Statement by Bank of Russia Governor Elvira Nabiullina in follow-up to Board of Directors meeting on 11 September 2026
Good afternoon. Today, we have made the decision to keep the key rate at 14% per annum.
The current price growth rate was high in July and August. The economy continued to grow at a moderate pace. Credit activity was elevated.
The summer acceleration in price growth was mainly attributable to the situation in the fuel market. It is a one-off factor per se, however, it is affecting prices for a wider range of goods and services. Inflation expectations stay high as well. The Bank of Russia will need more data to assess the magnitude and duration of these effects and their impact on underlying inflation. Furthermore, fiscal policy parameters are an important consideration for monetary policy. They are expected to be updated by the end of September. All of the above factors have provided grounds for making a pause in cutting the key rate at today’s meeting.
I will now explain the reasons behind our decision.
Firstly, inflation.
During the summer months, inflation accelerated. Importantly, while the main factor of this acceleration in June was the direct contribution of petrol and diesel price growth, later, its indirect effects began to materialise through the rise in businesses’ costs, along with the second-round effects related to the increase in inflation expectations and demand. In July, measures of underlying inflation demonstrated growth. According to our estimates, they shifted to the range of 5–6% in annualised terms. These estimates might be updated after we receive full statistical data for August.
Households’ inflation expectations decreased in August, while still significantly exceeding the levels of 2026 H1. The expectations of businesses and financial market participants have edged up since July.
In the baseline scenario, we expect the decline in underlying inflation to resume as the effects associated with the temporary reduction in production capacities dissipate, provided that aggregate demand growth remains modest. However, the Bank of Russia needs to be sure that this is happening to cut the key rate.
Secondly, the economy.
High-frequency data show that the economy continues to grow at a moderate pace in 2026 Q3. In July, a rather wide range of industries recorded growth. Those experiencing disruptions at production facilities faced a considerable downturn. That said, businesses’ sentiment and expectations regarding output and demand have slightly improved overall according to recent surveys.
The rise in consumption decelerated somewhat in July, while remaining high. In the summer months, it was supported by elevated demand for fuel. We will be able to assess the contribution of transitory and persistent factors to consumption growth more accurately in the next few months.
Investment activity has been gradually recovering, following its weak dynamics in 2026 Q1. Companies continue to implement large projects in a number of industries, namely in chemical production, energy, and transport vehicle manufacture.
The tightness in the labour market is easing gradually. The proportion of businesses experiencing labour shortages is decreasing. Wage growth rates have edged down, although labour productivity growth is still lagging behind significantly. For inflation to decelerate sustainably, the gap between the growth rates of labour productivity and those of wages should narrow further. It is strongly preferable for the above to be achieved through faster growth of labour productivity.
Overall, data for 2026 H1 and high-frequency indicators for 2026 Q3 show that economic growth is in line with our forecast.
Thirdly, monetary conditions.
They remain moderately tight. The dynamics of nominal rates have been mixed: deposit rates have edged up, while loan rates have continued to decline gradually. According to our estimates, overall monetary tightness in real terms has decreased slightly since July.
The propensity to save stays high. Households’ ruble funds with banks continue rising at a moderate pace. In the structure of savings, the proportion of current and savings accounts, cash money, and investments in real estate and financial market instruments is expanding.
July saw lending growth accelerate again, primarily in the corporate segment, after more subdued dynamics in June. Coupled with elevated budget expenditures, this has led to the year-to-date increase in money supply running above the trajectory that was typical of the period of low inflation in 2016–2019.
When evaluating monetary conditions in the coming months, we will pay particular attention to two factors. The first one is the sustainability and strength of corporate credit growth. The second factor is final budget projections, which are expected to be announced this month.
Now, I would like to speak of external conditions.
The situation in the Middle East continues to influence the environment in global markets. Prices for many commodities are rising in response to another round of escalation. In a number of major economies, inflation is accelerating and interest rates are going up.
As for the Russian economy, the dynamics of physical export volumes are restrained by geopolitical factors and temporary disruptions at a number of logistics facilities. Simultaneously, demand for imports is rising, driven in part by the need to ensure the supply of petroleum products and replenish the reduced stocks. The combination of these factors caused the ruble to weaken somewhat in the summer months.
I will now speak of risks.
We still consider that proinflationary risks prevail and believe that they have risen. The economy might return to the imbalance between demand and supply, after they aligned in 2026 H1. Demand growth might remain elevated as a result of a stronger fiscal impulse and an accelerated increase in lending. Concurrently, if the restoration of production facilities takes more time than assumed in the baseline scenario, this will constrain supply growth. As a result, price pressures might intensify. High inflation expectations might amplify these effects. Proinflationary risks are also associated with the tightness in the labour market and external conditions.
A more considerable cooling of domestic demand, as compared to our baseline estimates, remains a disinflationary risk.
Winding up, I would like to comment on our future decisions.
Price growth has sped up notably over recent months. This has been triggered by one-off factors that are beyond the influence of monetary policy. However, monetary policy can and should respond to their second-round effects, preventing a one-off acceleration in price growth from turning into a persistent trend. The above requires maintaining moderately tight monetary conditions. We have stated repeatedly that the key rate cannot be cut automatically, as monetary policy easing requires certain conditions to be in place. Out future decisions will be guided by the dynamics of inflation and inflation expectations, as well as the balance of risks. The key rate path will be set to ensure a decline in inflation to 4% in 2027 and its stabilisation at the target further on.
