders having similar parameters and made within less than 30 seconds time difference, whereby ZAO ZAKAZCHIK-L systematically incurred losses concluding the said transactions and OAO MSP-72 gained positive financial result.
At the date of the transactions, Mr Igor Ye. Vasilyev was holding the position of Director General of the both companies mentioned above and personally made bids across brokerage accounts of OAO MSP-72 and ZAO ZAKAZCHIK-L.
It was established that Mr Igor Ye. Vasilyev is related to the owners of ZAO ZAKAZCHIK-L, i.e. Mr Ye. Vasilyev (holding 50% of the share) and Ms L. Vasilyeva (holding 50% of the share).
Mr Igor Ye. Vasilyev could have conducted the above-mentioned transactions with intention of withdrawing funds from the brokerage account of ZAO ZAKAZCHIK-L or giving the appearance of losses incurred by ZAO ZAKAZCHIK-L during on-exchange trading transactions, which were ultimately aimed at reducing its tax base.
Mr Igor Ye. Vasilyev’s activities in managing trading accounts led to a substantial deviation in the price of the Bonds and are qualified as market manipulation in accordance with Article 5, Part 1.2 of Federal Law No.
The Bank of Russia has taken action to prevent a recurrence of similar violations in the future activities of the individuals involved in market manipulation. Reports on the operations of OAO MSP-72 and ZAO ZAKAZCHIK-L have been submitted to the Federal Tax Service.
11th July 2017
The Bank of Russia’s investigation has established that Mr Artem Kh. Lyulinsky, an employee of PJSC AK BARS Bank (PAO AK BARS Bank), conducted, in July 2015, a series of transactions with ordinary shares of Nizhnekamskneftekhim JSC(further referred to as the Shares) with the use of insider information.
Mr Artem Kh. Lyulinsky was conducting these transactions under a trust agreement concluded between PJSC AK BARS Bank (Trust Management) and Ms Tatyana V. Larionova, who is married to Mr Igor V. Larionov, an insider of Nizhnekamskneftekhim JSC. Having purchased the Shares at the lowest prices prior to the announcement resulted in the price growth of the Shares, Ms Larionova succeeded in getting additional proceeds of several million rubles.
The facts established in the course of the investigation, including the terms and conditions of the trust agreement, as well as the time the money was deposited on an investment account, give grounds to believe that the client was involved when the professional securities market participant was making the investment decision.
That said, the requirements set forth in Article 6 of Federal law No.
The following actions are found to be in breach of the law:
- Conducting transactions in financial instruments to which insider information is related, including transactions conducted on behalf of a third party;
- Transmitting insider information to a person that is not included in the list of insiders due to his/her duties in line with federal laws, his/her duties in line with his/her job description or job responsibilities as per his/her labour agreement;
- Providing insider information-based recommendations to third parties forcing or making them purchase or sell their financial instruments, foreign currency and / or commodities.
The Bank of Russia took a number of measures that resulted in, among other things, corrective action at Nizhnekamskneftekhim JSC against a recurrence of similar actions in the future.
5th July
The Bank of Russia established the fact of manipulation in the market for ordinary shares of PJSC GC Rollman (hereinafter, the ‘Shares’) during trading at PJSC Moscow Exchange over the period from 19 December 2012 to 20 May 2016.
During the inspection, the Bank of Russia found that the deals for the purpose of manipulation of the market of the Shares were conducted by two groups of persons that are clients of various professional securities market participants.
The first group included 7 individuals: Yuri V. Arkhangelsky, Fedor N. Burchikhin, Anton A. Vorobiev, Olga M. Vorobieva, Andrei A. Gusev, Denis I. Mariechkin, and Natalia A. Stavnichuk; and 2 legal entities: CJSC PG Edelveis and LLC KC Magistr affiliated with PJSC GC Rollman. The second group included one legal entity, LLC EUROFINANCE, and 10 individuals: Natalia A. Adylova, Yulia Y. Buchinskaya, Mikhail M. Voevodin, Aleksei G. Golikhin, Viktoria N. Degteva, Dmitri A. Romanov, Sergei Yu. Savuk, Nikita S. Sorokin, Dmitri V. Stremedlovsky, and Maksim A. Tolmachev.
During the specified period, deals conducted by the above persons accounted for over 90% of the total volume of the Shares trading. These persons conducted deals that led to significant deviations of the demand, supply, price and/or volume of trading in Shares for the most part with each other by prior agreement. These activities led to establishing an artificial market for the Shares and misinforming third parties with regard to their price. Thus, during the period in question, individuals and legal entities affiliated with PJSC GC Rollman were at least one of the parties to 63% of on-exchange trading with the Shares.
The appearance of an active market for the Shares allowed CJSC PG Edelveis affiliated with PJSC GC Rollman to sell a part of the issue of the Shares to various individuals, and also to use the Shares as collateral under loan agreements.
It should be noted that a number of deals with Shares made between N.A. Stavnichuk and F.N Burchikhin had a market-maker status and were recognised by the exchange as deals conducted by a professional securities market participant performing its obligations under a respective agreement. However, the actions of these persons are not subject to exceptions stipulated in Clauses 1 and 3 of Part 3 of Article 5 of Federal Law No.
The activities of the persons included in both groups constitute manipulation of the market for the Shares in accordance with Clauses 2 and 6 of Part 1 of Article 5 of the Federal Law.
The measures, including those prescribed by the Code of Administrative Offences of the Russian Federation, were taken against the persons who participated in manipulating the market for the Shares.
27th April
The Bank of Russia’s investigation revealed that in the period between 2014 and 2015 Vladimir V. Grevtsev made regular transactions in low liquid financial instruments with FinEco LLC and OJSC Investbank BZL (hereinafter referred to as the Participants), and received guaranteed profit while inflicting direct damage to the Participants.
The investigation revealed multiple interconnections between V.V. Grevtsev and the Participants as well as V.V. Grevtsev’s ability to gain physical access to the Participants’ trading terminals.
Proceeds gained by V.V. Grevtsev as a result of these transactions totalled more than 4 million rubles, which is qualified as large income according to the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation.
The consistency of transactions made between V.V. Grevtsev and the Participants and their revealed interconnections point to these transactions being concluded under a prior agreement.
The transactions between the said parties and the low liquidity of financial instruments resulted in a considerable deviation in securities trading parameters.
The actions taken by V.V. Grevtsev upon prior agreement with the Participants in the period between 29 July 2014 and 27 July 2015, which resulted in a considerable deviation in securities trading parameters, shall be recognised as market manipulation pursuant to the law (Article 5, Part 1, Section 2 of Federal Law No.
The Bank of Russia made the decision to cancel the certificate of financial market specialist issued to V.V. Grevtsev, and is reviewing measures to be taken against the parties involved in the manipulation in order to prevent similar violations in future.
The materials of the investigation will be submitted to the law enforcement authorities.
16th March 2017
The Bank of Russia has established facts of illegal use of insider information by insiders of Sistema Public Joint Stock Financial Corporation (PAO AFK Sistema, further referred to as ‘the Company’), namely, A. N. Buyanov, N. K. Nosova and A. Yu. Goncharuk conducting transactions in ordinary shares of the Company for their own account and on their behalf in July 2014.
Such transactions were found to have been conducted only several hours before the Company formally disclosed its insider information. As a result, the Company shares dropped more than 7% on the Moscow Exchange.
The information obtained in the course of the investigation suggests that the above individuals gained access to the Company’s insider information. The way the instructions to effect transactions were submitted, along with the trading behaviour, provide evidence to the fact that these individuals were conducting transactions in the shares of Sistema PJSFC for their own account using illegally the insider information they obtained.
These transactions enabled the above individuals to avoid material loss amounting to a total of tens of millions rubles.
The use of insider information with a view to conducting transactions in financial instruments is in breach of requirements set forth in Article 6 of Federal Law No.
The Bank of Russia has submitted the materials related to the investigation to the law enforcement authorities of the Russian Federation.
20th December
The Bank of Russia has established the fact of manipulation of the market for 8 securities traded on ZAO FB MMVB (MICEX Stock Exchange, CJSC) over the period from 9 January 2013 to 2 July 2015. Market manipulation, orchestrated by Yuriy D. Khilov, was committed by a group of persons comprising Natalia I. Khilova, Igor A. Novikov and Tatiana V. Novikova. The actions taken by the above persons resulted in receiving inordinately high income by the said individuals.
The investigation to establish the fact of the above market manipulation was conducted by the Bank of Russia with the kindest assistance from the German financial market regulator Bundesanstalt fur Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht (BaFin) under the IOSCO Multilateral Memorandum of Understanding (IOSCO MMoU).
During the course of its investigation the Bank of Russia established that Yuriy Dmitrievich Khilov, as an authorized officer of OOO Deutsche Bank (Deutsche Bank Ltd), was conducting trades across the accounts of Deutsche Bank London Branch (OOO Deutsche Bank’s client) in collusion with his relatives Natalia I. Khilova, Igor A. Novikov and Tatiana V. Novikova. Consequently, Natalia I. Khilova, Igor A. Novikov and Tatiana V. Novikova gained a positive financial result thereby causing detriment of similar amount to Deutsche Bank London Branch. That said, most of the above trades resulted in a significant deviation of the relevant securities trading parameters.
The following trading mechanism was used when concluding the trades. An individual (Khilova N.I., Novikov I.A., Novikova T.V.) bought or sold a block of securities (generally using funds borrowed from brokers), while he/she placed an order to purchase/sell back an equivalent amount of securities shortly afterwards. During periods of trading activity performed by the above individuals, Khilov Yu.D. was concluding trades on behalf of Deutsche Bank London Branch in the same securities, in the direction ensuring a favourable price level for the said individuals. Moreover, the orders to buy/sell back the securities were fully or partially filled by the orders Yu.D. Khilov was placing on behalf of Deutsche Bank London Branch. Therefore, the said individuals had several minutes to buy and sell the securities, thereby achieving a positive financial result.
Pursuant to Article 5, Section 1.5 of Federal Law No.
The above actions, circumventing the requirements and procedures established by OOO Deutsche Bank, were performed by Khilov Yu.D. for a continuous period of time.
The Bank of Russia will take appropriate measures prescribing Khilov Yu.D., Khilova N.I., Novikov I.A. and Novikova T.V. to refrain from any further violations similar to those indicated herein.
According to the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation, the amount of illicit income derived from securities market manipulation by the above individuals over the relevant period is qualified as inordinately high income.
The Bank of Russia has sent relevant documents pertaining to the investigation to the law enforcement authorities of the Russian Federation.
16 th November
The Bank of Russia has established the fact of market manipulation in ordinary shares of PJSC National Development Company (hereinafter, the Shares) during trading on PJSC Saint Petersburg Exchange (hereinafter, the Exchange) from 23 March 2015 through 22 June 2016 (hereinafter, the Period).
JSC IC Eltra clients O. A. Zhukovskaya and R. O. Tarasova conducted matching transactions in the Shares during anonymous trading sessions over the Period. The nature and systematicity of these transactions bear the evidence of a prearranged agreement.
Transactions across the accounts held by the said individuals created the whole Share market on the Exchange within the Period: they accounted for 99% of the total transactions in the Shares and total Share trading volume with virtually no other Share market participants present. The transactions executed between O. A. Zhukovskaya and R. O. Tarasova resulted in substantial deviation in price and/or volume of the Share trading.
JSC IC Eltra performed as a marketmaker for the Shares within the Period. The Bank of Russia revealed during the course of the investigation that the transactions across Tarasova’s and Zhukovskaya’s accounts were actually executed by JSC IC Eltra employee A. V. Okhremenko based on letters of attorney issued by the said individuals.
Actions undertaken by A. V. Okhremenko, who executed transactions from the two accounts, were aimed at establishing an artificial Share market value and misleading a wide range of individuals and the regulator as regards the Share market liquidity and activity. Besides, during the Period, the Shares were registered as part of assets held by several insurance companies.
Pursuant to Article 5, Section 1.5 of Federal Law No.
It is important to note that since JSC IC Eltra clients who were not trading participants executed actions qualified by the Federal Law as market manipulation, they are not subject to seizures pursuant to Article 5, Section 3.3 of the Federal Law.
The Bank of Russia will initiate required enforcement actions against individuals involved in the Share market manipulation.
Earlier, the Bank of Russia took a decision to revoke licences of a professional securities market participant to carry out broker and dealer activity issued to JSC IC Eltra and to cancel the qualification certificate of a financial market specialist issued to A. V. Okhremenko in view of the involvement in manipulating the share market of OJSC Zhivoy Office.
20th October
The Bank of Russia has established facts of market manipulation in the ordinary shares of OAO Zhivoy Office (Zhivoy office, OJSC; hereinafter the Shares) on ZAO MICEX Stock Exchange (MICEX SE, CJSC; hereinafter the Exchange) over the period from 13 January 2014 to 6 January 2015.
