Bank of Russia

2025 Q4–2026 Q1

FINANCIAL STABILITY REVIEW

Information and analytical review

2026

CONTENTS

Summary 2

Main Vulnerabilities 8

1. Global risks 9

Box 1. Risks to global financial stability associated with investments in AI 14

Box 2. Estimates of macroeconomic resilience of some Russian trading partners 17

Box 3. Situation in the Russian FX market 18

2. Russian corporate sector 19

2.1. Dynamics of companies' financial standing 19

2.2. Assessment of the largest companies' creditworthiness 23

Box 4. Structural changes in the retail market: growth of big techs and e-commerce 25

3. Vulnerabilities of the Russian financial sector 26

3.1. Credit risk in the corporate sector 26

3.2. Households' debt burden 33

Box 5. Situation in the BNPL market 44

3.3. Imbalances in the housing market and project finance risks 45

4. Assessment of the financial sector's resilience 55

4.1. Assessment of the banking sector's resilience 55

Box 6. Budget situation 63

4.2. Assessment of non-bank financial institutions' resilience 64

Box 7. Households' saving and investment behaviours 71

Annex. Global trends in macroprudential regulation and financial stability measures 74

Abbreviations 81

List of charts 84

This document was prepared by the Financial Stability Department of the Bank of Russia.
The electronic version of the review in Russian and English is available on the Bank of Russia website.
The reference to the Bank of Russia is mandatory if you intend to use this document.

Bldg V, 12 Neglinnaya Street, Moscow, 107016
Bank of Russia website: www.cbr.ru

© Central Bank of the Russian Federation 2026

SUMMARY

The financial sector remains highly resilient and continues to properly perform its main function, which is to ensure smooth financing of the economy. Vulnerabilities highlighted in the previous review (credit risks in the corporate sector, risks related to households' debt burden, and imbalances in the housing market) stay relevant, but are not critical. Amid the cyclical slowdown in the economy after its rapid expansion over 2023–2024, the Bank of Russia is closely monitoring credit risks:

- The risks of the retail portfolio started to materialise back in mid-2024. That was attributable to the surge in lending (and, frequently, to a growing number of high-risk borrowers having expensive loans) over 2023–2024. Currently, the credit quality in consumer and mortgage lending has stabilised. The quality of loans will be supported by record-low unemployment and continuing growth of wages. In case of deterioration in debt service quality, banks have accumulated macroprudential capital buffers that the Bank of Russia can release if needed.

- SMEs are more exposed to the risks associated with the economic slowdown. The proportion of loans of quality categories IV–V in the SME sector increased from 5.9% as of the beginning of 2025 to 7.6% as of 1 April 2026. Nonetheless, it is still three times lower than after the crisis of 2015. Banks are ready to support borrowers and restructure their loans.

- As for large businesses, the share of NPLs even edged down from 3.3% as of the beginning of 2025 to 3.1%, but this is accompanied by loan restructuring and a slower recognition of losses on large loans by banks. As part of its supervisory interaction with credit institutions, the Bank of Russia monitors that loans issued to companies persistently struggling to service their debt are adequately covered by provisions.

Overall, the corporate sector remains resilient, and problems facing individual borrowers are not systemic. A gradual key rate reduction from the peak of 21% to 14.5% has a positive effect on borrowers' ability to make loan repayments. Since two-thirds of corporate loans were issued at variable interest rates, monetary policy easing automatically decreases borrowers' interest expenses.

For banks, a decline in interest rates is a factor maintaining their interest margin and ensuring positive revaluation of bond portfolios, which supports their capability to generate capital and continue lending to the economy. Sustainable disinflation, further monetary policy easing, and well-balanced fiscal policy will help ensure macroeconomic and financial stability.

1. Global risks

Global economic growth outlook has worsened due to the geopolitical escalation in the Middle East in March 2026. Disruptions in trade and supply chains and surging commodity prices have exacerbated inflationary pressures worldwide. Market participants adjusted their expectations regarding monetary policy paths of leading central banks, anticipating a longer period of tight financial conditions.
In March 2026, many countries experienced a decline in both share and bond prices. Although the leading countries' stock markets largely rebounded already at the beginning of May owing to technology companies' strong reporting and expected de-escalation, the uncertainty persists. In the future, tightening financial conditions and accumulated imbalances in the debt sector might constrain economic activity worldwide, especially if the Middle East conflict drags on.

Moreover, the Middle East conflict has aggravated risks to global financial stability as well. More expensive funding and potential corrections in stock and real estate markets might make foreign banks and non-bank financial institutions more exposed to market shocks. The AI-related sector might also experience a correction as these companies are currently highly valued by investors, but at the same time are closely interconnected and largely dependent on financing from private credit funds. Fiscal and debt risks in advanced economies are another source of vulnerability as they might propagate into the financial sector. In these conditions, there are still risks of financial stress spilling over into the real sector, especially in highly leveraged economies which are dependent on foreign financing.

After the outbreak of the Middle East conflict, rising market volatility in EMEs has revealed their typical sensitivity to the risks of capital outflows and tightening global financial conditions. A number of oil importing countries faced an increase in their current account deficit due to higher prices for energy commodities, which also amplified the pressure on the exchange rates of their national currencies, thus aggravating inflationary risks.

As for Russia, rising oil and gas prices are a factor increasing its current account balance as well as revenues of oil and gas producers and the budget. However, the geopolitical tensions in the Middle East might adversely affect the Russian economy. Firstly, global inflation developments might have proinflationary pressure on Russia through higher prices for imports and logistics costs. Secondly, geopolitical risks adversely affect Russia's trading partners (India, China, Türkiye, and Iran) and important financial hubs (the United Arab Emirates). Thirdly, in the scenario of a protracted oil price shock, the world economy might face a significant slowdown, which will inevitably cause a reduction in the demand for Russian exports. Over a longer-term horizon, higher volatility of energy commodity prices can encourage consumers' transition to alternative energies, which might decrease the demand and prices for oil and gas.

In February–the first half of March, the money market experienced some imbalances in yuan liquidity, which temporarily pushed up CNY/RUB swap implied interest rates. This was due to a downward trend in yuan liquidity in the banking sector over the previous few months. When investing funds in foreign currency assets, banks need to mitigate the risks of maturity mismatches between foreign currency assets and liabilities, as well as avoid expanding foreign currency financing to clients lacking stable liabilities.

2. Russian corporate sector

As of the end of 2025, the corporate sector's net financial result declined from the record highs of 2023–2024. Excluding financial and insurance companies, the sector's net financial result dropped by 6.8% YoY, which was largely attributable to the worsening of external conditions, namely lower global oil prices and tightening sanctions against export industries. Specifically, coal producers' net loss grew by 33.3% YoY to ₽0.4 trillion, while oil and gas enterprises' net financial result plummeted by 63.9% YoY to ₽1.9 trillion.

Over 2025, 58% of the largest public companies[1] did not show any change in financial standing, 18% improved their financial metrics and even reduced their debt, while 24%, to the contrary, increased their leverage amid lower revenues and adverse market conditions. As a result, the largest companies' debt burden edged up over the year, with their aggregate net debt / EBITDA ratio rising by 0.4 YoY, to 2.2, while still staying below the level of 2.3 recorded during the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020. Nevertheless, the majority of the largest companies remain financially resilient. Only a number

[1] The sample comprised 89 non-financial organisations publishing IFRS statements.

of borrowers, accounting for 9.0% of the total debt of companies in the sample (vs 8.1% as of 30 June 2025), are facing debt repayment difficulties (ICR < 1). The peak of interest rates was passed in 2025 H1, and provided that the current macroeconomic and sectoral trends continue, most companies will stay financially resilient and capable of servicing their debt in 2026.

SMEs are more exposed to the risks stemming from the economic slowdown. Although the SME sector's indicators are generally in positive territory,[2] it is negatively affected by growth in the debt burden in 2026 and lower demand from large companies cutting their investment programmes.