Thank you for your attention.
Q&A for the Media
QUESTION from TASS:
Good afternoon. My question is traditional. What were the key rate decision options that the Board of Directors discussed today? You have touched on the prospects of a key rate reduction. How do you evaluate the scope for its reduction? How much room is there today and has it decreased?
ELVIRA NABIULLINA:
At this meeting, we substantively considered keeping the key rate unchanged. Apparently, what distinguished this meeting from the previous one is that there was no meaningful discussion of a key rate cut. Regarding the scope for a key rate reduction in the future, we will revisit this issue when preparing our updated forecast in October. Nevertheless, we may state that proinflationary risks have risen and remain dominant. Therefore, we will take into account this factor as well.
QUESTION from Reuters:
Have you changed your estimates of the budget deficit and how? Have you changed your estimate of the expected period needed to restore the oil refineries? Earlier, you said that you expected them to be restored before the end of the year. Has this period become longer? Generally, crude prices are high now. The situation in the Red Sea has escalated, which is exacerbating logistics problems. How can a longer period of high crude prices affect future policy in general?
ELVIRA NABIULLINA:
Speaking of our assumptions regarding the budget and the impact of the situation in the fuel market, our estimates, assumptions, and hypotheses remain the same so far because we have not received any updates about fiscal policy. We expect the Government to approve the budget parameters for the next three years this month. If these updates differ from our baseline scenario hypothesis (specifically, a budget deficit equalling 2% of GDP in 2026, 1% of GDP in 2027, 0.5% of GDP in 2028, and zero in 2029), if the trajectory is different, we will factor this into our updated October forecast.
As for the estimated timeframe for restoring the damaged facilities, our assumptions remain unchanged as well. We believe that they will be restored before the end of the year.
ALEXEY ZABOTKIN:
Speaking of the situation in the Middle East, de-escalation in the region remains distant. As we said earlier, the disinflationary effect of higher energy commodity prices in Russia was apparently largely exhausted in 2026 Q2. Going forward, higher prices for crude oil, energy and other commodities will exert increasingly strong inflationary pressure on domestic prices as they feed through global supply chains and the input prices for Russia’s imports.
The Bank for International Settlements published a relevant article in August. It shows that the inflationary impact of strong energy price shocks on energy-exporting economies is weaker than on energy-importing economies, but the net effect is still inflationary.
QUESTION from Russia 24:
How did you factor in the situation in the fuel market when making today’s decision? Your forecast says that the impact of this factor will wane by the end of the year. What is the assumption behind this forecast?
ELVIRA NABIULLINA:
Indeed, the situation in the fuel market was a factor we discussed when making our key rate decision. This is a one-off factor, but it has already affected a wider range of goods and services. It would be premature to assess the overall magnitude and duration of these effects right now. We need to see how the situation unfolds and receive more data. Nevertheless, we firmly assume that the situation will stabilise gradually and the production facilities will be restored before the end of the year. We can see that the Government and companies have been taking required measures and that the Government has been providing essential support for enterprises. Both are making every effort to restore and protect the damaged facilities. Therefore, our baseline scenario relies on this assumption. However, we will certainly monitor further developments in the fuel market.
QUESTION from Kommersant:
My question is about the correlation between the key rate and inflation expectations. From an outsider’s perspective, they have actually been almost uncorrelated over the past year. Inflation and the key rate are 1.5 times lower than in June 2025, whereas inflation expectations remain at 13–14%. Taking this into account, is it possible to say that this factor now has a weaker effect? One may not say that it is ignored, but it is not a primary factor in decision-making.
ELVIRA NABIULLINA:
No, we still believe that inflation expectations are at least as important as observed inflation, since they affect the tightness of monetary conditions, demand, and monetary policy decisions, and therefore, it is critical to consider both factors together. This factor remains equally important because households’ and businesses’ expectations regarding future prices influence their behaviour and demand.
However, inflation expectations are decreasing more slowly, which is apparently natural and expected due to a prolonged period of high inflation. The fact that inflation expectations are now high – I would like to reiterate that I am referring to the inflation expectations of households, businesses, market participants, and analysts – is a factor that now limits room for a further key rate reduction and necessitates a very cautious approach. We will assess disinflation as sustainable only if inflation expectations decline sustainably as well.
QUESTION from Delovoy Petersburg:
You stated that the accumulated tightness of monetary policy created conditions for returning inflation to its 4% target as early as 2026 H2. Recently, the baseline inflation forecast has been raised to 6–7%. Is this not a contradiction? Does this mean that attaining the inflation target will require a longer period of a higher key rate than assumed before?
ELVIRA NABIULLINA:
We see no contradiction here. At our previous meeting, we did raise the inflation forecast for this year to 6–7%, that is, by 1.5 pp, which was due to the one-off effect of the situation in the fuel market. We said that, in terms of the underlying component, it was current price growth, rather than annual inflation, that we expected to stabilise close to 4% by the end of this year. This is still what we expect to achieve, provided that the impact of the developments in the fuel market wanes in line with our estimates and given the measures implemented by the Government.