OAO Zhivoy office presented itself as a supplier of goods for “comfortable and bright” office work. OAO Zhivoy office arranged an active advertising campaign in the internet and print media, which encouraged institutional and private investors to invest their money in the ordinary shares of the company. According to the issuer, supplementary issue of the Shares was arranged to attract funds for further business development.
Supplementary Shares were offered to the public over the period from 3 July 2013 to 8 July 2013 in the ‘Innovation and investment market’ sector on the Exchange at the price 129 rubles per one Share, while net assets accounting per one Share was slightly above 1 ruble. A total of 4 000 000 Shares (comprising 33% of OAO Zhivoy Office enlarged share capital) were underwritten for the amount over half a billion rubles. Major purchasers of the Shares during their underwriting were companies interconnected with OAO Zhivoy Office: OOO Priboy (Priboy, LLC), OOO Modern (Modern, LLC) and OOO Vershina (Vershina, LLC).
The said legal entities acquired the Shares using borrowed funds which they received from an offshore company. OAO Zhivoy Office paid back the loan within one day through the interconnected entities. Thus, the underwriting of the Shares did not result in attracting real money despite of the issuer’s official announcement.
The Bank of Russia, in the course of its investigation, established that the trades qualified as Share market manipulation, were executed by two group of entities connected to OAO Zhivoy Office. Seventeen individuals and one entity, all of which were clients of various professional securities market participants comprised the first group (hereinafter Group 1). The Second group was comprised of three legal entities that acquired the Shares during their underwriting, and one individual (an employee of OOO Spens (Spens, LLC) which is a subsidiary of OAO Zhivoy Office), all of them being clients of AO investment company Eltra (investment company Eltra, JSC; hereinafter Group 2).
AO investment company Eltra was a market maker in the Shares. Along with that, trades in the Shares on the Exchange were executed solely by an authorized employee of AO investment company Eltra only across the accounts held by the entities comprising Group 2. The above mechanism was created by the top management of AO investment company Eltra and it was not suppressed by authorized persons of the above investment company. The Bank of Russia detected the trades qualified as non-market maker trades, and these trades were qualified as market manipulation in the Shares.
The above-mentioned entities executed trades, which resulted in substantial deviation of the demand, price and/or volume of the Shares, mainly with each other by prior agreement, inter alia with a view to creating artificial Share market and misleading other market participants regarding the Share price.
Thus, the entities connected to OAO Zhivoy Office were at least one of parties to 87% of the on-Exchange trades in the Shares over the relevant period, and 56% of the total Share trading volume were executed by these entities with each other.
Along with an artificial functioning of the Share market, a part of a supplementary issue was underwritten by a third party (a real investor).
OAO Zhivoy Office as well as interconnected legal entities and individuals were credited by commercial banks wherein the exchange-traded shares of OAO Zhivoy Office were acting as collateral. At present OOO Spens (Spens, LLC), one of the main subsidiaries of OAO Zhivoy Office, is under bankruptcy procedure. The issuer’s Board of Directors has taken a decision to hold an extra meeting of the shareholders, whereat one of the agenda issues raised will be OAO Zhivoy Office liquidation.
The actions undertaken by Group 1 and Group 2 as well as by AO investment company Eltra are qualified as market manipulation in the Shares pursuant to Article 5, Sections 1.2 and 1.6 of Federal Law No.
Based on the result of the investigation, the Bank of Russia has taken a decision to revoke licenses of professional securities market participants engaged in broker and dealer activity held by AO investment company Eltra as well as to cancel qualification certificates of professional securities market participants held by employees of AO investment company Eltra involved in market manipulation in the Shares. The Bank of Russia has taken measures, in relation to other entities involved in Share market manipulation, prescribing to refrain from any further activities similar to those indicated herein. The Bank of Russia has recommended the Exchange to consider delisting of the Shares.
11th October
The Bank of Russia has established facts of repeated market manipulation for PJSC Tuchkovsky KSM ordinary shares of the principal issue (hereinafter, the Stock) at MICEX SE trading from 27 February 2012 through 11 September 2013 committed by foreign legal entities BLUBBERSTAR LIMITED and SKAVADOS ENTERPRISES LIMITED. The said legal entities are interconnected and are also connected with the issuer.
The investigation conducted by the Bank of Russia revealed that within the time span stated BLUBBERSTAR LIMITED and SKAVADOS ENTERPRISES LIMITED by prior arrangement completed a series of transactions which resulted in substantial deviations in demand and supply and trading volumes of the Stock as well.
SKAVADOS ENTERPRISES LIMITED mainly sold the Stock to BLUBBERSTAR LIMITED which resold the said Stock to general public. Besides, these entities made individual transactions to acquire the Stock from other market participants by highest bids thus restoring Stock prices brought down through their mass selling by BLUBBERSTAR LIMITED.
So, activities of the said entities were aimed at selling the considerable part of the Stock they owned to general public at artificial prices they maintained.
Pursuant to Clause 2 of Part 1 of Article 5 of Federal Law No.
The Bank of Russia took action in relation to the entities which manipulated the stock market aimed at non-admission of similar violations in future. The Bank of Russia recommended MICEX SE to look into trade regime changes or stock delisting.
30 th September
The Bank of Russia has established facts of exchange-traded bonds market manipulation by LLC URALSIB Leasing Company at CJSC FB MOEX trading from 24 February 2012 through 26 August 2015. These facts relate to the fifth, the tenth and the eleventh issues of bonds (hereinafter, the Bonds).
The examination revealed that within the time span stated clients of LLC URALSIB CAPITAL — Financial Services — LLC SPECTRON-CITY and JSC MC URALSIB which acted in the interests of trustors performed bond transactions by prior arrangement based on highly synchronised counter bids with identical quantity and price conditions which resulted in substantial deviations in bonds trading parameters.
One needs to mention in this connection that the said persons turned out to be extremely active in bonds trading. For example, JSC MC URALSIB and LLC SPECTRON-CITY accounted for over 86% of completed transactions with LLC URALSIB Leasing Company bonds of the tenth issue.
The examination also revealed that JSC MC URALSIB employee Alexey Yu. Markin functioned as LLC SPECTRON-CITY general director within the time span stated. Bids on behalf of LLC SPECTRON-CITY and JSC MC URALSIB Trustee were made directly by Alexey V. Korolenko, who functioned as a head of the board to manage JSC MC URALSIB bond funds.
The transactions were aimed at price formation and bond price and traded value maintenance.
Pursuant to Clause 2 of Part 1 of Article 5 of Federal Law No.
Transactions which relate to bonds market manipulation were effected with a full connivance of Yury O. Belonoshchenko, who acted as JSC MC URALSIB general director.
The Bank of Russia has cancelled financial market specialist qualification certificates of Alexey V. Korolenko, Alexey Yu. Markin and Yury O. Belonoshchenko.
The Bank of Russia also cancelled financial market specialist qualification certificates issued to LLC URALSIB CAPITAL — Financial Services controller Tatyana N. Zizikova. In disregard for Russian legislation and duty regulations Tatyana N. Zizikova failed to timely identify and stop indecent behavior of LLC URALSIB CAPITAL — Financial Services clients although she did have opportunities to do so.
30 th September
The Bank of Russia has established facts of exchange-traded bonds market manipulation by LLC URALSIB Leasing Company at CJSC FB MOEX trading from 24 February 2012 through 26 August 2015. These facts relate to the fifth, the tenth and the eleventh issues of bonds (hereinafter, the Bonds).
The examination revealed that within the time span stated clients of LLC URALSIB CAPITAL — Financial Services — LLC SPECTRON-CITY and JSC MC URALSIB which acted in the interests of trustors performed bond transactions by prior arrangement based on highly synchronised counter bids with identical quantity and price conditions which resulted in substantial deviations in bonds trading parameters.
One needs to mention in this connection that the said persons turned out to be extremely active in bonds trading. For example, JSC MC URALSIB and LLC SPECTRON-CITY accounted for over 86% of completed transactions with LLC URALSIB Leasing Company bonds of the tenth issue.
The examination also revealed that JSC MC URALSIB employee Alexey Yu. Markin functioned as LLC SPECTRON-CITY general director within the time span stated. Bids on behalf of LLC SPECTRON-CITY and JSC MC URALSIB Trustee were made directly by Alexey V. Korolenko, who functioned as a head of the board to manage JSC MC URALSIB bond funds.
The transactions were aimed at price formation and bond price and traded value maintenance.
Pursuant to Clause 2 of Part 1 of Article 5 of Federal Law No.
Transactions which relate to bonds market manipulation were effected with a full connivance of Yury O. Belonoshchenko, who acted as JSC MC URALSIB general director.
The Bank of Russia has cancelled financial market specialist qualification certificates of Alexey V. Korolenko, Alexey Yu. Markin and Yury O. Belonoshchenko.
The Bank of Russia also cancelled financial market specialist qualification certificates issued to LLC URALSIB CAPITAL — Financial Services controller Tatyana N. Zizikova. In disregard for Russian legislation and duty regulations Tatyana N. Zizikova failed to timely identify and stop indecent behavior of LLC URALSIB CAPITAL — Financial Services clients although she did have opportunities to do so.
25th August 2016
The Bank of Russia has detected the fact of market manipulation involving 37 securities on ZAO MICEX Stock Exchange (MICEX SE, CJSC) during the period from January 1, 2014 till August 25, 2015 by a group of individuals comprising Natalya N.Kornilova, Pavel M.Govorov, Mariya V.Smirnova, Andrey N.Kornilov whose actions were aimed at generating high excess income.
In the course of inspection the Bank of Russia has established that Andrey N.Kornilov, being an authorized employee at PAO BALTINVESTBANK credit institution, conducted, on its behalf, transactions in collusion with Natalya N.Kornilova, Pavel M.Govorov and Mariya V.Smirnova. As a result of these transactions, Natalya N.Kornilova, Pavel M.Govorov and Mariya V.Smirnova recorded a positive financial result by inflicting similar damage on the commercial bank. Such actions in most cases caused substantial deviations in the corresponding securities trading parameters. The inspection also detected multiple interconnections between Natalya N.Kornilova, Pavel M.Govorov, Mariya V.Smirnova and Andrey N Kornilov.
Transactions were carried out according to the following scheme. An individual (Natalya N.Kornilova, Pavel M.Govorov or Mariya V.Smirnova) opened a position by purchase or unsecured sale of securities and shortly afterwards submitted an order to close such position at a favourable price. Then Andrey N.Kornilov, acting on behalf of the credit institution, initiated trades in the same securities in the direction coinciding with the individual’s opening position. As a consequence, the securities’ price changed substantially, thus, increasing the individual’s financial result of the position size, and the position was closed at a profit. A position was closed, on average,
Pursuant to Article 5, Part 1, Paragraph 2 of Federal Law No.
Individuals involved in market manipulation are held administratively liable by the Bank of Russia. The Bank of Russia has also revoked financial market qualification certificates issued to Andrey N.Kornilov.
In a separate series of such transactions which includes opening of a position by an individual and closing it out with a commercial organization involved, an individual recorded a financial result qualified as insignificant on a commercial scale. However, the aggregate income generated over the period in question as a result of securities market manipulation by a group of individuals, i.e. over 700 series of such transactions conducted within a long period of time, is classified as high in accordance with the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation.
The Bank of Russia will submit the inspection results to law enforcement authorities.
29th July 2016
The Bank of Russia has detected the fact of multiple market manipulation on ZAO MICEX Stock Exchange (MICEX SE, CJSC) involving ordinary shares of Urals Stampings Plant PAO, PJSC Chernogorneft, PJSC “KMP”), PJSC Saratov Oil Refinery, PJSC “NCSP” and preferred shares of PJSC “Rosseti” (hereinafter jointly refereed to as the Shares) performed during the period from May 27, 2015 to September 2, 2015 (hereinafter the Period) by related persons: Yuri A. Zhilyayev and Alexander I. Zhilyayev.
An investigation conducted by the Bank of Russia has established that over the Period Yuri A.Zhilyayev conducted a series of transactions in collusion with Alexander I. Zhilyayev that led to substantial deviations in supply and demand, prices as well as trading volume of the Shares.
Trading in a number of Shares markets over the Period is irregular, the proportion of transactions conducted in collusion between Yuri A. Zhilyayev and Alexander I. Zhilyayev in the total trading volume of the above-mentioned instruments accounted for 82% to 100% on a number of days over the Period. Thus, on these days Yuri A. Zhilyayev and Alexander I. Zhilyayev fully controlled pricing of the above-mentioned shares.
Pursuant to Article 5, Part 1, Section 2 of Federal law No.
The indicated individuals have been held administratively liable.