3. Vulnerabilities of the Russian financial sector

Credit risk in the corporate sector

Over the period under review,[3] corporate lending was growing at a sustainable pace of 5.7%, driven by major metallurgical companies, oil and gas producers, and marketplaces.[4] Last year, highly leveraged large companies were expanding their outstanding debt faster than the sector as a whole (16% and 12%, respectively). For banks to adequately take into account the risks associated with a rise in large companies' leverage, from 1 March 2026, the Bank of Russia raised the macroprudential add-on applicable to the increase in claims on such companies from 40% to 100%.

From 1 October 2025 to 1 April 2026, the proportion of NPLs (quality categories IV and V)[5] recognised by banks edged down by 0.1 pp to 3.9%. Concurrently, as assessed by major banks' risk management units, large and medium-sized enterprises' creditworthiness somewhat decreased, with the percentage of 'green zone' loans (without signs of impairment) declining by 2 pp to 69% over the six months under review. The Bank of Russia is monitoring outstanding debts of borrowers facing repayment difficulties and, where needed, implements measures for banks to create adequate provisions taking into account such borrowers' financial standing.

The quality of debt servicing by SMEs continued to deteriorate, especially among micro businesses: every tenth borrower in this segment was experiencing serious debt repayment problems over the past 12 months. Banks restructure such loans, or in case of a business's default, recognise them as non-performing and promptly create provisions.

From 1 October 2025 to 1 April 2026, the proportion of foreign currency claims on corporate borrowers (loans, bonds, and cross-currency interest rate swaps) decreased by 0.1 pp to 12.9% (adjusted for foreign currency revaluation),[6] but in 2026 Q1, it rose again, specifically by 0.2 pp. The demand for foreign currency loans was predominantly demonstrated by exporters. Taking this into account, the Bank of Russia did not set macroprudential risk-weight add-ons for foreign currency claims on legal entities. However, the imbalances in banks' foreign currency liquidity, coupled with growth in foreign currency lending, might provoke higher volatility in the FX market. Therefore, banks should enhance the quality of liquidity management.

---

[2] Specifically, over January–March 2026, the number of SMEs rose by 1.6% vs December 2025, approaching 7 million. SMEs' revenues reached ₽95.3 trillion as of the end of 2025, which is 10.8% more YoY. In 2026 Q1, their revenues increased by 5.6% YoY to ₽22.7 trillion.

[3] From 1 October 2025 to 1 April 2026.

[4] The construction sector's outstanding debt notably contracted over December 2025–January 2026 owing to commissioned buildings and funds released from escrow accounts.

[5] Reporting Form 0409115.

[6] At the exchange rate as of 1 April 2026.

Households' debt burden

Amid cooling in retail lending, associated with tight monetary and macroprudential policies and a significant rise in incomes, households' debt burden was decreasing. The proportion of disposable incomes that individuals use to repay outstanding loans declined from 10.7% as of 1 January 2025 to 9.1% as of 1 January 2026. From October 2024 to March 2026, outstanding unsecured consumer loans contracted by 6.0%. Nonetheless, it would be premature to suggest a credit crunch in retail lending because of growth in mortgage and car lending.

The percentage of NPLs[7] in the unsecured consumer loan portfolio reached 13.1% as of 1 April 2026, which is 0.2 pp more than as of 1 October 2025. Compared to 2025 H1, when their percentage rose by 3.1 pp, the increase in NPLs slowed down and was primarily associated with the maturity of loans issued to risky borrowers at high interest rates in 2023–2024 (including to borrowers having a low credit rating or no credit history) and a reduction in the unsecured consumer loan portfolio. Additionally, the growth of NPLs was partially attributable to the propagation of services offered by debt relief companies and the simplification of the individual bankruptcy procedure. The share of bankruptcies relative to the total number of borrowers was up from 0.8% in 2023 to 1.3% in 2025. Borrowers facing hardships should have a legal right to cope with an unmanageable debt burden. However, debt relief companies have been widely resorting to unfair practices, urging people to apply for bankruptcy, in some cases intentionally raising loans before this procedure. Individuals do not always comprehend that bankruptcy reduces their chances to raise new loans in the future and restricts their career opportunities.

Macroprudential measures, which limit lending to households with high DSTI, help improve the portfolio structure in the long term: the proportion of unsecured consumer loans issued to borrowers with DSTI above 50% in the banking sector's portfolio declined from 45% as of 1 April 2025 to 35% as of 1 April 2026. Furthermore, banks accumulated a substantial macroprudential capital buffer: as of 1 April 2026, the macroprudential buffer for unsecured consumer loans amounted to 8.3% of the portfolio of loans[8], for car loans – 2.5%, and for mortgages – 1.4%.

The Bank of Russia continued to improve macroprudential regulation by updating the DSTI assessment approaches (gradually cancelling less accurate income calculation methods). Furthermore, for 2026 Q2, the Bank of Russia established MPLs on an inclusion basis for the first time, which provides more flexibility to banks in lending and discourages them from issuing loans to borrowers who already have high DSTI.

In 2025, banks started to issue bonds secured by payments on retail loans more actively, with part of them purchased by other banks. Since macroprudential add-ons are not applicable to these bonds, this actually means that banks are exchanging their loan portfolios, thus reducing the burden on their capital created by the add-ons for loans. To ensure that such practices do not reduce the burden on capital, the Bank of Russia is amending the procedure for applying the macroprudential add-ons.

---

[7] Hereinafter, NPLs are loans included in quality categories IV and V (Section 1 of Financial Reporting Form 0409115), loans with a 100% probability of default (Section 1.1 of Financial Reporting Form 0409115), as well as loans overdue for more than 90 days (NPL 90+) (Section 3 of Financial Reporting Form 0409115).

[8] Net of loan loss provisions.

Imbalances in the housing market and project finance risks

The key rate reduction and elevated demand for subsidised loans before the tightening of the Family Mortgage programme terms from 1 February 2026 contributed to the accelerated growth in mortgage lending in 2025 Q4–2026 Q1.[9] Macroprudential policy helped improve the mortgage lending standards: over 2026 Q1, the proportion of mortgages to borrowers with DSTI above 80% in the housing under construction segment remained close to the level of 2025, namely about 3%, while that in the existing housing segment dropped to 6% from 13% a year before. From 2025, the share of mortgages with a small down payment (below 20%) in the new housing segment stayed low, making up less than 2%, while that in the existing housing segment dropped to 1% in 2026 Q1 from 14% a year before. To maintain conservative lending standards, the Bank of Russia introduced MPLs on an inclusion basis from 1 April 2026 and tightened the limits on the riskiest mortgages in the housing under construction and existing housing segments in apartment buildings from 2026 Q3. Additionally, the Bank of Russia toughened the MPLs for single-family home construction mortgages.

Over the period under review, the deterioration of mortgage credit quality slowed down in comparison with 2025 H1. Over the year, the proportion of NPLs rose by 0.6 pp to reach 1.8% as of 1 April 2026 (the growth rate over the past six months equalled 0.2 pp). This deterioration was mostly associated with a low quality of debt servicing in the segment of single-family home construction mortgages[10] and risky mortgages (issued to borrowers with high DSTI and a low down payment) granted over 2023–2024 as part of the non-targeted subsidised mortgage lending programme and market-based mortgage lending at higher interest rates. The repayment performance of mortgages issued in 2025 remains good, which will help stabilise the proportion of non-performing mortgages. Furthermore, the Bank of Russia plans to update the loan loss provisioning regulation taking into account heightened risks related to single-family home construction without using escrow accounts.

The situation in the housing under construction segment remains stable. Over 2025, the sales of housing under construction in terms of square metres exceeded the level of 2024 by 2%. In 2026 Q1, sales increased as well (+12% YoY), mostly in January. The situation with new construction projects was good as well: in 2026 Q1, new projects launched by developers totalled 10.7 million sq m, which is 1.4 times more than 7.7 million sq m a year before.