Keeping the key rate on hold today will also help maintain demand growth at a moderate level so as to avoid an intensification of second-round effects. Furthermore, in July, we raised our key rate forecast for 2027, which means that we expect monetary policy to be tighter and that we have less room for reducing the key rate, than we assumed in 2026 H1. One of the reasons is that the structural primary deficit is now expected to reach zero only in 2029. What does this mean? This means that the contribution of government demand will be greater and the Government will allocate more funds to prop up the economy, which will require a more modest increase in private credit so as to ensure that the economy returns to a balanced growth path and low inflation.
QUESTION from InvestFuture project:
According to the recent draft of the Monetary Policy Guidelines and your speech today, global economic prospects have been deteriorating. Generally, the draft also notes that negative developments in the segment of artificial intelligence may cause the risk scenario to materialise. It is unclear how worsening prospects of technology companies can affect a resident of Tambov, for example. This is my first question. And question two, please. Does the Central Bank plan to change the inflation target considering that businesses believe the target to be unattainable? Don’t you think that it would be reasonable to raise the target?
ELVIRA NABIULLINA:
Answering your first question, a possible decline in the value of assets, which may be associated with the artificial intelligence boom, is an element of the risk scenario considered in our Monetary Policy Guidelines, rather than a trigger. However, the main risks in this scenario are still the imbalances accumulated in the world economy and large amounts of government debt. As global inflation accelerates, debt servicing costs go up as well, which may cause local crises in securities markets to spill over into other industries. We consider this risk of the imbalances accumulated in the world economy as one of the main elements of the risk scenario. Our risk scenario also assumes a possible increase in the sanctions pressure, as well as other factors. Nevertheless, I would like to emphasise that the likelihood of the risk scenario is low. This is a hypothetical scenario where we describe how the Bank of Russia will act in case of such developments.
As regards changing the inflation target, we explored the impact of different inflation targets on the economy in general and public welfare as part of our previous Monetary Policy Review. These studies showed that the target should be lowered rather than raised. However, if we decide to change the target, we will certainly need a preparation period. We will discuss this topic in our second Monetary Policy Review.
We do not consider the possibility of raising the inflation target as we believe this to be very harmful. Those who suggest increasing the target think that this will drive interest rates down. To the contrary, interest rates will only rise, and consequently, the affordability of credit will certainly decrease. This is because a higher target would mean a higher inflation premium in interest rates. They will not be moderate. Emerging market economies, many of which initially adopted a 4% inflation target, reduced their targets precisely to ensure both growth in public welfare and more moderate interest rates, that is, more affordable loans. Therefore, the logic is just the opposite in this regard.
QUESTION from Anna Finance project:
The ruble weakened significantly in August, whereas the US dollar and the euro strengthened by 8.7% and 10.3%, respectively. You have already said that growing imports contribute to the weakening of the national currency. To what extent can the current depreciation of the ruble affect the path of the key rate? Are there any estimates of a possible level of the ruble exchange rate?
ELVIRA NABIULLINA:
The impact of exchange rate dynamics on inflation depends less on the magnitude of the exchange rate movement over a given period, and more on how significantly the exchange rate deviates from expectations, primarily those of enterprises when they prepare their plans and factor a specific exchange rate into these plans. I should say that the current exchange rate of the ruble is very close to businesses’ expectations, which is confirmed by the results of our monitoring. These expectations have not increased since the beginning of the year. Indeed, they have been fluctuating during the year, but they are currently close to the level recorded at the beginning of the year. Accordingly, the scale of the pass-through of exchange rate dynamics to prices is always more moderate than could be expected in the event of an automatic pass-through of actual exchange rate movements over a given period when a movement happens.
As regards the effect of the pass-through itself, our estimates remain unchanged. I would like to reiterate that the ultimate effect depends on exchange rate expectations, although this is not the only factor. It also depends on the availability of stocks of imported goods, the level of domestic demand, and other parameters. The effect of the exchange rate on inflation has always been moderate. This means that when the nominal effective exchange rate of the ruble weakened by 1%, inflation accelerated by no more than 0.1 pp. As we can see, the pass-through of exchange rate dynamics to inflation has slowed in recent years.
Another important aspect when analysing the correlation between exchange rate dynamics and inflation is that a sustained depreciation of the national currency when inflation is low is almost impossible. The two are incompatible.
QUESTION from Law and Finance project:
How should we interpret the fact that lending has accelerated although the key rate is 14%? Do you consider this to be a temporary spike or is this a sign of persistently high demand for funding even with the key rate at 14%?
ELVIRA NABIULLINA:
In my opinion, this is rather the accumulated effect of the key rate cuts. We started to cut the key rate in June 2025 and, over this period, reduced it by 7 pp, which is quite significant.
However, as regards the past few months, we may say that the increase in retail lending, especially excluding mortgages, remained rather moderate. According to recent data on unsecured consumer loans, excluding mortgages, the growth rate was 2.5% in annualised terms in July, which is not high.
Indeed, corporate lending growth sped up to nearly 14%. There are several possible drivers of this acceleration. It would be impossible to quantify the contribution of each of them. Nevertheless, we can see that companies are now more positive about future demand, which is evident from our monitoring of businesses. Companies have increased their price expectations and, accordingly, monetary conditions do not seem as restrictive in real terms, precisely because higher price expectations make monetary conditions less restrictive.
Of course, it is essential to remember that this growth rate of credit is still driven by subsidised loans and loans granted on softer terms. The share of market-based mortgages is growing gradually, but subsidised mortgages still account for more than 50%. This is certainly lower than nearly 80% recorded previously, but this proportion is nonetheless large.