8th July 2016
The Bank of Russia has established the fact of market manipulation involving preferred shares of PAO Chelyabenergosbyt (hereinafter the Shares) on ZAO MICEX Stock Exchange (MICEX SE, CJSC) in September and October 2013.
The nature and mechanism of transactions conducted in the Shares on ZAO MICEX Stock Exchange over the indicated period suggest collusive trading between the counterparties. Counterbids of the two individuals when trading the Shares often had identical quantitative and price terms with a minimum time lag between the bids. The financial result analysis of the said transactions did not reveal any economic efficiency.
The investigation established a number of factors pointing at the interconnection between the following individuals — F.N.Smolkin and A.Yu.Chizhenkov including the issued letters of attorney and over-the-counter transactions. The said information implies that the cross trading with the Shares between F.N.Smolkin and A.Yu.Chizhenkov was conducted in collusion.
Pursuant to Article 5, Part 1, Section 2 of Federal law No.
The Bank of Russia has taken action against the persons involved in the Shares market manipulation in order to prevent similar violations in the future.
22nd June 2016
The Bank of Russia has established the fact of continuously repeated market manipulation of the open joint-stock company Sofrinskiy Experimental Mechanical Plant (SEMZ, OJSC; OAO SEMZ) ordinary shares (hereinafter the Shares) by interconnected entities with a view to misleading a wide range of investors as regards price and liquidity of the Shares on ZAO MICEX SE (MICEX Stock Exchange, CJSC) from the end of 2011 to 2013.
During the said period, the trading activity of the Share market was maintained by the issuer itself, which is Decom limited liability company (Decom LLC; OOO Decom), a range of foreign legal entities, which are BLUBBERSTAR LIMITED, SKAVADOS ENTERPRISES LIMITED, Transcube Communications GmbH, Vionmane LTD, as well as natural persons — Skubak V.M. and Karmanov I.G. The Share trades between the entities mentioned above comprised more than 70% of the Share trading volume during the period indicated above and repeatedly amounted to 100% of the daily Share trading volume.
The investigation was conducted by the Bank of Russia with the kindest assistance of foreign financial market regulators: Cyprus Securities and Exchange Commission (CySEC) and Bundesanstalt fur Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht (BaFin).
According to the result of the investigation conducted by the Bank of Russia, it has been established that the Share trades between BLUBBERSTAR LIMITED, SKAVADOS ENTERPRISES LIMITED, Transcube Communications GmbH, OAO SEMZ (SEMZ, OJSC), OOO Decom (Decom LLC) as well as between Skubak V.M., Karmanov I.G. and Vionmane LTD were conducted in collusion. The said trades resulted in substantial deviation in the price, volume, demand and supply of the Shares. Pursuant to Article 5, Section 1.2 of Federal law No.
It should be noted that the Share trades between Skubak V.M., Karmanov I.G. and Vionmane LTD had the status of market making trades, and they were acknowledged by the exchange as the trades conducted while discharging obligations of a professional securities market participant under the relevant agreement. Along with that, exemption set forth in Article 5, Section 3.1 of Federal Law No.
OAO SEMZ (SEMZ, OJSC), OOO Decom (Decom LLC), SKAVADOS ENTERPRISES LIMITED, BLUBBERSTAR LIMITED subsequently placed buy orders at the highest price when conducting trades in the Shares, inter alia, with other securities market participants, thereby enabling Share price increase. The said trades were aimed at misleading other participants as regards the Share price, which resulted in its substantial deviation. Pursuant to Article 5, Section 1.6 of Federal law No.
The said manipulation resulted in framing artificial level of demand, supply, price and trading volume of the Shares.
The Bank of Russia has taken relevant measures regarding the entities involved in the Share market manipulation aimed at refraining from any further violations similar to those indicated herein.
2nd June 2016
The Bank of Russia has established the fact of market manipulation of investment units of real estate closed investment unit fund Avex Real Estate (real estate ZPIF Avex Real Estate; hereinafter Investment Units) managed by INTERCOMMERZ Asset Management, CJSC (ZAO INTERCOMMERZ Asset Management) on ZAO MICEX SE (MICEX Stock Exchange, CJSC) during the period from 29 October 2014 to 1 April 2015 (hereinafter the Period).
During the course of the investigation, it was established that Investment Unit trading activity over the Period was fully achieved by the fact that trades had been conducted in collusion between the following interconnected entities: Gusev A.A., Maryechkin D.I., Mikhailov D.A., Guseva I.I., Boyko Yu.I., Kharitonov S.B., Kharitonov D.E., Kudryavtsev E.P. and OAO SMART Broker (SMART Broker, OJSC).
The said entities have launched a scheme of multiple resale to each other of a limited number of Investment Units, which enabled to assume false Investment Unit market activity as well as create conditions relevant for ZAO MICEX SE (MICEX Stock Exchange, CJSC) to determine market price.
Along with that, Investment Unit trades were conducted on the OTC market during the Period. Insurance market participants and professional securities market participants that could use market price determined by ZAO MICEX SE (MICEX Stock Exchange, CJSC) to comply with rules and regulations and other requirements of the Russian Federation legislation were the final purchasers in the said market. Moreover, an entity interconnected with INTERCOMMERZ Asset Management, CJSC (ZAO INTERCOMMERZ Asset Management) was the sole owner of the Investment Units when arranging the Fund.
The established interconnections of the securities market participants with INTERCOMMERZ Asset Management, CJSC (ZAO INTERCOMMERZ Asset Management) as well as allocated Investment Units within the entities supervised by the Bank of Russia indicate that the inclination to mislead investors and the Bank of Russia regarding the price and liquidity of the Investment Units as well as real economic situation of the above financial companies was one of the purposes to manipulate the Investment Unit market.
Pursuant to Article 5, Section 2 of Federal law No.
Apart from that, pursuant to Article 5, Section 1.6 of the Federal Law, actions taken by Guseva I.I., Boyko Yu.I., Mikhailov D.A., Kharitonov D.E. for the purpose of misleading other entities in relation to the Investment Unit price and resulted in substantial deviation of the Investment Unit price are qualified as market manipulation.
Pursuant to Article 5, Section 1 of the Federal Law, investment Unit trades that did not result in substantial deviation of the Investment Unit trading parameters over the Period cannot be qualified as market manipulation, they are viewed, however, as an integral part of the series of trades conducted by interconnected entities in the course of subsequent artificial shaping of the Investment Unit market.
Market manipulation is a flagrant violation of the legislation of the Russian Federation.
The Bank of Russia has taken relevant measures regarding the entities involved in the Investment Unit market manipulation aimed at refraining from any further violations similar to those indicated herein.
17th March 2016
The Bank of Russia has established the fact of market manipulation of investment units of real estate closed investment unit fund Rodnie Prostory (real estate ZPIF Rodnie Prostory; hereinafter the Fund, the Investment Units) managed by management company AK BARS CAPITAL, LLC (OOO UK AK BARS CAPITAL) and bonds of Rotor, LLC (OOO Rotor, 4-03-36052-R), Zhilstroy LLC (OOO Zhilstroy,) 4-02-36238-R), STP, LLC (OOO STP, 4-01-28061-R) (hereinafter together the Bonds) on ZAO MICEX SE (MICEX Stock Exchange, CJSC; hereinafter the Stock Exchange) during the period from January 2013 to April 2015. The trades were conducted by the following entities: Rotor, LLC (OOO Rotor), Zhilstroy LLC (OOO Zhilstroy), AVK, LLC (OOO AVK), Permtransmekhanizatsiya, LLC (OOO Permtransmechanizatsiya), TSK-1, LLC (OOO TSK-1), Rentek, LLC (OOO Rentek), Promaktiv, PJSC (PAO Promaktiv ), as well as by Romanova P.V. and Ivanov N.A.
During the course of the investigation, it was established that all the said entities including non-state pension fund Strategiya, JSC (AO NPF Strategiya) were interconnected and comprised the same group of legal entities, the Strategiya Group under control of several natural persons, final owners of the shares of the mentioned companies. The natural persons that took part in trading the Investment Units and the Bonds hold different positions in the Strategiya Group and are family- or professionally-related.
The character and mechanism of placing the orders to conduct trades in the Investment Units and the Shares on the Stock Exchange (often identical level of price and trading volume), the same trading participants, promoting the gradual increase in price of the Investment Units and the Bonds (the most evident tendency was observed in the end of the financial year 2013, 2014) indicate that the said entities acted in collusion.
The established interconnections of the said entities show that market manipulation of the Investment Units and the Bonds was particularly aimed to artificially increase the value of the assets being on the balance sheet of the AO NPF Strategiya and to enable to assume false prosperous activity and the profitability of the fund. The said actions were taken by the NPF Strategiya for the purpose of misleading investors and the regulator in relation to the price and liquidity of the Investment Units and the Bonds, thus achieving required reserves with the help of the management companies allocating pension funds and investing pension savings of NPF Strategiya into the Investment Units and the Bonds.
Pursuant to Article 5, Section 1.2 and 1.6 of Federal law No.
The relevant measures regarding the entities involved in market manipulation of the Investment Units and the Bonds have been taken including those in compliance with the requirements of the Administrative Code of the Russian Federation.
The Strategiya Group comprises, inter alia, management company Fraktal, LLC (OOO UK Fraktal) and management company Magistral, LLC (OOO UK Magistral) both managing pension funds and pension savings of AO NPF Strategiya. The actions of the management companies were not always caused by risk-oriented approach in choosing the trading strategy and investment items along with respecting genuine interests of the investors and participants of AO NPF Strategiya. Often the transactions were carried out without any economic expediency.
It appears that the said management companies acted mainly for the account and on behalf of the Strategiya Group and its beneficiaries while performing trust management of its funds.
11th February 2016
The Bank of Russia has established the facts of continued and repeated manipulation of units of Closed-End Rental Unit Investment Fund Zemli Podmoskovya traded on MICEX Stock Exchange CJSC in
During the said period trading activities in the market of units of Closed-End Rental Unit Investment Fund Zemli Podmoskovya were fully based on trades conducted in collusion by the following interconnected entities: Investment Company DC Capital LLC and UNIVER Capital LLC. During this period these entities conducted more than 70% of the trades in the units of Closed-End Rental Unit Investment Fund Zemli Podmoskovya.
Univer Capital LLC and IC DC Capital LLC conducted repeatedly nonstandard trades for their account in the units of Closed-End Rental Unit Investment Fund Zemli Podmoskovya, while placing alternate orders to buy and sell units with a short time lag and their volume and prices coincided, which proves that the said entities acted in collusion. These trades were conducted to maintain the market value of the units of Closed-End Rental Unit Investment Fund Zemli Podmoskovya and create the illusion of activities in the unit market. The said units were used by a limited number of entities, in particular, by financial institutions, in order to intentionally misrepresent financial statements.
It should be noted that, while conducting the above trades, UNIVER Capital LLC acted as a market-maker in the unit market, thus, its activities are covered by the provisions of Article 5 Section 3.3 of Federal Law No.
However, pursuant to Article 5 Section 2.1 of the Federal Law, activities performed by IC DC Capital LLC during the said period which were aimed at conducting trades in the units of Closed-End Rental Unit Investment Fund Zemli Podmoskovya and resulted in substantial deviation in the price and/or volume of trades in the units may be qualified as market manipulation.
Market manipulation is a flagrant violation of the Russian Federation legislation.
The Bank of Russia has made a decision to revoke the license of a securities market professional participant in dealer activity issued to IC DC Capital LLC.
Financial market qualification certificates issued to IC DC Capital LLC officials involved as securities market professional participants in trades qualified as market manipulation of units of Closed-End Rental Unit Investment Fund Zemli Podmoskovya have been revoked.
17th December 2015
The Bank of Russia established facts of repeated and lengthy manipulation of the markets of ordinary and preference shares of OJSC Lenenergo (hereinafter, the Equity) at the trading of CJSC MICEX SE from September 2013 till June 2015.
The Bank of Russia’s inspection revealed that during this period CJSC IC Energocapital made a series of transactions by prior arrangement with its customer ONPER TRADING LIMITED. CJSC IC Energocapital used the customer’s trading account in its interests, which resulted in considerable deviations in the volumes of Equity trading, as well as demand and supply.
During this period, ONPER TRADING LIMITED and CJSC IC Energocapital systematically made a series of transactions within a short time span, which made a considerable share of daily Equity trading volume. These entities made bids simultaneously or within the seconds span. With rare exception, such deals resulted in the unchanged daily net-position of ONPER TRADING LIMITED in both equity and monetary terms. CJSC IC Energocapital and ONPER TRADING LIMITED were the key counterparties in the Equity market.