The percentage of sold housing under construction across Russia stays at an acceptable level of 32%, while the ratio between the percentage of sold housing and the stage of construction completion – at 72% (a share from 60% to 80% is considered normal). However, instalment plans still account for a considerable proportion in housing sales, which involves risks to buyers, banks, and developers. As of 1 April 2026, individuals' liabilities resulting from primary housing transactions under instalment plans amounted to ₽1.5 trillion, or 17% of the total value of signed SCPAs, which is close to the level of mid-2025.

Most companies in the construction industry remain profitable, despite problems facing a number of developers that are, nonetheless, limited and involve no systemic risks. Specifically, the building construction industry's financial result totalled ₽0.4 trillion in 2025, surging 2.7 times over the year, which was driven by companies' adaptation to the current market environment and the start of the monetary policy easing cycle. Although there are signs of oversupply in certain regions, the excess of supply will gradually reduce owing to lower interest rates.

---

[9] Subsidised loans still make up the largest share in total mortgages, namely around 68% in 2026 Q1.

[10] As of 1 April 2026, the proportion of NPL 90+ in the portfolio of single-family home construction mortgages reached nearly 4.6%, whereas that in the portfolio of mortgages for apartments was 0.9%.

4. Assessment of the financial sector's resilience

Assessment of the banking sector's resilience

Over the period under review, reinvestment activities allowed the banking sector to increase its CAR by 1.0 pp from 12.9% to 13.9% as of 1 April 2026. As a result, banks' capital expanded to 4.4 pp of N1.0 (+0.2 pp) relative to the minimum value of the regulatory capital including surcharges, despite the scheduled rise in the capital surcharges by 0.75 pp for SIBs and 0.5 pp for other banks from 1 January 2026. Banks' additional capital in the form of the accumulated macroprudential buffer (₽1.3 trillion) accounted for 0.9 pp of N1.0 as of 1 April 2026. The scheduled restoration of the surcharges to banks' CAR will enhance their resilience.

The situation with liquidity at SIBs' remained stable. As of 1 April 2026, SIBs' national LCR equalled 117%. Banks did not record elevated volatility in attracted client funds and maintained their liquid assets at an adequate level.

Assessment of non-bank financial institutions' resilience

Insurers' and SIBs' financial resilience remains at a high level. Owing to high interest income and positive revaluation of their bond portfolios, insurers were able to offset the reduction in insurance income and NPFs – to ensure growth in returns on invested pension savings and pension reserves.

The leasing industry suffered credit risks materialising back in 2025 since its portfolio was tilted towards companies sensitive to the economic slowdown (transportation, SMEs). Along with an increase in loss provisions, the industry is facing a reduction in the total lease portfolio. Specifically, it shrank by 9% in 2025 and by another 3.7%[11] over 2026 Q1. Consequently, lessors' financial result over the past year was close to zero, for the first time since 2022.[12] Over 2025 Q4, the sector's capital adequacy[13] declined by 0.6 pp to 9.7%, which is still above the minimum of 2023 (8.2%). Despite its weak performance over the past year, the industry is seeing the first signs of stabilisation[14] owing to the easing of monetary conditions since 2025 H2.

[11] Based on real-time data of the monthly survey by the Bank of Russia. The recent (preliminary) data are given for the sample of 12 companies (the market share in terms of the portfolio – 70%).

[12] According to the quarterly survey, total net loss as of the end of 2025 reached ₽3 billion vs net profit as of the end of 2024 amounting to ₽100.2 billion. The sample for the analysis comprises 18 companies that submitted their IFRS statements for the past seven quarters (their market share in terms of the portfolio – 74%).

[13] Calculated as the equity-to-liabilities ratio according to IFRS statements.

[14] An increase in leasing companies' new transactions in 2025 H2. Furthermore, since October 2025, the stocks of unsold seized assets accumulated on leasing companies' balance sheets have been declining.

MAIN VULNERABILITIES

Vulnerabilities

Vulnerabilities of the Russian non-financial sector

- The debt burden is at the highest level of the past few years.
- Some industries are sensitive to the economic slowdown.

Largest non-financial companies' debt and interest burden



Credit risk in the corporate sector

- Lending to highly leveraged companies expanded more notably compared to the corporate portfolio as a whole.
- The number of defaulting SMEs, predominantly micro businesses, increased.
- The amount of restructured loans rose, while the share of NPLs (quality categories IV–V) reached its record low.

Loans of quality categories IV–V in corporate portfolio, %



SMEs' default rate on issued loans during next 12 months, %



Households' debt burden

- Amid the economic slowdown, the risks of a decline in repayment discipline persist despite an improvement in repayment performance on loans issued in 2025 H2–early 2026.

Credit quality of issued cash loans, %



Imbalances in the housing market and project finance risks

- The mortgage market is highly sensitive to tight monetary policy.
- Instalment schemes from developers make up a significant share in total sales.

Accumulated outstanding instalments (unpaid SCPAs), ₽ bn



Stability factors and measures

- Most companies remain financially resilient.
- The situation in the Middle East is temporarily increasing revenues in the oil and gas sector.
- Monetary policy easing is gradually reducing companies' debt burden.

- The macroprudential add-ons for loans to highly leveraged large companies was raised by 60 pp to 100% from 1 March 2026.
- The Bank of Russia is working on encouraging banks to increase loan loss provisions if a corporate borrower lacks potential for restoring its financial resilience.

- The share of NPL 90+ after six MOB edged down from 2.5% to 1.6% over the past six months.
- Banks have been accumulating the macroprudential capital buffer: as of 1 April 2026, it covered 8.3% of the unsecured loan portfolio and 1.4% of the mortgage portfolio.
- The MPLs set for unsecured consumer loans contribute to a decline in new loans issued to borrowers with high DSTI: in 2026 Q1, borrowers with DSTI 50+ accounted for 18% of disbursements.

- The coverage of loans in project finance with funds in escrow accounts stabilised at 68–69%.
- Over 2025, housing sales in money terms increased by 11% YoY. The mechanism of project finance using escrow accounts will support the market since it is generally more profitable for banks to help complete a troubled project than to bankrupt the developer.

1. GLOBAL RISKS

The escalation in the Middle East in March 2026 has exacerbated risks to global economic growth. Higher commodity prices might accelerate inflation worldwide. Moreover, expectations about leading central banks switching to monetary tightening have already strengthened. In these conditions, many countries recorded a decline in stock markets and a rise in government bond yields. Although in early May, leading economies' stock indices rebounded, there are still risks of correction, including due to a possible revision of global investor sentiment regarding AI companies. Additionally, economies are still facing vulnerabilities accumulated earlier, including higher levels of sovereign and corporate debts.

Global inflation developments might have an adverse impact on Russia by decelerating disinflation in the country. A negative scenario assumes a considerable slowdown in the global economy, which might entail a decrease in the physical volume of foreign trade flows and a potential correction in commodity prices, primarily crude oil.

In its April 2026 World Economic Outlook, the IMF downgraded its global growth forecast by 0.2 pp compared to the January estimate: global GDP is expected to rise by 3.1% in 2026 (vs 3.4% in 2025), provided that the Middle East conflict will prove short-lived (Table 1). If the conflict drags on, this might entail more serious implications for the world economy and global financial markets through the key channels – disruptions in supply chains, destabilisation of energy infrastructure, and growing inflationary pressures. According to the IMF forecast, if the increase in energy commodity prices turns out to be more significant and lasts for longer, global economic growth might slow down to 2.6% in 2026, while global inflation will speed up to 5.4%. In an extremely negative scenario assuming a more substantial damage to energy infrastructure, global economic growth might decline to 2% in 2026, while global inflation will accelerate to 6.1% in 2027 (Chart 1). Moreover, according to the IMF's estimates, the negative effect on EMEs and developing economies might turn out to be twice as strong as on advanced economies.