As for corporate lending, loans issued at interest rates around 2 pp below the key rate currently account for about a quarter of the total portfolio. This is a large percentage of loans that companies obtain at interest rates that are lower than market-based rates. A large share of subsidised loans is definitely a factor that requires tighter monetary policy in order to decelerate inflation.
We are closely monitoring not only the growth rates of credit, but also monetary aggregates in general, which are driven by both lending and the inflow of budgetary funds into the economy. If the growth rate of corporate lending remains high, becomes persistently high, this would mean that monetary conditions are not restrictive enough to ensure balanced growth.
QUESTION from Expert:
My question is about government aid to businesses. Budget allocations should focus on efficient companies. This thesis is close to the regulator’s opinion and was recently repeated by your adviser Kirill Tremasov at the Eastern Economic Forum. A few years ago during a conversation with Anton Siluanov about efficient companies, you jokingly asked: ‘Perhaps they are efficient precisely because they receive no government support?’. In view of this, my question is as follows. What companies may be considered efficient, in your opinion? What companies should receive support? Where is the line between efficient government support and monetary policy easing? How large is this aid in monetary terms?
ELVIRA NABIULLINA:
The choice of companies to be supported is certainly within the competence of the Government. My opinion is as follows. If we are talking about the economy, I believe that the Government needs to invest in the development of transport, production, and social infrastructures used by everyone, in the first place. Supporting critical import substitution projects is also crucial. If, on top of this, the Government also has resources to support companies operating in competitive industries, it should prioritise higher-performing enterprises. Higher performance means higher labour productivity, higher value added, and higher returns on investment.
As for the line, any measures boosting government demand certainly affect future inflation. Their impact on future inflation and, accordingly, monetary policy decisions depends on current conditions, which can differ. I would like to remind you that during the pandemic in 2020, when market demand fell, we cut the key rate to 4.25%, which is quite low. We believed that fiscal stimulus to boost demand during that period was reasonable as well, since these measures accelerated the economy’s rebound to its potential. In other words, additional government demand and extra subsidies in 2020 had a countercyclical effect by preventing protracted high unemployment in the economy, deflation, etc. However, the current situation is the opposite in a way: the economy is at full employment, while inflation and inflation expectations are high. This actually means that any additional spending that boosts government demand is moving us further away from a key rate reduction.
QUESTION from AiF Saratov:
The Bank of Russia has already confirmed that the fuel crisis accelerates inflation. However, the effects are particularly keenly felt in some agricultural regions, such as the Saratov Region, where agriculture and grain transportation play an important role. How does the Central Bank assess second-round effects from more expensive fuels and lubricants for the agricultural regions of the country? Can the available monetary policy instruments ensure an efficient response?
ELVIRA NABIULLINA:
Affordable fuels are definitely critical for all regions without exception, including for the Saratov Region. As for agriculture and transportation, which you have mentioned, these industries mostly use diesel, the prices for which have luckily risen less sharply.
Speaking of the overall impact of the situation in the fuel market on price growth, the direct effects can be observed immediately in petrol and diesel prices at filling stations. However, there are also indirect effects that we have been discussing, which play out over time. These effects are associated with the pass-through of higher transport and logistics costs to prices for other goods and services. We can observe this pass-through in August statistics.
Finally, there are second-round effects which you refer to in your question. They include a rise in inflation expectations, which naturally increased in July. In August, they declined among households, while not declining among businesses so far. Nevertheless, as the situation in the fuel market normalises, the impact of these factors will dissipate, in our opinion. This is essential because concerns about future inflation may affect actual price growth rates. That said, the scale of the pass-through of all these costs to prices for a wide range of goods depends on the growth rate of demand in general. If it remains moderate, companies’ opportunities to pass through higher costs to prices will be limited.
As I have already said regarding such one-off factors, we are unable to influence fuel supplies and prices, but we can take measures that will ensure balanced growth in demand and prevent an intensification of second-round effects. To put it simply, our task is to prevent today’s rise in petrol prices from translating into high inflation tomorrow.
QUESTION from RIA Novosti:
How do you assess the launch of the digital ruble from 1 September? Do you consider it successful?
ELVIRA NABIULLINA:
We launched the project as scheduled, together with the banks that were obliged to do this. The launch went quite well, in my opinion. Of course, during the first few days, some clients of a number of banks had difficulty opening digital ruble accounts or conducting certain transactions. However, it is worth noting that these difficulties were eliminated promptly. I would like to thank those banks that did so. Indeed, they addressed all issues promptly. We were in close contact with the banks. We do not see any widespread problems or complaints right now, which generally proves that everything is going well.
As for the overall improvement of the customer journey, I would like to stress that this is always balancing simplicity and security. Simultaneously, we are now working to reduce the number of clicks a customer needs to make to open an account or conduct a transaction, while preserving a high level of security. Overall, we can see the demand for the digital ruble from both people and companies. The number of opened accounts is growing every day. The process is ongoing. Over the first 10 days, customers opened 87,000 accounts and conducted more than 50,000 transactions. Of course, many people are now testing how it all works. We hope that they will appreciate the convenience and zero fees and will use the services. Nevertheless, it is for them to decide which form of the ruble to use.
We do not maintain regional statistics because the digital ruble platform is the same for all cities and regions.