The inspection revealed that ONPER TRADING LIMITED and CJSC IC Energocapital with rare exception made deals in the Equity markets through offsetting orders placed by an authorised representative of CJSC IC Energocapital. In exceptional cases such offsetting orders were placed by two employees of CJSC IC Energocapital. These employees of CJSC IC Energocapital had the powers of attorney authorising them, among other things, to make any securities transactions on behalf of ONPER TRADING LIMITED without its prior agreement.
CJSC IC Energocapital had financial interest in achieving certain volume of trading in the OJSC Lenenergo equity markets, notably receiving a fee from its customer Energocapital-Consult LLC, the agent of the Equity issuer, under the relevant agreement in compliance with which one of parameters envisaged by the agreement was the achievement of certain monthly turnover in each OJSC Lenenergo equity market.
During the period under review, CJSC IC Energocapital was a market maker in the Equity markets. At the same time, CJSC IC Energocapital made equity transactions where ONPER TRADING LIMITED was a counterparty, on the basis of bids placed not within the contractual obligations of CJSC IC Energocapital as a market maker stipulated by the agreement with the Exchange.
Transactions between ONPER TRADING LIMITED and CJSC IC Energocapital made by the employees of CJSC IC Energocapital which resulted in considerable deviations in Equity trading volumes and supply and demand are considered as market manipulation in compliance with Clauses 2 and 4 of Part 1 of Article 5 of Federal Law No.
Thereby, the employees of CJSC IC Energocapital manipulated OJSC Lenenergo equity markets in the interests of CJSC IC Energocapital using the trading account of its customer ONPER TRADING LIMITED who had authorised CJSC IC Energocapital and its employees to make securities transactions on its behalf.
Market manipulation is a gross violation of the Russian legislation and a violation of professional conduct of financial market participants.
The Bank of Russia cancelled licences of professional securities market participant issued to CJSC IC Energocapital.
Administrative measures will be considered with regard to CJSC IC Energocapital and its officials involved in transactions made by the professional securities market participant, which resulted in Equity market manipulation.
The relevant inspection materials will be submitted to the law enforcement bodies.
10th December 2015
The Bank of Russia established a fact of repeated and continuous abuse of the market of investment units of Rozhdestvensky, closed-end real estate unit investment fund (real estate CUIF), during the trading on CJSC MICEX SE in
The trading activity in the market of investment units of Rozhdestvensky, real estate CUIF, during the period under consideration was fully maintained by deals made under prior agreement between the following interconnected entities: IC Talan LLC, Deal-tag LLC, Dmitry Solntsev, Romix LLC, Thayctel LTD, Technostroy LLC and CJSC Energoinvest.
IC Talan LLC, Dmitry Solntsev, Deal-tag LLC, Technostroy LLC, CJSC Energoinvest and Romix LLC made deals aimed at increasing the market value of investment units of Rozhdestvensky, real estate CUIF. As the investment unit reached its maximum value during the trading, Technostroy LLC and CJSC Energoinvest purchased the investment unit of Rozhdestvensky, real estate CUIF, from Thayctel LTD, a non-resident company registered in the Republic of Cyprus. Afterwards, IC Talan LLC, Dmitry Solntsev, Deal-tag LLC, Technostroy LLC, CJSC Energoinvest and Romix LLC made deals aimed at bringing the market price of the investment unit down. As the market price of the investment unit of Rozhdestvensky, real estate CUIF, fell to the level of the imputed value of the investment unit, Thayctel LTD made reverse transactions to purchase investment units from Technostroy LLC, CJSC Energoinvest and other trading participants.
Thereby, deals with investment units were repeatedly made during the trading on CJSC MICEX SE as a result of which Thayctel LTD systematically gained income, while Technostroy LLC, CJSC Energoinvest, Romix LLC and IC Talan LLC suffered losses, and the actions of IC Talan LLC, CJSC Energoinvest, Technostroy LLC, Deal-tag LLC, Romix LLC and Thayctel LTD in the market of investment units of Rozhdestvensky, real estate CUIF, were aimed at creating favourable and appropriate conditions for systematic transfer of funds into a foreign jurisdiction.
Deals with investment units of Rozhdestvensky, real estate CUIF, made by the said persons during the period under consideration resulted in considerable deviation in price and/or trading volume of these investment units, and considered to be market abuse pursuant to Clause 2 of Part 1 of Article 5 of Federal Law No.
Market abuse is a gross violation of the Russian legislation.
The Bank of Russia decided to cancel the licence of professional securities market participant to carry out dealer activity of IC Talan LLC.
Bank of Russia cancelled qualification certificates of financial market specialists of the officials of IC Talan LLC involved in deals made by professional securities market participants which resulted in the abuse of market of Rozhdestvensky, real estate CUIF.
The Bank of Russia sent the persons who had manipulated the market of Rozhdestvensky, real estate CUIF, instructions on non-admission of similar violations in future.
4th December 2015
The Bank of Russia has established the facts of continued and repeated manipulation with the market for investment units of the closed-end unit investment hedge fund Altair and the closed-end unit investment hedge fund Iskona managed by AMC GPI, limited liability company (hereinafter, the Funds), at auctions held by MICEX Stock Exchange, closed joint-stock company, in 2011 to 2013.
Trading activities in the markets of the aforementioned units were maintained through pre-agreed transactions by a group of interconnected entities: HFL Finance LLC, Eco-Engineering LLC, JSCB FINPROMBANK PJSC, Palreco Ltd, and UM Finance Ltd, also having links with issuers of bonds, which had made up the Funds’ property, i.e., Ecolive Ltd and Yorkland Holdings Ltd, and with the persons who had invested these bonds in the Funds’ property.
The volume of pre-agreed transactions between these entities amounted to over 95% of total trades in units of the closed-end unit investment hedge fund Altair and 82% of total trades in units of the closed-end unit investment hedge fund Iskona in the period under review.
Pursuant to Clause 2 of Part 1 of Article 5 of Federal Law No.
The Bank of Russia has established that JSCB FINPROMBANK PJSC made long-term investments in the Funds’ units and over a long period of time kept their records at a value based on the results of transactions with the Funds’ units at auctions held by MICEX Stock Exchange CJSC, without making loss provisions.
The facts revealed and the procedure for and the quality of assessing the Funds’ property indicate that the latter were set up in the interests of beneficiaries from the scheme of establishing unit markets not related to investing in Ecolive Ltd and Yorkland Holdings Ltd.
Market manipulation is a flagrant violation of the Russian Federation legislation.
Persons involved in the transactions by HFL Finance LLC and UM Finance Ltd, which resulted in market manipulation with the Funds’ units, had their qualification certificates of financial market specialists cancelled.
The Bank of Russia also forwarded to persons involved in market manipulation instructions to prevent similar violations in the future.
13th August 2015
The Bank of Russia established a fact of repeated and continuous abuse of the markets of investment units of Centre, closed-end rent unit investment fund (rent CUIF), and Malakhit, rent CUIF, during the trading on CJSC MICEX SE in
The trading activity in the markets of investment units of Centre, rent CUIF, and Malakhit, rent CUIF, during the period under consideration was fully maintained by the following interconnected entities: CB Koltso Urala LLC, Regional AVK LLC, REA Delovoy Dom LLC, Solutions and Investments LLC and CJSC Uralleasing, also connected with the management company of the said funds MC Sodruzhestvo LLC. They bargained by prior agreement.
Pursuant to Clause 2 of Part 1 of Article 5 of Federal Law No.
Besides, some deals with investment units of Centre, rent CUIF, and Malakhit, rent CUIF, repeatedly made by the said entities on certain trading days of the period under consideration which resulted in considerable deviation in price of these investment units, are considered to be market abuse pursuant to Clause 6 of Part 1 of Article 5 of Federal Law No.
The trading activity in the market of investment units of Strazhi Urala, real estate CUIF, during the period under consideration was fully maintained by the following interconnected participants: CB Koltso Urala LLC, CJSC Management Company United Investment Funds, UGMK-Strakhovanie, and Oleg Pelikh, also connected with the management company of the said funds MC Sodruzhestvo LLC. They bargained by prior agreement.
Some deals with investment units of Strazhi Urala, real estate CUIF made by CB Koltso Urala LLC, CJSC Management Company United Investment Funds, UGMK-Strakhovanie, and O.A. Pelikh during the period under consideration resulted in considerable deviation in price of these investment units, and considered to be market abuse pursuant to Clause 2 of Part 1 of Article 5 of Federal Law No.
Market abuse is a gross violation of the Russian legislation.
It should be noted, that Centre, rent CUIF, and Malakhit, rent CUIF, terminated their activity shortly after the MC Sodruzhestvo LLC received Bank of Russia instructions to provide documents regarding trust management of these funds.
The Bank of Russia took a decision to cancel licence to carry out professional activity in the securities market of CJSC Management Company United Investment Funds.
Bank of Russia cancelled qualification certificates of financial market specialists of the officials involved in deals made by professional securities market participants which resulted in the abuse of markets of the said investment units.
Administrative measures were applied to some officials involved in the abuse of markets of the said investment units.
The Bank of Russia sent the persons who had manipulated the markets of the said investment units, instructions on non-admission of similar violations in future.
9th July 2015
The Bank of Russia established facts of repeated market manipulation with regard to trades in Mechel OAO common stock on the Moscow Exchange.
In the course of its examination the Bank of Russia found out that on 13 November 2013 and 28 February 2014 Mechel OAO common stock prices significantly dropped during the trading sessions on the Moscow Exchange as a result of concurrent large calls for sale. On 13 November 2013, several traders offered more than 14.5 million shares for sale, and on 28 February, the offer exceeded 18.5 million shares, making 59% and 43% of the total stock trade on the indicated dates respectively.
Non-standard offers for stock sale were initiated by 8 Russian professional players, and also by 10 foreign brokers (investment companies trading at their customers’ instructions). Meanwhile, due to interaction with foreign counterparts and due to information provided by the Cyprus Securities and Exchange Commission, the Bank of Russia learned that all the non-standard offers were made in the interest of one entity, i.e. UFS Investments Ltd with the involvement of UFS CAPITAL LIMITED, a foreign broker company.
Over the same period of time, UFS Investments Ltd and UFS CAPITAL LIMITED sold depositary receipts on the common stock of Mechel OAO on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE).
Acting on behalf of UFS Investments Ltd, UFS CAPITAL LIMITED struck deals to sell shares on the basis of offers with the lowest selling prices, after which during subsequent trading days reverse deals were made on behalf of UFS Investments Ltd.
It was also established that on 14 November 2013, UFS Investments Ltd made deals with shares during the trading session on the Moscow Exchange, and that the obligations of the parties to these deals were performed on account and for one and the same entity — UFS Investments Ltd.
According to Clauses 3 and 5 of Part 1 of Article 5 of Federal Law No.
The facts of stock market manipulation became possible because of improper discharge by the foreign depository (custodian) UFS CAPITAL LIMITED of its obligation to safekeep shares belonging to its legitimate owner. UFS CAPITAL LIMITED disposed of the shares at its discretion, namely, without obtaining required instructions this company posted shares belonging to their legitimate owner to the custodian account of UFS Investments Ltd. After this, the shares were sold at organised trades.
The stock market manipulation was conducted with the involvement of a Russian professional securities market participant — IC Arbat Finance (the former name of the company was IC UFS Finance), which set up a confusing scheme for the accounting of stock rights. Market manipulation is a gross violation of the Russian legislation requirements, and also a breach of financial market participants’ professional ethics. Besides, IC Arbat Finance created obstacles to examinations, and submitted contradictory and misleading information to the Bank of Russia.
In the period from 25 September 2009 to 25 June 2015, the sole executive body of IC Arbat Finance was Elena V. Zheleznova, which is also the sole founder and managing director of UFS CAPITAL LIMITED, and a beneficial owner of UFS Investments Ltd, UFS CAPITAL LIMITED and IC Arbat Finance. The actions of E.V. Zheleznova directly led to stock market manipulation by UFS CAPITAL LIMITED and UFS Investments Ltd. Besides, on many occasions E.V. Zheleznova did not provide information requested by the Bank of Russia.
As a result of repeated and gross violations of the legislative requirments on countering the illegitimate use of insider information and market manipulation, and also Russian securities legislation, the Bank of Russia decided to cancel the qualification certificate of financial market specialist issued to E.V. Zheleznova and to cancel the licences of a professional securities market participant issued to IC Arbat Finance.
The Bank of Russia passed over information on the violations of the Russian laws and, possibly, of the laws of the Republic of Cyprus commited by UFS Investments Ltd and UFS CAPITAL LIMITED to the Cyprus Securities and Exchange Commission. The licences of the investment company UFS CAPITAL LIMITED had been canceled earlier by the said commission.
The Bank of Russia submitted information on actions constituting the stock market manipulation and bearing the evidence of criminal offence to the Investigative Committee of the Russian Federation for consideration and procedural decision making.