GDP GROWTH, IMF FORECAST *Table 1*

Commodity markets	13 May 2026			Maximum in 2026		Change, %	
			From early March 2026	From early 2026	2027	2026	2027
Global GDP growth rate	**3.4**	**3.1**	**3.2**	**-0.2**	**0**	**0.0**	**0**
Developed countries	**1.9**	**1.8**	**1.7**	**0**	**0**	**0.2**	**0**
USA	2.1	2.3	2.1	-0.1	0.1	0.2	0
Canada	1.7	1.5	1.9	-0.1	0	0	0
Great Britain	1.3	0.8	1.3	-0.5	-0.2	-0.5	-0.2
Euro area	1.4	1.1	1.2	-0.2	-0.2	-0.1	-0.2
Germany	0.2	0.8	1.2	-0.3	-0.3	-0.1	-0.3
France	0.9	0.9	0.9	-0.1	-0.3	0	-0.3
Italy	0.5	0.5	0.5	-0.2	-0.2	-0.3	-0.1
Spain	2.8	2.1	1.8	-0.2	-0.1	0.1	0.1
Japan	1.2	0.7	0.6	0	0.0	0.1	0.0
EMEs and developing countries	**4.4**	**3.9**	**4.2**	**-0.3**	**0.1**	**-0.1**	**0**
China	5	4.4	4	-0.1	0	0.2	0
India	7.6	6.5	6.5	0.1	0.1	0.3	0.1
Russia	**1**	**1.1**	**1.1**	**0.3**	**0.1**	**0.1**	**0**
Brazil	2.3	1.9	2	0.3	-0.3	0	-0.2
Republic of South Africa	1.1	1	1.3	-0.4	-0.2	-0.2	-0.2
Mexico	0.6	1.6	2.2	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.2

Source: IMF.

Currently, the situation in the Middle East remains highly uncertain. According to the International Energy Agency's estimates, due to the blockade of the Strait of Hormuz, global oil supplies plummeted by 10.1 million barrels per day in March 2026 (to 97 million barrels per day) with a further decline of 2.9 million barrels per day in April 2026, which is the largest oil supply disruption in history. As assessed by some experts, the scale of commodity supply disruptions in the conditions of the current crisis is more serious than supply disruptions during the energy crises of 1973 and 1979. Global supply of liquefied natural gas plunged by 20%, as estimated by a number of analysts. Moreover, it remains uncertain how long it will take to restore the refineries damaged during the conflict. The restoration might take from a few months to several years as it requires considerable capital investment while access to technologies and financing is limited. Concurrently, the reduction in refining capacities pushed up prices for fuels and petroleum products, while restrictions on transport corridors entailed a rise in shipping insurance premiums and made logistics routes longer and more expensive. Higher energy and logistics costs, in turn, might increase product costs in a wide range of industries from manufacturing to fertilisers and food. This is amplifying inflationary pressures, and not only in energy importing countries. For example, headline inflation in the USA was up to 3.8% in annualised terms (the highest level since June 2023) and that in the euro area – to 3.0% in annualised terms (the highest level since October 2023). In spring 2026, many countries were forced to introduce measures restricting energy consumption and rationing fuel.[1]

IMF'S SCENARIO FORECAST OF GLOBAL GDP GROWTH AND INFLATION *Chart 1*
(%)



Source: IMF.

[1] The Philippines declared a state of national energy emergency and took measures to control energy prices and consumption; Sri Lanka introduced a nationwide fuel rationing system; China banned petrol and diesel exports; India restricted liquefied petroleum gas supplies to the industrial sector to preserve the resources for households; Egypt reduced business hours; a number of European countries (Germany, France, Spain, Italy, the UK, etc.) introduced softer measures (temperature limits, the requirement to switch off window-display lighting, and energy consumption cuts in the public sector).

COMMODITY PRICES *Table 2*

Commodity markets	13 May 2026	Maximum in 2026	Change, %	
			From early March 2026	From early 2026
Brent (front-month futures contract, ICE), $ per barrel	106	118	46	74
Brent (spot, Argus), $ per barrel	112	163	54	76
Urals from Primorsk (FOB, Argus), $ per barrel	87	119	113	143
Espo (Argus), $ per barrel	98	104	78	107
Urals on India's western coast (Argus), $ per barrel	113	151	93	109
Gas (TTF), € per MWh	47	62	47	67
Coal (Australia)	131	147	11	22
Aluminium (LME)	3,654	3,654	16	22
Gold, $ per oz t	4,686	5,440	-11	8
Silver, $ per oz t	87	117	-7	23

Sources: Cbonds, Argus.

Global financial markets recorded quite significant correction amid surging energy commodity prices (Table 2). In April 2026, the Brent crude oil price (front-month futures contract) rose to $118 per barrel (adjusting downwards to $106 per barrel by 13 May 2026, which was still 74% above the level of early 2026), while the Urals price at the Primorsk seaport (according to Argus) was up to $119 per barrel. After the outbreak of the conflict, aviation fuel prices more than doubled (Chart 2): in Europe the price was approximately $800 per tonne in early March, then soared to an all-time high of $1,800 per tonne on 18 March, and adjusted downwards and stabilised at $1,300 per tonne at the beginning of May 2026. From early 2026 to 13 May 2026, European gas prices (TTF) soared by 67%.

AVIATION FUEL PRICES IN EUROPE IN 2026 *Chart 2*
($ PER TONNE)



Source: Argus.

Growing uncertainty in commodity markets was accompanied by a simultaneous decline in stock and bond prices. The most considerable drop in the US S&P 500 index since early 2026 reached 9%, the EU's STOXX Europe 600 – 10%, and the MSCI Emerging Markets index tracking EME stocks – 14%. The stock markets of energy importing countries, including Japan, the Republic of Korea, India, and a number of other Asian states, recorded the most notable decline (Table 3). Recently, in anticipation of the conflict end in the near future and strong reporting from technology companies, global stock market sentiment has improved substantially, with the stock indices of Japan, the Republic of Korea, and the USA hitting new highs (Chart 3) and European stock indices bouncing back.

CHANGES IN GLOBAL STOCK INDICES *Table 3*
(%)

Most notable decline in indices during volatility period from their highs reached:	S&P 500	STOXX Europe 600	MSCI Emerging Markets	Nikkei 225 (Japan)	Kospi (Republic of Korea)	SSE Composite (China)	BSE (India)
In early 2020 (pandemic)	-34	-36	-34	-31	-36	-15	-38
In early 2025 (US tariffs)	-19	-17	-13	-22	-14	-10	-9
In early 2026 (Middle East conflict)	-9	-10	-14	-13	-20	-9	-16
Change from early 2026 to 13 May 2026	9	3	21	26	86	7	-12

Source: Cbonds.

STOCK INDICES (EARLY 2025 = 100%) *Chart 3*
(%)



Source: Cbonds.

Government bond yields in many countries have reached the highest levels over a long time. From early March to 13 May 2026, yields on 10-year government bonds in the UK, Italy, France, and the USA surged by 83 bp, 59 bp, 51 bp, and 49 bp, respectively. Long-term government bond yields are rising as well. Specifically, on 13 May 2026, US 30-year Treasury yield exceeded 5.00%, UK 30-year gilt yield reached 5.77% (the maximum since 1998), and Japan's 20-year government bond yield hit a record high of 3.82%.

These dynamics were associated with market participants revising their expectations regarding monetary policy paths of leading central banks towards tightening. Market participants estimate the probability of the US Fed raising its federal funds rate in 2026 at 55%. As for the ECB, market participants price in three 25 bp policy rate increases this year. At the beginning of May 2026, Australia's and Norway's central banks raised their policy rates by 25 bp.

Growing yields on government bonds are amplifying fiscal and debt sustainability risks and might exert additional pressure on global financial markets. Moreover, there is still potential for considerable cross-border spillovers, such as large-scale selling of US Treasuries by foreign holders (including Japan and EMEs) to prop up their national currencies and unwinding of carry trade strategies (e.g. using the yen). Volatility might be also exacerbated by hedge funds expanding their operations in fixed income markets in recent years. According to the IMF's Global Financial Stability Report, their exposure to risks related to interest rate derivatives and investment in government bonds worldwide increased twofold from $9 trillion in 2020 to $18 trillion in 2025. Overall, forced sales by non-bank financial intermediaries, which have expanded their operations by using leverage, might amplify volatility in stock and bond markets and put pressure on liquidity through margin calls. Moreover, banks' exposure to non-bank financial intermediaries' risks is rising, being estimated by the IMF at 13% of global GDP. Additionally, there are still risks of a negative feedback loop arising between the sovereign and financial sectors similarly to the euro area's debt crisis of 2010–2012.