QUESTION from Izvestia:
At the end of 2025, you said that the new budget was disinflationary. You then noted that an expansion of the budget deficit amid higher budget spending generally had a more negative effect on inflation than growth in the tax burden due to higher VAT. How do you assess the likelihood of a further increase in the budget deficit now? How probable is it that the Bank of Russia may need to revise upwards its forecast of the average key rate for 2027 at its October meeting?
ELVIRA NABIULLINA:
Indeed, a high structural primary deficit of the budget is a critical factor influencing both demand and inflation. Our assumptions may be revised after the Government announces the budget parameters. However, our current assumptions are based on the information from the Ministry of Finance about the federal budget returning to balance in 2029 at the earliest. It will update the trajectory of the deficit reduction later and announce it only after it submits the draft budget to the State Duma.
Therefore, we prepared our own estimates, our own assumptions so as to revise our forecast at the previous meeting. We believe that this trajectory will be smooth. As I have already said today, the budget deficit for the next three years will be 2%, 1% and 0.5% of GDP. Based on this assumption, we have revised upwards the key rate path for 2027 by 2 pp. As the deficit decreases, monetary policy will ease. Our forecast assumes that monetary policy will ease, albeit more gradually than projected before. In view of this, monetary policy will be tighter in 2027 than predicted in our baseline scenario as recently as April.
Nonetheless, I would like to reiterate that these are changes that we already took into account when preparing our forecast in July. We will revisit our forecast again in October. We expect the Government to announce the budget parameters by that time. If the Government projects a higher structural primary deficit than assumed in our trajectories, this may require more restrictive monetary policy. By contrast, if the Government announces a faster consolidation of the budget, we will be able to somewhat adjust the trajectories downwards.
ALEXEY ZABOTKIN:
The trajectory of 2%, 1%, and 0.5% of GDP refers to the structural primary deficit of the federal budget, rather than to the total deficit of the fiscal system. It is the overall situation in government finance, which is not limited to the federal budget, that affects monetary policy, while the federal budget is certainly the main driver.
QUESTION from Dengi Ne Spyat project:
My question continues the topic of the budget parameters and the Bank of Russia’s estimates of the budget deficit reaching zero by 2029. If the budget parameters to be announced at the end of September differ from the Bank of Russia’s estimates, will the Bank of Russia revise the monetary policy path upwards?
My second question is about money supply growth. Specifically, household deposits now exceed ₽70 trillion. In view of this, does the Central Bank see any proinflationary risk in terms of consumer behaviour and higher consumption?
ELVIRA NABIULLINA:
As regards the impact of the budget on our monetary policy, I have already said that we expect the Government to announce the budget parameters this month. We have certain assumptions. If the final budget projections imply a larger deficit in the next three years, this will require tighter monetary policy, and vice versa.
However, the budget parameters are not the only factor that we will take into account when revising the key rate path. Indeed, the budget and fiscal policy have a significant effect on the key rate path, but there are other factors as well. We will consider them all together, including actual inflation and inflation expectations. We will update the entire forecast of economic development. A possible key rate path will be determined taking into account all these factors. I would like to reiterate that this is also a forecast. We revisit the key rate path at every meeting, consider all factors, and update our economic outlook.
As for deposits, we see no risks in this regard. Indeed, the saving ratio has been declining gradually, which is natural amid monetary easing. Nevertheless, it stays high. The increase in deposits over the previous period is the result of attractive interest rates and tight monetary conditions. Generally, deposits grow when the economy expands. We prefer to analyse monetary aggregates as a whole. They are currently at the upper bound of, or even slightly above, the range of money supply growth that was typical of the low inflation period. This is certainly a matter of concern to us, but we expect the growth rate of money supply to decline gradually in the future.
QUESTION from Interfax:
You have mentioned the alternatives that you discussed today. Did you consider the option of a key rate increase? Did you discuss the attacks against logistics infrastructure in detail? Do you see any risks posed by them? Do you expect these facilities to be restored as quickly as the damaged production facilities?
ELVIRA NABIULLINA:
As I have already said, keeping the key rate unchanged was the only option we discussed substantively. We barely discussed any alternatives.
Speaking of the attacks against logistics infrastructure, their impact on inflation is minor so far.
QUESTION from RBC:
Does the Bank of Russia consider the possibility of Russian National Reinsurance Company’s recapitalisation through the release of guarantees amounting to ₽750 billion? The amounts of reinsurance are increasing, as are the risks assumed by companies, including those in strategic industries. If the Bank of Russia does consider this possibility, what should be the amount of recapitalisation, in your opinion?
ELVIRA NABIULLINA:
We have already made a decision on Russian National Reinsurance Company’s recapitalisation in the amount of ₽165 billion. Taking into account all the procedures, Russian National Reinsurance Company’s capital will be increased in September. Our decision will enable Russian National Reinsurance Company to fulfil all its obligations. Currently, it actually reinsures all risks of terrorism and acts of sabotage, while continuing to provide subsidised reinsurance services to key industries.
QUESTION from Volga 24, Nizhny Novgorod:
The largest banks continue raising deposit rates despite the key rate reduction. Should we expect a broad-based reversal in the market or was it only a short-term rise? How will today’s decision to keep the key rate on hold affect the situation?