29th April 2015
The Bank of Russia has established facts of market manipulation with regard to ordinary shares of Rosneft JSC, ordinary and preference shares of OJSC Rostelecom, ordinary shares of JSC RusHydro, ordinary and preference shares of Sberbank, ordinary shares of Surgutneftegaz OJSC, ordinary shares of Tatneft JSC, ordinary shares of ОАО LUKOIL (hereinafter referred to as ‘Shares’) during the trading sessions on the Moscow Stock Exchange over the period from 1 February, 2012 to 1 October, 2013 by the following entities: Ursa Capital LLC, Transportny LLC, INRESBANK LLC in its own interests and by the clients of INRESBANK LLC — JSCB MOSOBLBANK OJSC, RIK LLC, RSD LLC, Finance Business Bank LLC and also by a client of another professional player Shepelev Evgeniy Lvovich.
During the course of examination were established facts that the above mentioned entities acted in collusion concluding deals with the Shares, which resulted in sufficient deviation of the trades volume and Shares demand and supply.
During some days the share of the agreed deals between Ursa Capital LLC, Transportny LLC, INRESBANK LLC, JSCB MOSOBLBANK OJSC, RIK LLC, RSD LLC, Finance Business Bank LLC comprised
Pursuant to Article 5, Section 1.2 of Federal Law No.
It should be noted that market manipulation of the Shares had been arranged by INRESBANK LLC, JSCB MOSOBLBANK OJSC and Finance Business Bank LLC in a period before the Bank of Russia took its decision about their financial recovery. Former majority shareholders of INRESBANK LLC, JSCB MOSOBLBANK OJSC and Finance Business Bank LLC were removed from being owners or managers of these organisations. In light of the above mentioned, the Bank of Russia will not apply administrative measures regarding the said credit institutions. Still the Bank of Russia cancelled qualification certificates of securities market specialists of the employees involved in the market manipulation. Such employees were dismissed from the posts they had taken in the stated credit institutions.
Licences authorizing professional activity in the securities market of other legal entities, involved in market manipulation with the Shares, were cancelled.
The Bank of Russia has also forwarded an order notifying the entities involved in the Shares market manipulation that they should avert similar violations in the future.
16th March
The Bank of Russia has ascertained the facts of repeated manipulation of unit markets of closed-end rental unit investment fund Istok managed by FORTIS-Invest Management company LLC, closed-end rental unit investment fund GBM-Alfa and closed-end rental unit investment fund GBM-Beta managed by GBM Capital LLC at the trading sessions of MICEX Stock Exchange CJSC in 2012 and 2013.
The unit markets of closed-end rental unit investment fund Istok, closed-end rental unit investment fund GBM-Alfa and closed-end rental unit investment fund GBM-Beta were created artificially practically in full. The prices and trading volumes of units of all the three funds at the trading sessions of MICEX Stock Exchange CJSC were formed by non-marketable methods and supported purposefully by legal entities affiliated with each other and with the management companies of units: ВРМ А LLC, CarTrade LLC, Land Investment Company LLC, Samokat LLC, ElectroSbyt LLC, Galant LLC. The overwhelming majority of transactions with the funds’ units on the exchange (over 90%) were made by these entities. Moreover, considerable shares in trading volumes of unit markets of closed-end rental unit investment fund GBM-Alfa and closed-end rental unit investment fund GBM-Beta were formed involving CB Miraf-Bank CJSC, which had made premeditated transactions with Samokat LLC and ElectroSbyt LLC.
In pursuance of Clause 2 of Part 1 of Article 5 of Federal Law No.
The actions to manipulate unit markets of closed-end rental unit investment fund Istok, closed-end rental unit investment fund GBM-Alfa and closed-end rental unit investment fund GBM-Beta were aimed at misleading a wide number of investors, as well аs the financial market regulator with regard to the price and liquidity of these units.
Based on Clause 5 of Part 1 of Article 14 Federal Law No.
19th February 2015
The Bank of Russia has established the fact of continued and repeated manipulation with the market for investment units of ZPIFN Montes Auri Mountain (closed-end real estate unit investment fund Montes Auri Mountain) during the period from July 2011 to June 2014.
The market for investment units of ZPIFN Montes Auri Mountain was almost completely created artificially by a group of interconnected individuals, also having indirect links with OOO UK Montes Auri (Montes Auri LLC), the asset manager of ZPIFN Montes Auri Mountain. The vast majority of trades in investment units were executed on the ZAO MICEX SE (closed joint stock company MICEX Stock Exchange) by Denis Alekseevich Bredikhin, Dmitry Andreevich Yakovenko, Aleksander Sergeevich Pristupnitskiy, Sergey Vladimirovich Vikharev and Rinat Rimovich Battalov acting in collusion. The above persons were sustaining trading activities on the market for investment units and their quotations, while in some cases cross trades comprised up to 100% of the daily trading volume in investment units of ZPIFN Montes Auri Mountain.
The way bids were submitted for executing trades in investment units, the systematic nature of trades, the limited number of trading market participants, the apparent connection between counterparties, lack of economic rationale behind the trades for some of them indicate that the trades were executed by counterparties acting in collusion, and liquidity, as well as prices, trading volumes, demand for investment units and their supply were artificially maintained.
These activities were presumably undertaken with a view to misleading a large part of the investor community as regards the price and liquidity of the investment units of ZPIFN Montes Auri Mountain.
Pursuant to Article 5, Section 1.2 of Federal law No.
In accordance with Article 14, Section 1.5 of Federal law No.
The Bank of Russia is currently considering other enforcement measures to be imposed on individuals involved in market manipulation (market abuse).
12th November 2014
The Bank of Russia has established the fact of continued and repeated manipulation of the market for investment units of the closed-end credit unit investment fund Rossiyskiy Kreditny Soyuz, ZPIFC RKS (Russian Credit Union) during the period from November 2011 to September 2013.
The market for investment units of ZPIFC RKS was almost completely created artificially by a group of interconnected legal entities and individuals, also having links with OOO MFOND (MFOND LLC), the asset manager of ZPIFC RKS. The vast majority of trades in investment units of ZPIFC RKS were executed on the ZAO MICEX SE (MICEX Stock Exchange, CJSC) by OAO MEZHTOPENERGOCOM Investment Company (Interregional Fuel & Energy Investment Company, OJSC), ZAO Kompaniya Portphelnykh Investitsiy (Portfolio Investment Company, CJSC), OAO Bank Narodny Credit (People’s Credit Bank, OJSC), and R. M. Mironov acting in collusion. The above entities were sustaining trading activities on the market for investment units of ZPIFC RKS and their quotations by executing collusive trades. In most cases, cross trades effected by the above entities during the trading period comprised up to 100% of the daily trading volume in investment units of ZPIFC RKS.
That said, it should be noted that on certain days, when executing trades, OAO MEZHTOPENERGOCOM Investment Company was both a party to the trades acting on its own behalf and a trading participant acting on behalf and for the account of its clients, ZAO Kompaniya Portphelnykh Investitsiy and OAO Bank Narodny Credit, in accordance with the brokerage agreements concluded with them.
In view of the interconnectedness among OAO MEZHTOPENERGOCOM Investment Company, ZAO Kompaniya Portphelnykh Investitsiy and OAO Bank Narodny Credit through a group of legal entities and private individuals, and in respect of the lack of trades in investment units of ZPIFC RKS executed by other entities/individuals on the MICEX Stock Exchange on such days, it has been established that OAO MEZHTOPENERGOCOM Investment Company was acting on behalf of its clients, ZAO Kompaniya Portphelnykh Investitsiy and OAO Bank Narodny Credit by prior arrangement.
Pursuant to Article 5, Section 1.2 of Federal law No.
Market abuse shall be construed as a flagrant violation of the laws applicable in the Russian Federation, in breach of the code of professional conduct for financial market participants.
The Bank of Russia has taken the decision to revoke the license authorizing professional activity in the securities market held by legal entities, professional securities market participants, manipulating the market for investment units of ZPIFC RKS.
Furthermore, certificates of qualification in financial markets held by the officials involved in the trades executed by professional securities market participants, which resulted in the manipulation of the market for investment units of ZPIFC RKS, have been cancelled.
10th July 2014
Being in informational exchange with foreign regulating authorities, in February 2012 the Bank of Russia established facts of misuse of insider information of Otkritiye investicii LtD (Opin LtD) and ONEXIM HOLDINGS LIMITED.
In February 2012 ONEXIM HOLDINGS LIMITED decided to prepare a mandatory offer of ordinary personal uncertificated shares purchase issued by Opin, JSC. Before the information was provided to Federal Financial Market Service of the Russian Federation in March 2012, it had a status of insider information both for Opin LtD and for ONEXIM HOLDINGS LIMITED.
Inspections conducted by the Bank of Russia revealed the fact of
delivering the insider information about the planned offer to ARDELICA LTD by
S.S. Gorskiy, who at that time was
ONEXIM HOLDINGS LIMITED representative. In such a way S.S. Gorskiy violated item 2 part 1 article 5 of the Federal Law №
Using the insider information, ARDELICA LTD purchased in
February 2012 Opin, JSC, shares in Moscow
Exchange trades. The shares were stored up by FOESTA LIMITED, which interests
were also represented by S.S. Gorskiy. The final
beneficiary of the manipulations was ONEXIM HOLDINGS LIMITED. By
conducting such manipulations, ARDELICA LTD, FOESTA LIMITED
and ONEXIM HOLDINGS LIMITED violated item 1 part 1 article 6 of Law
The transactions were likely aimed at profiting by ONEXIM HOLDINGS LIMITED from purchase of Opin, JSC, shares before its shareholders received the mandatory offer of a price without acquisition premium.
According to item 5 part 1 article 14 of Law
According to item 1 part 1 article 15 of Law
We call your attention, that insider trading foresees criminal responsibility since August 2013. That’s why the Bank of Russia has no ground for sending inspections results to law-enforcement authorities for beginning a criminal investigation. Still, the facts described in this informational message, established by fulfilling the supervisory activities by the Bank of Russia and represented in the instructions, can be used for assessing business reputation of individuals and legal entities mentioned above.
23th June 2014
The Bank of Russia established facts of multiple and enduring manipulations with investment units issued by closed-end investment rent income fund Agrokapital trading in Moscow exchange in 2012 and 2013.
Inspections revised, that market for investment units Agrokapital, ZPIF was almost completely simulated. Prices of the investment units on Moscow exchange trades, like other trade characteristics (volume, supply and demand) were formed in non-market ways and intentionally supported by concerned individuals and legal entities related to each other. Being customers of the same financial market professional participant, the individuals and legal entities accomplished the greatest part of transactions with the investment units.
Exceptions with Agrokapital investment units were accomplished by individuals and legal entities, connected to the fund management company Euro Trust — a securities market professional participant - and a number of other individuals and legal entities.
Manipulations with Agrokapital investment units were aimed at misinformation of a wide range of investors and the financial market regulator about price and liquidity of the investment units.
Market manipulations are a crude violation of Russian legislation and a violation of professional honor of financial market participants. The Bank of Russia cancelled qualification certificates of securities market specialists from individuals operating in companies, which were securities market professional participants and were involved in manipulations, namely Ivanov A.A., Kuprina E.G., Shachurina V.V. and Davidov A.V.
Individuals, who took part in manipulations, will be held administratively liable.
28th May 2014
The Bank of Russia established facts of multiple manipulations with ordinary shares issued by Joint Stock Company UK ORF and investment units issued by Interval mutual investment fund of mixed investments “Third reserve fund” trading in Moscow exchange in 2011 and 2012.
Inspections revised, that trades with shares and investment units of the companies were almost completely simulated. 96,78% of trade volume of ORF, JSC, shares was accomplished with Fineko, LLC, and its customers — individuals and legal entities, related to each other, by the issuer, the management company of “Third reserve fund” and by the securities market professional participant itself. 99,71% of trade volume of “Third reserve fund” investment units was accomplished with Fineko, LLC, and its customers.
The trading authority Fineko, LLC, conducted an agreement with the companies mentioned above on market-making services for their shares and investment units. According to the agreement, Fineko, LLC, and its 32 customers submitted bids for the shares and investment units. Russian legislation on the prevention of misuse of insider information and market manipulations doesn’t regard actions aimed at price, demand, supply and trade volume support conducted according to agreements with trading authority as market manipulations.
In this very case, transactions with ORF, JSC, shares and “Third reserve fund” investment units concluded with Fineko, LLC, acting in own best interests and for its customers benefit, amounted to 90.8% (ORF, JSC) and 99,6% (“Third reserve fund”).