A potential correction of AI companies' stocks, which have surged in recent years, combined with the existing structural vulnerabilities in the financial system, might aggravate volatility in global markets (see Box 1). Furthermore, it is essential to take into account growing risks stemming from AI use. For example, the AI model developed by Anthropic[2] (Claude Mythos Preview or similar models) is able to promptly detect vulnerabilities in critical infrastructure. Although this product is now available only to a limited number of companies, financial regulators are concerned about the risk of attackers gaining access to a similar model and using it to identify vulnerabilities in financial institutions' cybersecurity systems.[3]

[2] In April 2026, Anthropic's valuation in the secondary stock market reached $1 trillion.

[3] The US Fed, South Korea's Financial Services Commission, and the Prudential Authority of the South African Reserve Bank expressed their concerns about potential threats posed by this model and urged financial institutions to enhance monitoring of related risks and ensure reliable protection against cyber threats.

Box 1. Risks to global financial stability associated with investments in AI

Growth in investment in AI companies, observed in recent years, resembles the collapse in the stock prices of internet-based companies that happened in the late 1990s (the dot-com bubble) (Chart 4).

PRICES FOR THE TOP AI COMPANIES' SHARES AND S&P 500 (JANUARY 2025=100) *Chart 4*
(%)



Note. The Bloomberg Artificial Intelligence Total Return Index tracks the performance of the top 50 companies that develop, facilitate, or use solutions such as deep learning, machine learning, natural language processing, etc.
Sources: IMF, Bloomberg, Cbonds.

A potential sharp deterioration of investor sentiment in relation to AI, coupled with the existing structural vulnerabilities, might amplify shocks and propagate them across leading countries' financial systems. The following vulnerabilities can be highlighted:

- **Considerable growth in the debt burden of AI development companies** that have sharply expanded their capital expenditures and are increasingly relying on borrowings. In the next five years, AI development companies are expected to continue actively raising borrowings (according to some estimates, AI companies might need to borrow over $2.5 trillion in the next five years).

- **Strengthening interconnectedness** both inside the AI sector and between AI developers and the financial system as a whole. Companies across the AI value chain (chip manufacturers, cloud providers, models developers, etc.) invest in each other along the chain, which complicates the assessment of the ownership structure and involves concentration risks. In addition, there are private credit funds[1] that provide extensive external financing to AI development companies. Private credit funds raise financing from insurers, pension funds, and other institutional investors, as well as banks and retail investors. Multiple direct and indirect links make it difficult to assess risks and create channels of rapid stress transmission.

The following risks directly related to private credit funds should be highlighted:

- **Opacity of the private credit market.** Complex financial structures and off-balance-sheet borrowings might conceal the real levels of the debt burden and risk, which became evident from a number of

[1] PCFs focus on granting non-bank corporate loans under bilateral agreements. Such loans are usually issued to medium-sized businesses that cannot meet their financing needs by raising regulated bank loans or public debt funds.

recent bankruptcies in the USA.[2] Similar practices are also becoming increasingly frequent in financing of AI development companies, making it difficult for lenders, investors, and supervisory authorities to comprehensively assess risks and stability of their financial standing.

- **Maturity mismatches between assets and liabilities associated with retail investors' growing participation in private credit funds.** Such funds usually invest in long-term and illiquid assets. However, funds focusing on institutional investors often do not allow investor redemptions before maturity, which helps reduce liquidity risks. Nevertheless, there is a growing proportion of retail-focused interval private credit funds allowing redemptions before maturity. The recent spike in requests for investor redemptions already indicates the risk of destabilising divestment from private credit funds during stress periods.

A decrease in investment in AI in case of a notable revision of expectations about returns (e.g. due to a slower than expected deployment of technologies, weak monetisation, competition from cheaper open AI models, and higher interest rates in the world economy) might worsen the financial position of other companies participating in the AI development chain (including those working in construction, utility services, and other industries engaged in creating data processing centres).

Therefore, although AI technology deployment can potentially boost productivity and economic growth worldwide, in the short term, the AI sector, attracting large borrowings, is exposed to market shocks.

[2] This refers to bankruptcies of a number of US companies in autumn 2025 (the largest of them were the auto lender and used car retailer Tricolor Holdings and the auto parts maker First Brand) that had been extensively raising financing from PCFs. In April 2026, the private credit segment saw another default: the investment fund Thoma Bravo handed over ownership control of the software firm Medallia to its lenders as part of the restructuring, which will wipe out the fund's equity.

As for EMEs, the recent escalation of geopolitical tensions proves that they are still exposed to global market stress and investors' risk reassessments. After the outbreak of the Middle East conflict, most EMEs recorded a rise in government bond yields, a decline in stock markets, and a weakening of their national currencies against the US dollar (Table 4). The reduction in the MSCI Emerging Markets index was comparable with that observed after the USA announced its tariffs in spring 2025. Economies highly dependent on imports of energy and other commodities turned out to be the most vulnerable since higher commodity prices expand their current account deficits, affect the exchange rates of their national currencies, and amplify inflationary pressures (Table 4). Moreover, tightening global financial conditions contribute to capital outflows from EMEs and increase the cost of external borrowings. In this environment, a number of countries resorted to FX interventions to dampen exchange rate volatility (specifically, according to mass media, such measures were implemented in Türkiye and India), and central banks in a whole range of states decided to slow down the pace of their policy rate reduction cycles (Türkiye, India, and South Africa).

MAIN INDICATORS IN EME FINANCIAL MARKETS *Table 4*

Economy	Change from 1 October 2025 (as of 13 May 2026)				
	Exchange rates against USD	Stock index	10-year government bond yields	General ranking (1 – worst, 15 – best)	
	%	%	bp		
Indonesia	-4.5	-16.6	37		1
India	-7.2	-7.0	47		2
Philippines	-5.1	-0.1	121		3
Colombia	3.4	10.7	216		4
Türkiye	-8.4	32.6	276		5
Mexico	6.6	11.6	64		6
Malaysia	7.1	8.3	14		7
Thailand	0.4	19.7	49		8
Russia	12.3	0.4	-25		9
China	4.8	9.3	-14		10
South Africa	5.3	8.7	-47		11
Poland	0.3	24.5	35		12
Brazil	6.0	21.1	40		13
Chile	8.4	16.5	-7		14
Hungary	8.7	32.6	-109		15
14 EMEs excluding Russia	**1.8**	**12.3**	**51**		

Economy	Change from early March 2026 (as of 13 May 2026)				
	Exchange rates against USD	Stock index	10-year government bond yields	General ranking (1 – worst, 15 – best)	
	%	%	bp		
Türkiye	-3.2	6.4	383		1
Philippines	-6.1	-10.1	130		2
Indonesia	-4.0	-18.4	30		3
South Africa	-3.0	-8.6	75		4
India	-4.9	-8.2	38		5
Thailand	-4.0	-3.1	46		6
Brazil	2.2	-6.2	67		7
Chile	-1.6	-3.9	24		8
Colombia	-0.8	-6.7	3		9
Mexico	0.3	-1.7	51		10
Poland	-1.5	4.4	88		11
Russia	4.5	-3.7	37		12
Malaysia	-1.0	1.7	10		13
China	1.0	1.9	-6		14
Hungary	4.3	3.6	-68		15
14 EMEs excluding Russia	**-1.6**	**-3.5**	**62**		

Thresholds	Changes in indicators		
	Exchange rates against USD (%)	Stock index (%)	Yields on 10-year government bonds (bp)
Minimum	-10.0	-10.0	-100
	0.0	0.0	0
Maximum	10.0	10.0	100

Source: Cbonds.