ELVIRA NABIULLINA:
We believe that there are no reasons to speak of any stable trend or a reversal in the market. Deposit rates rose only slightly in July–August. The largest banks’ maximum rates remained at about 13%. The analysis shows that deposit rates were mostly raised by those banks that had reduced them more significantly even before our June meeting, expecting the key rate to be cut faster. However, the situation then changed, as you know. We updated our key rate forecast and were forced to shift towards a more cautious approach. Accordingly, banks adjusted their deposit terms to the updated path of the key rate. This appears to be the main driver. Nevertheless, I would like to repeat that the changes are minor, in our view.
QUESTION from Delovye Novosti, NTV channel:
One of the topics extensively discussed at the Eastern Economic Forum was Generation Z. Employers are increasingly dissatisfied with the young generation’s habits. Specifically, a bank executive cannot comprehend young people’s desire to work four days a week or, even better, remotely. Furthermore, the Central Bank is always speaking of staff shortages. Aren’t these zoomers, who allegedly avoid working hard, posing a threat to the Russian economy, its growth, and labour productivity, which is critical now?
ELVIRA NABIULLINA:
No, they are not. We believe that the matter is not about hours worked but about the quality of the work done over these hours, which is labour productivity. Looking at history, we can see that the trend towards a gradual reduction in the number of hours worked did not emerge yesterday. Today, people work much less than they did 200 years, 100 years ago, but their labour productivity is substantially higher. In this context, zoomers may even have an advantage as they have grown up in a digital, technology-driven environment, which is natural for them. I can see this observing those young people who work at the Central Bank. They are highly qualified specialists and we really appreciate their skills.
QUESTION from Bitkogan project:
We follow the example of the USA where the new US Fed chair says that regulators should avoid giving any forecasts since they have a negative effect on the market. Do you see any risks in this context, for example for Russia?
ELVIRA NABIULLINA:
We have never pursued a forward guidance policy implying stricter commitments, as followed by many other countries. We have never undertaken such commitments. Indeed, we began publishing a key rate forecast some time ago. We believe that it provides more reference points to businesses, in the first place. Nevertheless, we always emphasise that we will update the key rate forecast if the situation changes. And we do this, as you can see. We either confirm or adjust the key rate path at every core meeting.
ALEXEY ZABOTKIN:
Frankly, I do not understand the need to follow anyone’s example when we have our own view of how to communicate with the market.
QUESTION from Igor Shimko media project:
My question is theoretical. Today, for the first time in many meetings, the Bank of Russia kept the key rate on hold, neither raising nor lowering it. Given proinflationary risks and the updated scenarios, do you consider the risk of the key rate equalling about 13% and staying at this level for a prolonged period? Are the economy and the banking system prepared for this? There are now concerns about liquidity, and this topic has already gone viral in the media. To what extent can the budget accommodate additional subsidies, and how solid are certain unsubsidised companies? You have a large array of data and you surely discuss such issues as well.
ELVIRA NABIULLINA:
Firstly, our current baseline forecast, which we believe to be the most likely scenario, does not assume such a key rate path, that is, it does not assume that we cut the key rate to 13% and keep it on hold for a prolonged period.
In terms of the principles of policy, in no case will we keep the key rate at a level the economy cannot sustain for an extended period. Why? If the level of the key rate is unbearable, it will quickly provoke a cyclical downturn, higher unemployment, a decline in real incomes, and a reduction in underlying inflation below the Central Bank’s target. Within the inflation targeting regime, the Bank of Russia will ease its monetary policy, cutting the key rate, without waiting for these developments to materialise but rather by predicting them.
The key rate is not an independent monetary policy instrument, but is closely correlated with and actually reflects the economic situation. Underlying inflation is one of the main measures indicating the ratio between demand and supply. For instance, it shows whether demand exceeds the economy’s production capacity or whether the opposite is true, as was the case during the pandemic, when production capacity was higher because demand had fallen. Inflation targeting enables the Bank of Russia to bring its monetary policy in line with the current economic situation in general. This applies to the economy as a whole, rather than individual industries.
QUESTION from Rossiyskaya Gazeta:
My question is about cash. You have said that the propensity to save has edged down and that, among other things, people either transfer their savings to demand deposit accounts or withdraw cash. How do you assess the increase in the amount of cash in circulation year to date? Moreover, the share of cashless payments has declined, according to the released statistics. What is your opinion about this?
ELVIRA NABIULLINA:
Indeed, we can see that people used cash for payments more frequently in 2026 Q2, compared to previous periods. In our opinion, that was driven by a combination of multiple factors, including mobile network outages, adjustments to the tax changes, and concerns caused by rumours and misinformation. Nevertheless, this does not lead to any macroeconomic problems. Furthermore, households continued to use cashless payment instruments extensively, which is critical. The issue is that the growth rate of these transactions was lower than that of cash payments.
As for the increase in the amount of cash in circulation, sometimes measured in trillions, I would like to reiterate that such growth is normal for an expanding economy. When the economy expands, money supply and cash in circulation grow as well. In addition, it is also important to take into account that, in 2024–2025, deposit rates were very high, while cash in circulation increased much more slowly. To a certain extent, the current trend may be interpreted as catch-up growth in cash relative to these years.
How should we perceive this? It is essential to analyse long-term dynamics, rather than short-term fluctuations. The share of cash in money supply has edged up, although by less than 1 pp, to approximately 15%. However, this share was 20% just five years ago. This shows a clear downward trend in the share of cash. There may be some factors arising in certain periods, which may boost the demand for cash, but we do not see any systemic issues in this regard.