Manipulations with shares and investment units were accomplished by Fineko, LLC, customers — Russian and foreign individuals and legal entities. Individuals took different positions in ORF, JSC, which was a managing company of the “Third reserve fund” and in Fineko, LLC, a securities market professional participant, which contributed to the manipulations. The companies controlled legal entities manipulating on the financial instruments market.
Hence, prices for financial instruments were formed on Moscow exchange trades in non-market ways, as well as other trade characteristics (volume, supply and demand) and supported by concerned parties related to each other. The Bank of Russia believes, that JSC UK ORF share prices and “Third reserve fund” investment units prices developed in the open market (official rates) are not fair and do not represent the true value of the financial instruments.
Market manipulations are a crude violation of Russian legislation. The Bank of Russia revoked license for securities market professional participant for broker activity from Fineko, LLC, and cancelled qualification certificates of securities market specialists by Yuminov O.V., Orlov I.V. and Yakovlev A.S., who took positions of Director General in JSC UK ORF, Director General in LLC Fineko and compliance officer in LLC Fineko.
27th February 2014
Inspections conducted by the Bank of Russia’s Financial Market Service established facts of market manipulations accomplished with registered preference shares issued by Joint Stock Company “Oil Transportation Joint-Stock Corporation “Transneft” on the Moscow Exchange trades in period from December 2012 till March 2013.
URSA capital, LLC, acting in own best interests and Inresbank, LLC, acting for the benefit of its customer — legal entity — accomplished a number of mutual transactions on preliminary agreement with Transneft, JSC, shares in period from December 2012 till March 2013. By trading in anonymous trade regime a party submitted bids for a transaction, its counterparty simultaneously submitted an opposite bid for an identical volume and price. Accomplishment of the transactions in negotiated deal mode was followed by a submission of address orders closing reversed purchase and sale transactions between the same parties and for the same amount. On some days the transactions were conducted at first in negotiated deal mode, following with reversed deals accomplished in the general trade mode. The described manipulations resulted in substantial shares price and trade volume deviations.
URSA capital, LLC, Inresbank,
LLC and its customers accomplished a number of transactions in trading with
preference shares of Transneft, JSC, in period from
December 2012 till March 2013, regarded as market manipulations according to
item 2 part 1 article 5 of the Federal Law №
Specialists in securities market qualifications certificates were revoked by officials, who had passed resolutions of bid submission for transactions resulting in market manipulations with preference shares of Transneft, JSC, and officials, who hadn’t carefully fulfill compliance duties, which led to crude violations of regulations of the Russian Federation by securities market participants.
27th February 2014
Based on the inspections results conducted by the Bank of Russia’s Financial Market Service a fact of ordinary shares market manipulations was established, which had taken place in Moscow Exchange trades from December 2012 till April 2013. Manipulations were committed by Republic investment company, LLC, Republic financial corporation, JSC, and Inresbank, LLC.
The transactions, accomplished from December 2012 till April 2013
committed on stock exchange trades by Republic investment company, LLC,
Republic financial corporation, JSC, — customers of Inresbank,
LLC — can be classified on their mechanism as transactions on preliminary
agreement and are seen as market manipulations according to Federal Law №
According to item 2 part 1 article 5 of this Federal Law, market manipulations are defined as accomplishment of transactions with financial instruments, foreign exchange and (or) a commodity on preliminary agreement between trades participants and (or) their officers and (or) individuals and legal entities at the expense of which and for the benefit of which transactions are carried out, resulting in price, supply, demand and trade volume deviations of the financial instrument, foreign exchange and (or) a commodity form the level, that would remain without the transactions.
Functioning as securities market professional participants and manipulating the shares market legal entities lost their license for securities market professional participant activities.
Qualifications of specialists in securities market were revoked by officials, who accepted decisions of bid submission for transactions resulting in market manipulations and officials, who didn’t carefully fulfill compliance duties, which led to crude violations of regulations of the Russian Federation by securities market participants.
27th December 2013
The Bank of Russia’s Financial Market Service revealed manipulations with the Varyeganneftegaz, JSC, shares in Moscow Exchange trades in the period from March 2012 till September 2013.
The basis for inspections was a proclamation made by a securities market professional participant about accomplishing by its customers transactions bearing marks of market manipulations. The integrated system of financial market monitoring also revealed a number of odd transactions with Varyeganneftegaz, JSC, ordinary shares, accomplished by the same customers of the securities market professional participant.
The inspections revealed, that three individuals, which were customers of the same market professional participant and had blood relationship to each other, accomplished a number of repeating transactions, that occupied a great market share in trading with Varyeganneftegaz, JSC, ordinary shares. On some trading days such transactions amounted to 100% of the daily trade volume with the shares. The described transactions resulted in price and other market variables deviations of Varyeganneftegaz, JSC ordinary shares.
The inspections established, that the actions were committed by one and the same individual for his own benefit, using accounts opened for other individuals.
The individual, who accomplished manipulations with Varyeganneftegaz, JSC, ordinary shares, will be held administratively liable.
13th November 2013
The Bank of Russia’s Financial Market Service established the fact of repeated manipulating the market of the shares issued by War and Peace Media Group, JSC, at the Moscow Exchange trades in 2012.
Manipulating was accomplished by founders and by company officials.
The market of the War and Peace Media Group, JSC, shares was manipulated through intentional dissemination of false information and through transactions with its shares agreed before by participants benefiting from them. As a result of the manipulations market variables deviated from the level, that would remain without the transactions. Besides, during trading days in Moscow Exchange, multiple transactions for the benefit of one and the same individual based on bids with highest purchase price and lowest selling price were accomplished, resulting in price deviation from the level, that would be formed without such bids. The manipulations were aimed at benefiting from reverse transactions carried out by deviated prices.
Transactions describes above were carried out in great volume, had no economic purpose and were only aimed at imitating high demand for War and Peace Media Group, JSC, shares, in order to sell them to general public and increase trades activity.
Besides, the company official individual violated the Federal Law “On the prevention of misuse of insider information and market manipulations, with amendments to concerning legislative acts of the Russian Federation” in the items concerning the delivery of notices about transactions accomplished with the company’s shares.
The concerned War and Peace Media Group, JSC, official individual will be held administratively liable by the Bank of Russia’s Financial Market Service.
Inspections results will be sent to law-enforcement authorities for beginning a criminal investigation due to the fact, that involved individuals gained profit in an especially large amount. The Bank of Russia’s Financial Market Service will provide assistance to law-enforcement authorities in investigating the manipulations.
To prevent similar manipulations in future by the offenders, they were forbidden to accomplish any transactions with trading authorities including any operations with derivatives.
In addition, the Bank of Russia’s Financial Market Service sent to Moscow Exchange a letter on necessary measures to be taken for precautions and preventions of manipulations with War and Peace Media Group, JSC.
September 10, 2013
The Bank of Russia’s Financial Market Service established the fact of manipulating Bogorodskie delikatesy, OJSC, shares at the Moscow Exchange trades in December 2012.
The inspection revealed activities with the Bogorodskie delikatesy, OJSC, shares taken by a number of legal entities and classified as market manipulation in accordance with the Federal law “On countering the illegal use of inside information and market manipulation and on amending certain legislative acts of the Russian Federation”. Such activities were submitting bids for the Bogorodskie delikatesy, OJSC, shares transactions that led to their decline from the level that would have formed without their submitting. The overwhelming majority of Bogorodskie delikatesy, OJSC, shares transactions at Moscow Exchange trades were made by entities carrying out manipulation.
Among the legal entities carrying out manipulation there was an organization that, at the moment when the indicated activities were made, was a professional participant of the securities market. By the time the inspection was finished the mentioned organization’s license of a professional securities market participant had been revoked. The Bogorodskie delikatesy, OJSC, shares were a part of the company’s financial investments, the buy-sell transactions of these stocks aimed at sitting and fixing a market price of the shares, among all for giving the appearance that the company’s own funds respond to the standards of the own funds sufficiency established by the Russian legislation on securities.
Individuals who carried out manipulations of the Bogorodskie delikatesy, OJSC, shares market will be called to administrative account by the Financial Markets Service of the Bank of Russia.
July 1, 2013. 21:09. Author: Dmitry Pankin
In autumn 2011 many market participants, mass media and business representatives noted a rapid growth of KALINA shares prior to the purchase of the controlling block of KALINA shares by Unilever represented by Unilever Rus, LLC. In that period I was often asked about a possible misuse of inside information about the purchase of KALINA shares. That was the time, when FFMS of Russia started investigations of that fact.
We requested a huge number of documents, the FFMS of Russia received and analyzed information on more than 300 individuals and about 50 entities that participated in preparation of the deal of the KALINA controlling shares block buyout by the Unilever company together with the Unilever Rus, LLC. During the inspection it was established that some individuals involved in the deal misused the inside information, that they had at their disposal and bought KALINA shares themselves.
One of those individuals was a KALINA employee who held a chief position. At first he accomplished shares transactions in his own name, then — via discretionary accounts in other individuals’ name.
Besides, the inside information was illegally used by the legal entity registered in foreign jurisdiction that carried out transactions of KALINA shares buying in the over-the-counter market.
The volume of transactions carried out by the individuals mentioned above exceeds a few hundred million rubles.
This is the first proved case of illegal use of inside information in the Russian market.
In the near future we will send all available materials to the law-enforcement authorities.
June 19, 2013
The Federal Financial Markets Service (FFMS) revealed AvtoVAZ OJSC shares manipulations at Moscow Exchange trades in December 2012.
Manipulations were established through inspection of the issuer’s request to the service and of data received from the integrated system of financial market monitoring used by the FFMS of Russia.
Conducted inspections revealed, that manipulations were conducted by spreading false information in mass media by legal entities and individuals. The entities and individuals involved in spreading false information were also found out. Besides, the FFMS of Russia detected false information supposed to be spread in future.
In order to establish manipulations, dozens of requests for information were sent and a great number of document s received was analyzed. The information and documents contained evidences of entities and individuals involvement in manipulations and also evidences of relations between them.
As a result of market manipulations, the AvtoVAZ OJSC shares price changed and the volume of shares trades rose considerably. Furthermore, the inspections detected that as a consequence of the indicated activities a lot of market participants incurred losses.
The individual, who manipulated the AvtoVAZ OJSC shares market, will be held administratively liable by the FFMS of Russia, and the evidences will be sent to law enforcement authorities.
May 30, 2013
The Federal Financial Markets Service (FFMS) established manipulations
with the
Manipulations were established through inspection of the issuer’s request to the service and of the data received from the integrated system of financial market monitoring used by the FFMS of Russia.
The inspections revealed, that two Russian citizens, related to each other and being customers of the same securities market professional participant, regularly concluded mutual transactions. The individuals mentioned above simultaneously submitted bids and matching bids. On some days the share of such transactions reached 100% of the daily trading volume of the bonds. On some days the bond volatility rose up over 100%. Later on, those bonds were sold to other trading participants by one of the mentioned individuals.
The individuals involved in manipulating the
April 25, 2013
The Federal Financial Markets Service ascertained manipulation with ordinary shares prices of open joint-stock company Proektniye Investiciyi during the trading sessions at the MICEX Stock Exchange from January 2012 to February 2013.
The inspection was triggered by the applications of a number of individuals to the Service. In the course of the inspection the FFMS of Russia also received applications from market participants with information that their clients’ orders bore some signs of manipulation with shares of Proektniye Investiciyi, JSC.
In the course of the inspection it was determined that from January 2012 to February 2013 clients of several professional participants regularly conducted crossing trades. For example, trade volume of transactions conducted by them with shares of Proektniye Investiciyi, JSC, covered a considerable part of daily trade volume, and for several days it amounted almost to 100%. These transactions caused a considerable deviation of shares price.
Broker’s accounts of one Russian individual and two foreign entities were used for the manipulation. The inspection detected the connections between these persons. Besides, it was found out that the manipulative transactions were carried out for the benefit of the issuer, Proektniye Investiciyi, JSC.
The persons responsible for the manipulation with ordinary shares prices of Proektniye Investiciyi, JSC will bear administrative responsibility. The FFMS of Russia will send the materials of inspection to the law enforcement authority.
March 06, 2013
The Federal Financial Markets Service ascertained manipulation with ordinary shares prices of open joint-stock company AKB AVANGARD during the trading sessions at the MICEX Stock Exchange from December 2011 to May 2012.
The manipulation was detected during an inspection organized to check the information about probable manipulation received from the Overall Monitoring System for the financial market. Besides, the Service received an application from a securities market professional participant that his client accomplished transactions bearing signs of market manipulations.
In the course of inspection it was determined that customers of several professional participants regularly conducted crossing trades. For example, for several days trade volume of transactions with AKB AVANGARD, JSC, performed by these participants amounted to 100% of daily trade volume of the shares.
According to the conclusion issued by the Experts Committee on Sustainable Market Deviations under the FFMS of Russia, the mentioned transactions caused a sustainable deviation of price of shares of AKB AVANGARD, JSC, and other market variables.