Box 2. Estimates of macroeconomic resilience of some Russian trading partners

The macroeconomic situation in Russia's main trading partners generally remains stable despite higher uncertainty in the world economy induced by the geopolitical tensions in the Middle East.

GDP growth in **China** sped up from 4.5% YoY in 2025 Q4 to 5.0% YoY in 2026 Q1, which was largely driven by strong performance in foreign trade. In April 2026, imports expanded by 25.3% YoY (vs +27.8% YoY in March), while exports increased by 14.1% YoY (vs +2.5% YoY in March). However, the escalation in the Middle East has aggravated foreign trade risks. Although China is the largest crude importer, the implications of the conflict for this country are smoothed to a degree by its strategic stocks and domestic crude production. Another source of uncertainty is the risk of a deterioration of trade relations with the USA, which might exert pressure on export-oriented industries and investment activity. Concurrently, China's economic growth is contained by persistently weak domestic demand, which is reflected in low inflationary pressures: in April 2026, consumer prices in the country edged up by 1.2% YoY (vs +1.0% YoY in March). The rise in the producer price index to 2.8% YoY in April from 0.5% in March was mostly driven by higher energy commodities prices. Key problems remain the same: the real estate market (new housing prices continue to decline and, in March, they dropped in 70 Chinese cities by 3.4% YoY) and a high debt burden, especially at the level of regional and local budgets.

India maintains high growth rates (its GDP growth reached 7.8% YoY in 2025 Q4), staying one of the most rapidly developing countries among EMEs. However, deepening external imbalances, primarily the current account deficit, are exerting pressure on its national currency (the Indian rupee weakened against the US dollar by 4.9% from early March to 13 May 2026). Amid higher global uncertainty, the stock market is also experiencing a correction (the BSE Sensex Index dropped by 8.2% from early March to 13 May 2026). Despite its acceleration, inflation remains moderate: in April 2026, consumer prices were up by 3.48% YoY (vs +0.25% YoY in October 2025). Additionally, there are supply-side risks: logistics problems induced by the Middle East conflict entail disruptions in energy supplies, which is already causing a local deficit of fuel in the country. Some Indian fertiliser manufacturers suspended operation, which might adversely affect the agricultural sector[1] and food inflation.

GDP growth in Türkiye decelerated to 3.4% in 2025 Q4 from 3.7% YoY in 2025 Q3. Given the Middle East conflict, the Turkish economy is vulnerable to external shocks, which is ascribed to a whole range of factors, including its high dependence on energy (crude and gas) imports, persistent current account deficit, and considerable external debt, as well as a high share of foreign currency liabilities in its corporate sector. These factors make the country much more vulnerable to commodity price fluctuations and external financing terms. Moreover, inflation is stuck at a heightened level, reaching 32.4% YoY in April 2026. The Central Bank of the Republic of Türkiye has been keeping its policy rate at 37% since January 2026, after its reduction by a total of 3.5 pp from October 2025. Türkiye's national currency is still under pressure, although its central bank has been taking extensive measures to limit the depreciation of the Turkish lira (from early March to 13 May 2026, the Turkish lira weakened against the US dollar by 3.2%). In March 2026, the regulator conducted quite significant FX interventions, including by using its gold reserves.

Kazakhstan maintains high economic growth rates (its GDP increased by 6.5% YoY in 2025 Q4). As before, the country's main macroeconomic vulnerability is the dependence of its budget and current account on crude and metal prices, although recent commodity price dynamics have a supporting effect on the economy. Additionally, Kazakhstan's economy still has structural constrains, such as a high concentration of revenues and output in the commodity sector as well as limited diversification of corporate debt and its expansion, which exacerbates the country's vulnerability to internal and external shocks. Inflation has started to decelerate gradually, while staying high (10.6% YoY in April 2026). To tame inflationary pressures, the National Bank of Kazakhstan has been maintaining restrictive monetary policy parameters, keeping its policy rate at 18% from October 2025.

[1] India continues to play an important role in the global food market, being a major agricultural product supplier in Asia, and is a global leader in rice and sugar production.

Thus, the surge in energy commodity prices has aggravated risks in many countries. The situation in the Russian market (see Box 3), being a major crude and gas exporter, is relatively stable. In a positive scenario, the inflow of extra foreign currency earnings into the country will make it possible to increase revenues of oil and gas producers and the budget. If the Middle East conflict drags on, negative implications for Russia will undercut the benefits: inflationary pressures will be growing and, in case of a considerable economic slowdown, the demand for hydrocarbons will be declining.

Box 3. Situation in the Russian FX market

The situation in the Russian FX market remained stable in 2025 Q4–2026 Q1. The volatility of the ruble exchange rate was quite low, except for short-term episodes.

Amid changes in the structure of settlements, the share of the largest exporters in the FX market dropped, while that of other companies was up. Additionally, before the March reversal in oil and gas prices, the proportion of oil and gas producers was shrinking, while that of other exporters was rising (specifically, of exporters in the non-ferrous metal and chemical fertiliser industries). Hence, the amount of net foreign currency sales by non-financial companies in general, rather than by the largest exporters is becoming a more illustrative indicator. These sales averaged $17.9 billion per month over October 2025–April 2026 (Chart 5).

MONTHLY NET FOREIGN CURRENCY SALES FOR RUBLES BY NET SELLERS – NON-FINANCIAL COMPANIES* AND CNY/RUB MONTHLY AVERAGE EXCHANGE RATE *Chart 5*



* *Net sellers' total positions as of the end of the day.*
Sources: Reporting Form 0409701, Bank of Russia.

In March, the volatility of the ruble exchange rate increased. Over the first 20 days of March, the CNY/RUB exchange rate rose by over 10%, which was attributable to several factors: in early March, the inflow of foreign currency earnings was small due to low crude prices at the beginning of the year, large companies increased their demand for foreign currency needed to repay foreign currency debts, and the Russian Ministry of Finance suspended fiscal rule-based foreign currency sales. However, the escalation in the Middle East caused a surge in crude prices and the inflow of export earnings into the market expanded already in April.

Amid the reduction in foreign currency earnings in early March through both export and fiscal rule channels, the market experienced a decline in yuan liquidity. Implied interest rates on CNY/RUB swaps reached 40%, while within a day, they could rise to 59%. As the inflow of foreign currency earnings increased, the situation normalised by the end of March.

The main reason for higher market vulnerability was a downward trend in yuan liquidity in the banking sector observed since last year. Furthermore, banks were extensively investing in foreign currency assets (loans and bonds), including cross-currency interest rate swaps to provide yuan (for details, see Subsection 3.1), which decreased available balances in banks' accounts. By the beginning of March, they dropped to the level of autumn 2024 when the market also faced a spike in yuan rates.

When investing funds in foreign currency assets, banks need to mitigate the risks of maturity gaps between foreign currency assets and liabilities. Additionally, they should manage their interest rate and liquidity risks in the FX segment on their own. The Bank of Russia's operations (CNY/RUB swaps) are only aimed at maintaining a minimum liquidity level in the market to ensure uninterrupted foreign currency payments. In view of this, banks are advised to enhance the resilience of their foreign currency liabilities and form sufficient liquidity buffers to be protected in case of their possible outflow.

2. RUSSIAN CORPORATE SECTOR

The corporate sector's financial performance continued to decline moderately in 2025 amid the negative external economic environment and a slowdown in economic activity. As of the end of 2025, the largest companies' debt burden edged up, with their aggregate net debt / EBITDA ratio rising by 0.4 YoY to 2.2, while still staying below the level of 2.3 recorded during the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020.

If the current macroeconomic and sectoral trends continue, the majority of the largest companies will remain financially resilient, while some industries might expect an improvement in 2026. However, a number of highly leveraged businesses (with ICR < 1) might experience difficulties. The proportion of their debt in the sample of the largest companies edged up by 0.9 pp to 9.0% over the past six months.