ALEXEY ZABOTKIN:
I would like to emphasise once again that the cash growth rate in 2026 is being compared with 2024 and 2025. Indeed, the cash growth rate in 2026 has been much higher than in 2024 and 2025. However, the cash growth rate in 2024–2025 was abnormally low because interest rates were very high. Accordingly, people opted for deposits much more frequently.
If we look back at 2023, we can see that the current dynamics of cash in circulation are similar to the trend observed in 2023, even when measured in trillions. When measured as a share of money supply, the growth rate this year has been even lower than in 2023. Hence, we cannot speak of any abnormal trend in 2026. It is the years 2024 and 2025 that were abnormal when the cash growth rates were very low.
QUESTION from Nezavisimaya Gazeta:
Consumer and investment demand are frequently considered to be powerful drivers of economic growth. However, both are now actually suppressed by still tight monetary policy. What are the main drivers of Russia’s economic growth in such conditions, in the Central Bank’s opinion? Could you identify not hypothetical or potential drivers, but those that are already having an impact?
ELVIRA NABIULLINA:
Indeed, demand is often considered to be a driver of economic growth. However, there is also another side of economic growth – supply, which we are focusing on. In my opinion, the driver of economic development that we should focus on today to achieve sustainably high growth rates is an increase in labour productivity in the economy, which is now lower in Russia than in many other countries. This should be the principal driver.
I would disagree with the claim that monetary policy suppresses consumption and investment. Consumer demand is growing strongly. Although its growth has slowed down, the level of consumption stays rather high. This growth is driven primarily by incomes, rather than loans. Consumer loans have always covered only a small portion of consumption, e.g. as little as 5% last year. The main source is still a rise in household incomes, which have been increasing very quickly over the past few years.
The situation in investment is similar. Companies mostly use internal financing as a source of investment. Borrowings, including bank loans and securities market instruments, account for about a quarter, according to various estimates. Investment dynamics improved in 2026 Q2, compared to the beginning of the year. Our task is to ensure that this growth is consistent with the economy’s physical capacity, as otherwise it may accelerate inflation. As for investment, the nominal growth rate was up, although almost all of this translated into prices. By contrast, in physical terms, investment declined. Boosting demand should not translate into prices. Therefore, balance is essential.
QUESTION from TT Finance online media (Saint Petersburg):
Can the introduction of the digital ruble affect key rate dynamics or the ruble exchange rate in any way?
ELVIRA NABIULLINA:
No, the introduction of the digital ruble cannot affect key rate dynamics or the ruble exchange rate. We have emphasised many times and I would like to reiterate that the launch of the digital ruble will not involve any negative consequences for monetary transmission. This is because the digital ruble is very similar to cash. In other words, the digital ruble does not compete with bank deposits, but is primarily used for settlements, alongside cash rubles which are actually beyond the banking system. Therefore, the digital ruble will not have any distorting impact on money supply, the exchange rate, or the level of the key rate.
As for its possible influence, the digital ruble may reduce businesses’ transaction costs, that is, the funds that businesses use to conduct transactions. These amounts are quite high. As we know, businesses often complain about acquiring fees and so on. The digital ruble may intensify interbank competition for clients’ funds. As a result, monetary policy transmission may become more efficient.
QUESTION from Frank Media:
Your press release, for the first time over a long period, states that proinflationary risks have risen, rather than stayed unchanged. The main risks are the same as in the previous press release, specifically the consequences of the reduction in production capacity. Why have you reassessed these risks and now say that they have risen? Have you become less confident that the damaged facilities will be restored quickly or are there any other reasons?
ELVIRA NABIULLINA:
Firstly, as far as I remember, this is not the first time that we have stated that proinflationary risks have risen and we do this at times. As you have probably seen, we have somewhat reassessed the current level of underlying inflation. In contrast to July when we assessed it at about 4–5%, we now consider that its level is 5–6%. We certainly monitor inflation expectations as well. Of course, inflation expectations rose in July, which was natural. In August, they declined among households, while remaining rather high, but slightly rose among businesses. This is also a critical factor that we need to take into account.
In July, when we discussed our key rate decision, the growth of corporate lending slowed down slightly, whereas now we can see its acceleration. Therefore, we have listed these risks in our press release, noting that they have intensified. We are not speaking of any new factors, but about some proinflationary risks becoming stronger.
ALEXEY ZABOTKIN:
The situation in the Strait of Hormuz has already been mentioned. As the escalation there continues, the proinflationary impact of the situation in the Middle East on the world economy and, through it, on Russia is gradually increasing, as we have already discussed. This was not a major factor behind today’s decision. However, in terms of the balance of risks, this situation somewhat increased proinflationary risks over the past 1.5–2 months.
QUESTION from PRO.FINANSY project:
According to the World Gold Council, central banks of the world made significant gold purchases in 2026 Q2, setting a new record of 289 tonnes. The Bank of Russia was the largest seller of gold, reducing holdings by 22 tonnes. Concurrently, gold prices fell by nearly 11%. This period seems to be the right moment for gold purchases rather than sales. Why did the Bank of Russia make a decision that is opposite to the global trend towards increasing gold reserves?
ELVIRA NABIULLINA:
Perhaps it is the other way around: other central banks are following the Bank of Russia? I would say that the current global trend is similar to the strategy that we implemented over 2014–2020. This is why the Bank of Russia ranks sixth by the size of gold reserves, holding more than 2,200 tonnes.