Further relevant investigations aimed to carefully examine the circumstances under which the transactions were conducted by the mentioned persons revealed that these actions were actually committed on behalf and at the expense of one individual, i.e., they were actually crossing trades.
The person responsible for the manipulation with ordinary shares prices of AKB AVANGARD, JSC, will bear administrative responsibility. Besides, it will be considered the possibility of sending the materials on this violation to the law enforcement authority.
February 22, 2013 at 15:03 Written by Dmitry Pankin
The Federal Financial Markets Service ascertained another episode of manipulation. This time ordinary and preference shares of Archangelskaya Sbytovaya Companiya were manipulated during trading sessions at the MICEX Stock Exchange.
We received information about an episode of possible manipulation from a professional participant. The results of trading session were analyzed and it was discovered that the maximum trade volume of ordinary and preference shares was reached on December 16, 2011, and it amounted to 1,266,347 and 2,064,122 rubles according to shares categories.
We also found out that 90% of daily trade volume of ordinary shares and 96,53% of daily trade volume of preference shares were accomplished by two participants (individuals). The transactions were economically inefficient, as they were accomplished at the same price and earned no profit. No-address bids for the transactions were submitted simultaneously with identical volume and prices. And in the majority of cases the time gap between bids was less than 5 seconds.
The information received by the Service during the inspection was examined by the Experts Committee on Sustainable Market Deviations under the FFMS of Russia. The Committee members acknowledged that the accomplished transactions caused a sustainable deviation of market variables of the issuer’s securities, in particular it concerned daily trade volume.
Besides, we disclosed that individuals who accomplished the transactions are members of the Board of Directors of BaikalInvestBank, JSC, and members of the Supervisory Board of the Enisey Bank Public Company, and they occupy managerial positions in Ortiga Group, LLC. Based on this information, we come to the conclusion that their actions were committed intendedly and in collusion.
This incident is the first episode of manipulation with non-marketable securities reported by the Service under the Law on Inside Information.
November 29, 2012
The Federal Financial Markets Service ascertained the manipulation with ordinary shares prices of open joint-stock company Solikamsk Magnesium Plant during trading sessions at the MICEX Stock Exchange in March 2012.
Having received several requests from individuals and entities, the FFMS of Russia carried out an inspection from March to November of that year to check the provided information.
In the course of the inspection the FFMS of
Russia revealed that a copycat website http://см3.рф/ appeared in the Internet,
and its spelling and wording resembled http://смз.рф/, the website of SMP, JSC.
Besides, the copycat website was visually identical to SMP website. The copycat
website contained misleading information on repurchase of SMP shares at the
price much higher than the market price registered on the MICEX Stock Exchange.
It caused a considerable variance of price and other market shares variables
which is regarded as market manipulation according to Paragraph 1 Part 1
Article 5 of Federal Law No.
The person responsible for the manipulation will bear administrative responsibility. Besides, the FFMS of Russia will send the materials it possessed to the law enforcement authority.
September 20, 2012
The Federal Financial Markets Service ascertained manipulation with ordinary shares prices of open joint-stock company RBC during trading sessions at the MICEX Stock Exchange in the autumn of 2011.
The manipulation was detected during the inspection organized after a request of RBC, JSC, the issuer of the shares.
The inspection revealed several transactions with a considerable variance of price and other market variables. Some transactions were performed by trading session participants within a standard investment or speculative strategy. Nevertheless, it was noticed that during several days in November 2011 some transactions accomplished by a group of clients of one of securities market professional participants were interconnected. The mentioned transactions caused a considerable variance of price and other market variables, and for several days the volume of transactions with RBC shares amounted to 40% of daily trade volume of the shares.
The inspection revealed that the transactions were accomplished for the benefit of one individual who also participated in the trading session. The mentioned person will bear appropriate administrative responsibility, and inspection results will be sent to law enforcement authority.
August 10, 2011
The Federal Financial Markets Service ascertained price manipulation with ordinary shares of open joint-stock company TATBENTO during trading sessions at the MICEX Stock Exchange.
The manipulation with bond prices was detected during the inspection organized after the request of a trading session participant and it was also discovered by the Overall Monitoring System for the financial market of the FFMS of Russia.
The manipulation was performed from September to December 2010 by several persons, clients of the above mentioned trading sessions participant, one of whom, a citizen of Russia, is the founder of TATBENTO, JSC. Prices on ordinary shares of TATBENTO, JSC, increased by more than 150% within the mentioned period
The persons responsible for the manipulation with bond prices will bear appropriate administrative responsibility. The FFMS will disclose the information on the mentioned person after the imposition of administrative sanctions.
The FFMS of Russia will send inspection results to the law enforcement authority.
June 30, 2011
The Federal Financial Markets Service ascertained price manipulation with ordinary shares of open joint-stock company Samaraenergo during trading sessions of the RTS Stock Exchange.
The manipulation with bond prices was detected during the inspection which was organized following the request of a trading session participant, one of the largest Russian investment companies.
The manipulation was effected by a client of
this company, a citizen of the Russian Federation, in December 2010 during the
validity of the provisions of Federal Law No.
The person responsible for the manipulation with bond prices will bear appropriate administrative responsibility. The FFMS will disclose the information on the mentioned person after the imposition of administrative sanctions.
The FFMS of Russia will send inspection results to the law enforcement authority.
May 25, 2011
The Federal Financial Markets Service ascertained the manipulation with the prices on a number of securities, i.e., prices on bonds of Citronics, JSC (state registration No. 4-01-50038-A), AKB Investtorgbank, JSC (state registration No. 40402763B), Tatfondbank, JSC (state registration No. 40403058B), Metallservice-Finance, LLC (state registration No. 4-01-36246-R), Setl Group, LLC (state registration No. 4-01-36160-R), Rotor, LLC (state registration No. 4-03-36052-R), Strategia Investment Company, LLC (state registration No. 4-02-36238-R), prices on investment units of closed-end real estate fund Rodnye Prostory managed by Management Company Ermak, CJSC, prices on ordinary shares of Management Company Strategia, JSC, during trading sessions of the MICEX Stock Exchange, CJSC, as well as prices on ordinary shares of Permpromnedvizhimost, JSC, and Promyshlenny Activ, JSC, during trading sessions of RTS, JSC,.
The manipulation with securities prices was detected during the inspection.
The manipulation took place in
Persons responsible for the manipulation with securities prices will bear appropriate administrative responsibility. The FFMS will disclose the information on the mentioned persons after the imposition of administrative sanctions.
The inspection materials will be sent to the law enforcement authority.
March 25, 2010
The Federal Financial Markets Service took a decision to acknowledge price manipulation with shares of InterTradeInvest, JSC, and FinComInvest, JSC, performed by the following persons: Profit-Time, LLC (TIN 7701770811), Assole, LLC (TIN 7733680134) and Ajvengo, LLC (TIN 7724605204) within the trading sessions of the closed joint stock company MICEX Stock Exchange.
This decision is taken according to the securities legislation and is based on the results of an inspection carried out by the FFMS of Russia.
In the course of the inspection the Service found out that within the trading day Profit-Time, LLC, carried out numerous transactions with shares of InterTradeInvest, LLC, in the interest of Assole, LLC, as well as transactions with shares of FinComInvest, JSC, in the interest of Ajvengo, LLC, without any economic sense or legal purpose, and the fulfilment of liabilities under which did not change securities’ holders.
It should be noted that the above mentioned actions increased prices and demand on the shares of InterTradeInvest, JSC, and FinComInvest, JSC, as well as their trade volume on the FFMS.
The results of the inspection carried out by the FFMS of Russia will be sent to the law enforcement authority in order to detect criminal crimes.
Due to the acknowledgment of the manipulation with securities prices, the FFMS of Russia revoked the licenses to carry out broker, dealer activities, portfolio management and custody business issued to the securities market professional participant Profit-Time, LLC, as well as qualification certificates of Koguta Sergey Viktorovich, its General Director, and Burenko Oksana Borisovna, a compliance officer.
Profit-Time, LLC, repeatedly violated the securities legislation of the Russian Federation, including federal authority regulations governing the securities market, i.e., Federal Law on the Securities Market, Regulations on Broker and Dealer Activities on the Securities Market of the Russian Federation, Regulation on the Accountability of Securities Market Professional Participants, Capital Adequacy Ratio for securities market professional participants, investment funds management companies, open-end funds and non-governmental pension funds.
December 28, 2010
The Federal Financial Markets Service took a decision to acknowledge price manipulation with ordinary registered uncertified shares of Biodinamika, JSC, Donskaya Investment Company, JSC, Mezhotraslevaya Strahovaya Companiya, JSC, Polyot, JSC, and FinInvest, JSC.
This decision is taken according to the securities legislation and it is based on the results of the inspection carried out by the FFMS of Russia.
In the course of the inspection the Service found out that from 2008 to 2010 Donskaya Investment Company, JSC, and FinInvest, JSC, manipulated shares prices of Biodinamika, JSC, Donskaya Investment Company, JSC, Mezhotraslevaya Strahovaya Companiya, JSC, Polyot, JSC, and FinInvest, JSC, during trade sessions at the Moscow Stock Exchange and carried out repeated transactions with the above mentioned shares for the benefit of their clients CenterLeasing, JSC, and SK Expertno-Konsultativnoe Strakhovanie, LLC, without any obvious economic sense or legal purpose, and the fulfilment of liabilities under which did not change securities’ holders.
The inspection also found out that from 2008 to 2010 CenterLeasing, JSC, and SK Expertno-Konsultativnoe Strakhovanie, LLC, manipulated shares prices of Biodinamika, JSC, Donskaya Investment Company, JSC, Mezhotraslevaya Strahovaya Companiya, JSC, Polyot, JSC, and FinInvest, JSC, in the course of trade sessions at the Moscow Stock Exchange, as they issued orders to one or simultaneously two trading participants to carry out two or more transactions with the same security, and in the transactions the buyer and the seller acted for the benefit of the client.
As the result of the actions performed by Donskaya Investment Company, JSC, TradeFinance, LLC, Center Leasing, JSC, and SK Expertno-Konsultativnoe Strakhovanie, LLC, the prices on shares of Biodinamika, JSC, Donskaya Investment Company, JSC, Mezhotraslevaya Strahovaya Companiya, JSC, Polyot, JSC, and FinInvest, JSC, were maintained at a fixed level, and their trade volume was increased at the Moscow Stock Exchange, JSC.
Due to the acknowledgment of shares prices manipulation, the FFMS of Russia revoked the licenses to carry out broker, dealer activities, securities management and depository activities issued to securities market professional participant Donskaya Investment Company, JSC.
Earlier, on September 22, 2009, the FFMS of Russia revoked the licenses of the securities market professional participant TradeFinance, LLC, because of committed violations.
At present the Federal Financial Markets Service is going to send the inspection results to the law enforcement authority.
In the course of its monitoring of on-exchange trading of market participants, the Bank of Russia detects cross-trades which may be qualified as market abuse.
These cross-trades are conducted on the basis of orders made by an entity acting both as a seller and a buyer in a transaction conducted for its own account as a result of cross-orders being placed:
1) Through various participants (brokers, banks, etc.) by one entity with a different customer identification code registered with the exchange; or
2) Through one participant in the event the exchange authorises the said trading participant, upon its request, to conduct cross-trades.
In some cases, these trades are conducted via algorithmic trading systems operating on behalf of one and the same entity. This results from the fact that mechanisms preventing on-exchange trading transactions between various ‘strategies’ were not implemented in the relevant algorithms.
In this regard, the Bank of Russia finds it necessary to inform market participants as follows.
The trades, obligations under which are fulfilled for the account and on behalf of the same entity, may result in sufficient deviations of trading parameters. As a whole, they may be qualified as market manipulation pursuant to Article 5, Section 1.3 of Federal Law No.
The Bank of Russia recommends that market participants, when developing algorithmic trading systems, take into account the risks that arise out of the conducting of on-exchange cross-trades.
Participants, prior to filing an application with the exchange in order to receive an authorisation for their clients to conduct cross-trades, are recommended to consider whether this authorisation would be relevant and expedient. In the event the said authorisation is given to a client which is a foreign entity providing services to third parties in the financial market, the participant is recommended to consider whether it would be relevant for the exchange to register ‘second-layer’ clients to be able to discern clients on whose behalf trades are conducted.