Amid the increase in the tax burden in 2026 and the economic slowdown, SMEs' financial standing is deteriorating, which adversely affects the quality of debt servicing. Micro businesses, which are more sensitive to an increase in the tax burden, are under pressure.

2.1. Dynamics of companies' financial standing

As of the end of 2025, companies' net financial result, excluding the financial and insurance sectors, decreased by 6.8% YoY to ₽25 trillion. In January–February 2026, companies' net financial result totalled ₽3.4 trillion, which is 33.1% less YoY. Over 2025, the ratio of financial result of loss-making companies to that of profitable businesses rose by 3 pp YoY to 24.7% (Chart 6). The average ratio over the past 10 years was 16.3%, and it was higher during crisis periods than it is now: 37.4% in 2014 and 28.7% in 2020.

RATIO OF FINANCIAL RESULT OF LOSS-MAKING BUSINESSES TO THAT OF PROFITABLE ONES, EXCLUDING FINANCIAL AND INSURANCE SECTORS, ACCORDING TO ROSSTAT, OVER 2010–2025 *Chart 6*



Sources: Rosstat, Bank of Russia analysis.

As of the end of 2025, the most notable decline in the net financial result was recorded in **oil and gas production, coal mining, ferrous metallurgy, and wholesale**.

Specifically, **oil and gas producers**' net financial result[1] plummeted by 63.9% YoY to ₽1.9 trillion as of the end of 2025. That slump was primarily attributed to the external environment, specifically lower global crude prices and tightened sanctions, which accounted for nearly 85% of the profit reduction. The oil refining industry's net financial result declined by 15.7% YoY to ₽2.3 trillion as of the end of 2025. Nevertheless, amid escalating geopolitical tensions in the Middle East, oil and gas producers' financial performance might improve as of the end of 2026 as a result of higher hydrocarbon prices (for details, see Section 1). Russian crude, petroleum products and gas exporters as well as freight and cargo insurance companies can earn additional export revenues, but their scale will depend on how long crude prices will stay elevated.

The **coal industry** is still facing difficulties, mostly due to the negative market situation and high coal transportation costs at the Eastern railway section. As of the end of 2025, the industry's net loss totalled ₽408 billion. According to Rosstat, Russia's coal output as of the end of 2025 remained at the previous year's level, namely 429 million tonnes, but contracted by 6.1% YoY to 104.8 million tonnes in 2026 Q1.

As of the end of 2025, coal loadings via the Russian Railways network declined by 2.1% YoY to 324.5 million tonnes, although coal exports to the East expanded by 6.1% YoY, hitting a new record high of 118.2 million tonnes. Over January–April 2026, coal loadings decreased by 1.0% YoY to 110.4 million tonnes. The improvement of the market environment due to the escalation in the Middle East will not have a significant effect on coal producers' financial standing since the observed rise in prices is minor compared to their decline in recent years (Table 5).

AVERAGE COAL PRICES *Table 5*

Period	Thermal coal		Metallurgical coal	
	Price, $ per tonne	Change, % YoY	Price, $ per tonne	Change, % YoY
2024	103.8	-11.7	138.7	-24.4
2025	83.9	-19.2	102.4	-26.2
January–February 2026	83.9	-8.3	114.1	-2.7
Mar.26	96.8	20.8	116.4	11
Apr.26	96.9	24.6	122.7	22.2

Source: prices for thermal coal NAR 6,000 kcal/kg fob Vostochny and Metallurgical Coal prime high-vol fob Vostochny.

As of the end of 2025, the net financial result in **ferrous metallurgy** plummeted by 53% YoY to ₽0.25 trillion, which was primarily attributable to weaker domestic demand for metal products and moderate price dynamics. The industry recorded a decline in the main performance indicators: the output of cast iron was 98% of the 2024 level, rolled ferrous metals were at 95.1%, steel at 95.4% and steel pipes and fittings at 78.9%.[2] Despite the deterioration of the market situation, most companies have historically low debts and remain resilient.

[1] The Bank of Russia's analysis based on Rosstat's data.

[2] According to Rosstat.

Agricultural companies' net financial result dropped by 11.8% YoY to ₽643.8 billion due to lower grain sales, higher prices for agricultural machinery, and increased labour costs.

Over 2025, the net financial result in **wholesale** declined by 21% YoY to ₽1.6 trillion, dragged down by the segments experiencing a reduction in financial performance, namely trade in natural resources, agricultural raw materials, machinery, and equipment. Contrastingly, the net financial result in **retail** increased by 26% YoY to ₽0.8 trillion. As of the end of 2025, retail turnover[3] expanded by 2.6% to ₽61.3 trillion, while online sales[4] soared by 28% YoY to ₽11.5 trillion. The proportion of online sales in total retail sales was up by 2.6 pp to 18.8% over the year, driven by growth in marketplaces' share (see Box 4).

INDUSTRIES EXPERIENCING DECLINE IN NET FINANCIAL RESULT IN 2025 *Chart 7*
(₽ BN)



Sources: Rosstat, Bank of Russia calculations.

SMEs' financial standing worsened as well. The tax reform of 2025–2026 had the most serious impact on those SMEs which were near the threshold that determines the applicable tax regime. In 2025, the tax increase affected companies whose annual turnover exceeded ₽60 million, while in 2026, the threshold was lowered to ₽20 million, thus affecting an even larger number of businesses. Moreover, the cancellation of preferential insurance premiums entailed problems in labour-intensive industries, such as public catering and services where labour costs make up a significant share in total costs. The hardest-hit industries within the SME segment were trade, public catering, services, construction, and IT. The growth rate of SMEs' revenues dropped to 10.8% YoY as of the end of 2025 and to 5.6% YoY in 2026 Q1. To facilitate businesses' smooth adaptation to the tax changes, effective from 2026, the authorities introduced amendments to the Tax Code of the Russian Federation that will preserve companies' access to certain SME support measures.

A rise in the net financial result in 2025 was recorded in **non-ferrous metallurgy** (by 90.0% YoY to ₽2.2 trillion), **power generation** (by a factor of 2.6 to ₽1.8 trillion), **manufacture of chemicals and chemical products** (by 51.0% YoY to ₽1.5 trillion), **construction**[5] (by 57.5% YoY to ₽881.2 billion), and **air and space transport** (by a factor of 6.1 to ₽417.9 billion).

[3] According to Rosstat.

[4] According to the Russian Online Retail Association.

[5] Construction of buildings – ₽384.9 billion (up by a factor of 2.7 YoY), construction of engineering facilities – ₽186.5 billion (down by 7.6% YoY).

INDUSTRIES WITH GROWTH IN NET FINANCIAL RESULT IN 2025 *Chart 8*
(₽ BN)



Sources: Rosstat, Bank of Russia analysis.

SHARE OF OVERDUE RECEIVABLES, BY INDUSTRY, FROM 31 DECEMBER 2024 TO 31 DECEMBER 2025 *Chart 9*



Sources: Rosstat, Bank of Russia calculations.

According to Rosstat, the corporate sector's overdue receivables (Chart 9) as of the end of 2025 increased by 25.4% YoY to ₽7.7 trillion. Moreover, companies' overall receivables were up by 0.5% YoY to total ₽123.8 trillion. The share of overdue payments in total receivables rose from 5.0% as of the end of 2024 to 6.2% as of the end of 2025. In early 2026, the proportion of overdue receivables continued to grow, reaching 6.7% of total receivables as of the end of February 2026 (total receivables amounted to ₽126.0 trillion, including overdue receivables of ₽8.4 trillion).

The most notable increase in overdue receivables over 2025 was recorded in manufacturing (by 53.4% YoY to ₽2.6 trillion, while total receivables contracted by 2.3% YoY), trade (by 18.6% YoY to ₽1.9 trillion, while total receivables were up by 7.8% YoY), and mining and quarrying (by 12.9% YoY to ₽0.8 trillion, while total receivables declined by 15.7% YoY). Despite the rise in overdue receivables, the situation involves no threats, according to the Bank of Russia's estimate. Nevertheless, this situation requires continuous monitoring, including by banks as they might face credit risk materialisation if borrowers' financial standing deteriorates.