The slight decrease now is mostly associated with the transactions of the Ministry of Finance with the National Wealth Fund’s assets. These transactions are consistent with the fiscal rule. Gold is also used to manufacture coins. We do not disclose any other data on our gold transactions.
QUESTION from Economikal channel on Telegram:
I have conducted a small study and found out that, before 2022, prices for Russian oil and gas exports were the most powerful factor influencing the Russian ruble. Specifically, the correlation between Brent price dynamics and the RUB/USD exchange rate was rather high reaching about -0.85. Since 2022, this correlation has almost fallen to zero, now equalling +0.02. Contrastingly, the correlation between key rate decisions and the ruble exchange rate has notably increased. For instance, when the key rate is raised, the ruble strengthens, and vice versa, when the key rate is cut, the ruble weakens.
In this connection, I would like to ask you a question. Given the familiar principle that correlation does not mean causation, do you see these trends and such a strong effect of the key rate itself on the ruble exchange rate? Could this lead to a bottleneck as a key rate cut will lead to the ruble’s depreciation? This will mean that imports will become more expensive and, accordingly, proinflationary risks will intensify.
ELVIRA NABIULLINA:
There are multiple factors influencing the ruble exchange rate, including the situation with the balance of payments, exports and imports, as well as monetary policy. We have already discussed this. Tight monetary conditions naturally make ruble savings more attractive, which affects the exchange rate.
ALEXEY ZABOTKIN:
The economy operates as a single system. What we observe now is the result of what economists refer to as a general equilibrium, that is, everything depends on everything else, to put it simply.
As we have already said today, monetary policy aims to ensure low inflation. When inflation is low, a self-sustaining weakening of the nominal exchange rate, persisting over months, quarters or even years, is simply impossible. This is what everyone is wary of. When inflation in the country is low, the exchange rate may fluctuate from quarter to quarter and these fluctuations may even be rather significant, but there will never be any stable trend towards a continuous weakening of the exchange rate. Since the Bank of Russia chooses the level of the key rate so as to ensure low inflation, the concerns you raised are not justified over a longer time horizon.
QUESTION from Vedomosti:
Currently, the Business Climate Index based on the Bank of Russia’s monitoring of businesses is at its lowest level since 2022. Experts say that this is a crisis level. What is the Bank of Russia’s view of this level and how does it ultimately correlate with economic dynamics?
And question two, please. You have already commented on the situation with Russian National Reinsurance Company. How can you assess the situation in the insurance market as a whole, given the materialised risks related to the attacks against Russian facilities?
ELVIRA NABIULLINA:
As for our monitoring of businesses, indeed, we actively use the results of this survey, as it is a source of high-frequency data for us. Generally, there is a correlation with the economic situation. We have been using these indicators for many years.
As for the Business Climate Index, it reflects both assessments of the current situation and expectations about future demand. Recent data show that expectations about future demand have become better. Indeed, assessments of the current situation are rather low, but expectations have improved.
Speaking of insurance, it is true that some risks have materialised. Nevertheless, the overall situation in insurance is very stable. The insurance industry has sufficient resources and capital. Insurers establish long-term relations with their clients and are now assessing and discussing these risks. If needed, Russian National Reinsurance Company reinsures a considerable portion of such risks.
QUESTION from finance.rambler.ru:
According to recent data, banks are now facing their largest liquidity shortage since 2022. What is the reason for this? Does this mean that, if the situation worsens, banks may lack liquidity to meet deposit withdrawals?
ELVIRA NABIULLINA:
There is no cash deficit or liquidity crisis. It would be incorrect to phrase it this way. It is incorrect to say that people are withdrawing their money from banks and no longer want to save. As I have already said, the growth rate of deposits edged down over the past three months, but bank deposits increased by almost ₽0.5 trillion over the past three months.
Indeed, the demand for cash rose somewhat, as we have already discussed.
As for liquidity, this is not about a lack of cash to meet withdrawals. We refer to a structural surplus and a structural deficit of liquidity in our banking statistics, but these terms only describe the relationship between the regulator and banks. A structural liquidity deficit should not be interpreted in absolute terms. When measured as a share of banks’ assets, the deficit is now smaller than it was three years ago when the banking system also had a structural liquidity deficit. There may be either a structural deficit or a structural surplus of liquidity, but this has nothing to do with the relations between banks and their clients.
ALEXEY ZABOTKIN:
It was not three, but four years ago when the demand for cash surged, namely in February–March 2022. Time flies; that was four years ago.
QUESTION from Domclick:
My question is about the proposed scheme for purchasing new-build housing in instalments, developed by the Ministry of Construction together with the Central Bank. Will you stipulate separately a foreclosure procedure for cases when an individual may simply lack funds to make these instalment payments? Will the project guarantee refunds to the buyer? If yes, how will this mechanism work?
ELVIRA NABIULLINA:
According to the draft law, after a building has been commissioned, ownership of the apartment will pass to the buyer. However, the developer acquires a security interest in the apartment. Therefore, the developer may enforce that security interest if the buyer fails to meet the obligations under the instalment plan. In our opinion, this procedure does not need to be described in the law since it is already stipulated in civil laws and in the laws on collateral and mortgages. These rules, which are clear to everyone, will apply in this case as well. Hence, the foreclosure procedure should actually be the same as when a borrower obtains a mortgage from a bank. This is our view.
Thank you very much.