The corporate shareholder (company) intended to purchase a controlling interest in the issuer’s shares traded on the exchange. As a result of the purchase, the said shareholder was subject to an obligation to make a public offer to the minority shareholders of the issuer. During the preparation of the mandatory offer, the shareholder, having provisionally set its terms and conditions, was purchasing the issuer’s shares on the exchange through its affiliated companies acting on its behalf. After that, the accumulated issuer’s shares were transferred from the custody accounts of the above affiliated companies to the custody accounts of the above corporate shareholder under over-the-counter share purchase agreements in place. That said, the company did not take any formal corporate actions relating to the acquisition of the issuer’s shares and terms and conditions of the mandatory offer during the purchase period.
The activities specified above were undertaken during the period following the corporate action issued by the company regarding the intended acquisition of a controlling interest in the shares and hence the launch of a mandatory offer subject to certain conditions but before the offer was actually forwarded to the regulator and the issuer, and before the disclosure of this information in line with the established procedure. The shares were purchased at a price lower than that being made available in the intended mandatory offer. As soon as the information relating to the launch of the mandatory offer by the corporate shareholder was disclosed to the regulator to give prior notification, the exchange saw an increase in the volume of the issuer’s shares traded, as well as higher prices for the shares. As soon as the information relating to the launch of the public offer, as well as its terms and conditions, were disclosed to the issuer, the issuer’s share price considerably declined reaching the level comparable to the mandatory offer price.
The company, by way of explanation for its actions, stated that it did not consider the information regarding the plans for acquiring a controlling interest in the issuer’s shares, and hence the preparation of the mandatory public offer, as insider information since it had failed to follow the formal corporate procedures for decision-making with regard to the issues specified. Moreover, according to the company, it was not subject to the requirement to maintain an insider list.
These practices are considered unfair by the Bank of Russia, in breach of the insider trading and market manipulation legislation. Failure to comply with any formal provisional rules and procedures established by legislation, binding on companies, as well as failure to adhere to internal corporate policies and procedures does not absolve such a company from liability for future insider trading violations.
The information concerning the person controlling the issuer (directly or indirectly through affiliated persons), as well as about the launch of a voluntary, mandatory or competitive offer for the acquisition of the issuer’s shares is insider information pertaining not only to the issuer but also to other persons having access to such information. That said, the information regarding the launch of a public offer is considered insider information from the moment its preparation starts and all the essential terms and conditions are tentatively set out by the shareholder. For instance, the time the shareholder files an application for a bank guarantee, which is binding in this case, may be considered such a moment. Persons having access to such information, as well as persons having launched the relevant offer are considered insiders.
The corporate shareholder should have implemented all the necessary measures to protect the said insider information and ensure that individuals designated by law having access to insider information are on the insider list. The corporate shareholder and its insiders with regard to the information relating to the launch of the public offer should have refrained from transactions in the issuer’s shares on the exchange under invariably preferential terms and conditions specifically set for them, as compared with the terms and conditions under the mandatory public offer prior to the disclosure of insider information about the launch of the public offer.
The corporate shareholder misused the insider information regarding the launch of the public offer with a view to conducting transactions to acquire the issuer’s shares through third party companies, as well as by passing on the insider information to these companies, which is expressly prohibited by law. The corporate shareholder engaged in illegal and unfair conduct in order to avoid losses stemming from an increase in the issuer’s share prices on the exchange, which may have occurred under the influence of the said information during the acquisition of the shares.
The corporate shareholder’s conduct has infringed the rights and legitimate interests of independent organized market players, i.e. investors that incurred losses due to the lack of information required to make correct, informed investment decisions with regard to the situation under review. The organized market players selling the issuer’s shares that did not have access to the relevant insider information prior to its official disclosure were invariably put at a disadvantage by the corporate shareholder and its related parties during this period given that they were selling the shares at a price lower than that being subsequently made available in the mandatory offer. Therefore, the market conditions for fair value pricing of the issuer’s shares were undermined.
The corporate shareholder’s representative disclosed, to the mass media, that as soon as the company purchases a controlling interest in the issuer’s shares, it intends to launch a public offer to the minority shareholders of the issuer for the acquisition of their shares.
The announcement resulted in an increase in the issuer’s share trading volume and a substantial rise in the share quotations on the exchange over an extended period of time. In accordance with the criteria established by the trading organizer (exchange), the deviation in the demand, trading volume and price for the issuer’s shares appeared material. However, the offer was not launched, which was caused by the difficulties faced by the corporate shareholder while trying to raise funds necessary for purchasing the shares under the offer. The corporate shareholder subsequently dismissed the idea of acquiring the issuer’s shares.
Pursuant to Article 5, Section 1.1 of Federal law No.
However, the above practices are qualified as unfair by the Bank of Russia since they fail to comply with the established code of business conduct and ethics in the financial market and may fringe the rights and legitimate interests of investors, financial market players.
The information disseminated through the announcement made by the corporate shareholder, by its nature and content, under certain conditions shall be qualified as insider information and disclosed in line with the established procedures. To this end, it is necessary to provisionally define and agree on all the material terms and conditions of the intended transaction for the acquisition of the issuer’s shares and obtain confirmation and guarantees most relevant to its execution (for example, with regard to the possibility and willingness to provide the required funding). Otherwise, as it happened in the above-mentioned instance, the information disseminated is inaccurate and untimely, unconfirmed or representing the expectations of someone who provided the information regarding the probability and desirability of certain circumstances.
The announcement made by the corporate shareholder contained information concerning its plans, intentions, expectations and assumptions with regard to acquiring a controlling interest in the issuer’s shares, the launch of a public offer to the minority shareholders of the issuer, receiving the required funding and obtaining a bank guarantee for the acquisition of the issuer’s shares. The information disseminated by the corporate shareholder’s representative was not definite, accurate and precise. Along with that, in the context of the announcement made it was perceived by the financial market participants as final and accurate. The dissemination and supply of such information by any means without relevant reservations are deemed unacceptable by the Bank of Russia from the perspective of fair practices.
The company’s official providing such information should take into account the increased sensitivity of the financial market to the disclosure of the said information, regardless of how accurate it is, and hence accept reasonable responsibility for the possible use of the said information by market participants. The dissemination or supply of such information may be misleading for them and materially affect the price and other parameters of a financial instrument, thereby distorting the market factors behind fair value pricing. The use of such information may inflict losses on investors.
When disseminating such information through the mass media and official sources, it is necessary to specifically emphasize that it is tentative and not final, while highlighting that it may possibly be revised and subsequently altered. Along with that, it is necessary to focus the market on the probability of the said events, among other things, depending on compliance with internal policies and procedures as required by law (for instance, approval of the transaction by relevant management bodies of the company; gaining consent for the transaction from the competition authority; issuing relevant notification). Treatment of such information as insider information and its subsequent gradual disclosure (progressively as the information is revised and altered), in accordance with the established rules and procedures, make it possible to fully and effectively protect the rights of all stakeholders.
If information disseminated in this manner fails to be in line with the real intents, proves inadequate, inaccurate, or incomplete, leaves room for ambiguous or incorrect interpretation by market participants, the relevant source of information shall immediately demand that the information is refuted, revised or amended (specified) in accordance with the established rules and procedures. Such revisions will enable other interested market participants to avoid inherently wrong investment decisions.
The facts of similar unfair practices will be taken into account by the Bank of Russia when assessing the business reputation of the persons involved in the said conduct. More rigorous controls will be imposed on transactions and other activities of the said persons in the financial market.
The professional securities market participant intends to sell its securities or receives an order from its client, under the brokerage services agreement in place, for the sale of a large block of securities, the liquidity of which is not sufficient enough to ensure that the said order may be executed on the exchange by the desired dates. Attempts to sell such securities on the exchange in small quantities set a downward trend in the price of securities, and hence may result in a substantial decline in profits from any subsequent sales of the block of securities.
In this regard, the professional securities market participant seeks to find, to its own or the client’s benefit, a counterparty to the transaction by means of issuing and disseminating, to a wide range of market participants, an analytical report deliberately containing a positive assessment of securities and highlighting their investment attractiveness. This analytical report may be prepared and issued by the professional securities market participant interested in the transaction (its analytical division) on its own behalf; along with that, it may be commissioned by the said market participant (or its official) and issued by some other person not directly related to him that has no interest in the transaction, inter alia, by some other professional securities market participant on its own behalf. Thereafter, the professional securities market participant effects a transaction to sell the said block of securities for its own account and on its own behalf or on behalf of its client in collusion with the counterparty. Pursuant to Article 5, Section 1.2 of Federal law No.
In this particular case, the analytical report disseminated to a wide audience has been used by the professional securities market participant as a tool to influence potential buyers with a view to selling a large block of securities.
The above practices, i.e. the issue and dissemination of analytical reports by professional securities market participants with a view to artificially creating a favorable information background for the implementation of investment decisions in the financial market, are deemed unfair by the Bank of Russia, regardless of whether the decisions (transactions and trades) implemented in this manner result in a material deviation in the market parameters of a financial instrument or not. Conducting such collusive trades in the over-the-counter market by making use of deliberately false information, conclusions and recommendations contained in the analytical report is deemed as unfair practices by the Bank of Russia as well. Despite the fact that, to date, such conduct is not directly referred to as market manipulation under the Russian legislation, the given practices appear misleading to market participants and, essentially, represent one of the means to deliberately spread misinformation.
Along with that, according to international practices the above-mentioned series of actions taken by the professional securities market participant is defined as manipulative practices.
The professional securities market participant intended to sell a large block of securities under conditions that could not be secured by the market (lack of adequate demand for securities and hence low price level) and influence the market situation (by means of information resources). The professional securities market participant fulfilled the above intention, having artificially created the requisite situation in the market through stimulating the demand for securities by means of the analytical report with a view to generating profits.
In order to prevent similar unfair practices, it seems appropriate to introduce, among other things, a clear division and segregation of duties assigned to the investment and analytics divisions of professional securities market participants.
The facts of similar unfair practices will be taken into account by the Bank of Russia when assessing the business reputation of the persons involved in the said conduct. Along with that, more rigorous controls will be imposed by the Bank of Russia on transactions and other activities of the said persons in the financial market.
In response to the request submitted by the Issuer, the Bank of Russia has conducted an investigation into alleged market manipulation involving ordinary shares of the Issuer (hereinafter the Shares) traded on ZAO MICEX Stock Exchange (hereinafter the Exchange), which saw their share price decline over a few days by more than 50%.
During the course of the investigation the Bank of Russia established as follows.
The Issuer’s foreign subsidiary (hereinafter the Subsidiary) is a client of a foreign broker (hereinafter the Broker), which is a client of a Russian professional securities market participant, a trading participant on the Exchange. In order to raise the requisite funding, the Subsidiary entered into an over-the-counter REPO transaction in Shares with the Broker (hereinafter the Repo transaction) against the Issuer’s guarantee.
The Subsidiary failed to discharge its obligations to the Broker under the REPO transaction in a timely manner.
In accordance with the terms and conditions of the agreement with the Subsidiary, the Broker started to heavily sell low liquid Shares on the Exchange in the main trading mode, which caused the Share price to plummet.
The conduct of the parties does not constitute a breach of any prohibitions expressly set forth under Federal law No.
However, given that the conduct of the parties to the REPO transaction artificially caused a substantial change in the price of Shares traded on the Exchange, the Bank of Russia deems it necessary to draw market participants’ attention to the following.
- Market participants should carry out a comprehensive risk assessment. Specifically, the volume of the REPO transaction concerned exceeded several hundred times the average daily trading volume of Shares. Such a volume does not allow for a possibility to quickly sell Shares on the Exchange in the main trading mode without materially affecting the price. The possible decline in the Share price was not adequately accounted for in the discount rate agreed on by the parties to the REPO transaction. The Bank of Russia considers that the Broker failed to take a balanced approach to risks. When carrying out a risk assessment, prior to entering into the REPO transaction, the Broker should have performed an analysis of the liquidity and capacity of the Share market.
- The Broker having specialist knowledge of financial markets and the requisite infrastructure, prior to the sale of a large block of Shares, ignored the level of liquidity in the market, failed to take into account possible implications of the sale of Shares traded on the Exchange and did not consider any other options of the sale of a block of Shares.
- The irresponsible conduct of the Subsidiary and the Broker could have inflicted potential losses on third parties, shareholders of the Issuer.
- The Subsidiary is managed by the Issuer’s employees. The Issuer was aware that the second leg of the REPO transaction was entered into but failed to be executed in a timely manner by the Subsidiary, and that the Broker intends to sell Shares to pay off the Subsidiary’s debt. However, the Issuer failed to fully implement the appropriate measures to resolve the said conflict situation. In its request the Issuer withheld some facts and circumstances of the case, thereby misinforming the Bank of Russia and putting pressure on the Broker through the Bank of Russia.
The Bank of Russia proposes that market participants should be more responsible and carefully consider possible implications of their conduct. Situations related to the counterparties’ failure to discharge their obligations under over-the-counter transactions shall be resolved within the boundaries of the legal framework and should not materially affect the rights and interests of third parties.