2.2. Assessment of the largest companies' creditworthiness

The largest non-financial companies' financial results changed diversely over 2025. Some companies improved their financial metrics, reducing their debts, whereas others, to the contrary, increased their debt burden amid lower revenues and adverse market conditions. Overall, the aggregate net debt / EBITDA ratio of the sample of the largest companies[6] rose by 0.4 to 2.2 over the year (vs 2.3 in 2020 during the coronavirus pandemic) due to a 6.5% increase in net debt and a 4.0% decline in EBITDA.

The most notable reduction was recorded in the same industries that faced the most significant drop in profits. The coal industry's debt burden rose to the highest values, while its ICR fell below 1. The oil and gas industry's net debt / EBITDA ratio rose by 0.3 to 1.7 over the past six months, which was associated with worsening market conditions and sanctions imposed on major oil and gas producers. The transport industry's net debt / EBITDA ratio was up by 0.1 to 2.6 over the past six months, which was attributed to a reduction in loadings and freight turnover. The metallurgical industry's net debt / EBITDA ratio rose by 0.2 to 1.7 due to low domestic demand for metal products. In other industries, the ratio has barely changed since the date of the previous monitoring.

A lower EBITDA interest coverage ratio in 2025 in a number of industries was primarily due to companies' weaker operational performance, while higher debt servicing costs were an additional factor but not the determinant. Overall, most industries' debt and interest burden remained moderate, and their dynamics do not suggest rising risks to companies' financial resilience (Chart 10).

AGGREGATE DEBT INDICATORS OF CERTAIN INDUSTRIES IN 2024–2025 *Chart 10*



* *The calculations are based on recent IFRS statements disclosed by companies.*
** *EBITDA was adjusted for non-cash items as well as non-operating income and expenses, which are not regular and not directly related to a company's operations. Other industries include retail and e-commerce, development, telecommunications and IT, machine building, agriculture, consumer goods manufacturing, and multi-industry holding companies.*
Sources: companies' IFRS statements, Bank of Russia calculations.

The Bank of Russia conducted a scenario analysis of the largest non-financial organisations' financial standing based on its medium-term forecast, dated 24 April 2026, and sectoral trends observed in 2026. Relying on the findings of the analysis, the Bank of Russia made a forecast of the EBITDA

[6] The assessment perimeter embraced the 89 largest non-financial companies releasing IFRS financial statements.

interest coverage ratio,[7] which characterises how well a company can pay the interest due on outstanding debt using EBITDA. An ICR below 1.0 is critical, implying that a company is unable to properly service its liabilities. An ICR from 1.0 to 3.0 means that a company has an elevated interest burden and might face difficulties servicing its debt in case of an increase in interest expenses or a decline in operational performance. It should be noted that this metric is conservative (over a short term, a company may have other sources to finance its interest expenses, including interest income, shareholder support, debt refinancing and restructuring) and especially important when a company's ICR is persistently low.

The assessment covers the 89 largest non-financial companies (from 13 industries) whose consolidated earnings over 2025 totalled ₽74 trillion (34% of GDP over 2025) and consolidated debt according to IFRS statements as of 31 December 2025 was ₽48 trillion (47% of total claims on organisations). As of the end of 2025, amid growth in debts and a simultaneous decline in operational performance at certain large enterprises, the proportion of debt of the companies in the sample accounted for by organisations with the ICR below 3 increased by 8.8 pp to 75.4%. Nonetheless, only a number of companies in coal production, construction, trade, and machine building are facing serious difficulties in debt servicing (ICR < 1). These organisations accounted for 9.0% of total debt of the companies in the sample (as of 30 June 2025, they accounted for 8.1%).

The scenario analysis shows that, in 2026 as a result of a gradual easing of monetary conditions, the proportion of debt of companies whose ICR is below 1 might shrink to 8.4%, while that of companies with the ICR from 1 to 3 might edge down from 66.4% to 62.1% (Chart 11). Provided that the current trends continue, most companies will remain financially resilient and capable of servicing their debt in 2026. Some companies might need to restructure their debts, but the majority will remain stable.

BREAKDOWN OF COMPANIES' DEBTS, BY ICR, IN 2025 H1–2026 *Chart 11*
(%)



* *The calculations are based on recent IFRS statements disclosed by companies.*
Sources: companies' IFRS statements, Bank of Russia.

[7] Calculated as the ratio of EBITDA to interest expenses accrued.

Box 4. Structural changes in the retail market: growth of big techs and e-commerce

The sustainable shift of demand to the online segment continues in the retail market. According to Data Insight,[1] in 2025, Russian consumers made 8.3 billion online orders, which is 24% more than a year before (the growth rate in 2024 and 2023 equalled 43% and 69%, respectively). The main driver of online retail growth is the expansion of big techs,[2] mostly those focusing on e-commerce. The GMV[3] of big tech groups owning marketplaces surged by 36% over 2025 to reach ₽10.7 trillion.[4]

In addition to e-commerce, big tech groups are also actively developing fintech services. Some banks of big tech groups have already become large payment market participants, with two of them recognised as important in the payment services market[5]. Furthermore, banks are developing consumer lending, BNPL[6] services, and financing of suppliers working on their platforms. Nevertheless, the proportion of loans issued by big techs' banks to individuals and legal entities in the banking sector's total loan portfolio remains minor, equalling just 0.1% as of 1 April 2026.

The expansion of big techs is accompanied by significant investment in infrastructure, primarily warehouses expansion. Some companies are diversifying their business by investing in new projects and expanding their business lines. Over the past 12 months, the five largest big techs' total assets surged by 48%, reaching ₽4.6 trillion as of 1 January 2026. Their total debt[7] as of 1 January 2026 is estimated at ₽2 trillion, which is 53% more YoY. In view of the above, it is essential to monitor big techs' debt burden. Although some of them do not disclose their financial statements, the Bank of Russia has already started to receive such information from a number of large big techs and will continue interacting with these groups to enhance their transparency.

---

1 Marketing research E-commerce in Russia in 2026 (in Russian only).

2 Big techs are large businesses that have formed based on non-financial organisations, are developing using digital technologies, platforms and big data, and are establishing an ecosystem of services for their client base. One of the criteria for businesses to be included in this group is total assets exceeding ₽200 billion.

3 GMV (gross merchandise value) measures the total value of all goods sold on a trade platform over a specific period.

4 The data are given for companies whose assets exceed ₽200 billion.

5 See: Register of Credit Institutions Recognised by the Bank of Russia as Important in the Payment Services Market (in Russian only).

6 For details about BNPL services, see Box 5.

7 Big techs' total debt includes loans, microloans, and rent liabilities.

3. VULNERABILITIES OF THE RUSSIAN FINANCIAL SECTOR

3.1. Credit risk in the corporate sector

Bank lending to the corporate sector continued to expand at a balanced pace taking into account the seasonal effects, specifically its rise in 2025 Q4 and decline in 2026 Q1. As a result, the growth rate of credit claims on legal entities from 1 October 2025 to 1 April 2026 equalled 5.7%, while highly leveraged large companies increased their debt more notably than the corporate sector as a whole, specifically by 7.6% (vs +11.8% and +16.0%, respectively, over 2025). From 1 March 2026, the Bank of Russia raised the macroprudential add-on applicable to growth in claims on such companies to 100%, which will encourage banks to pursue more cautious lending policies and accumulate capital buffers.

The share of NPLs (quality categories IV–V) edged down by 0.1 pp to 3.9% of the corporate loan portfolio. However, the quality of debt servicing by SMEs, especially micro businesses, continues to worsen. According to SIBs' recent data, loan restructuring dynamics remained stable, although SIBs recorded two short-term rises in the amount of restructured loans in December 2025 (₽3.0 trillion, or 3.7% of legal entities' debt to SIBs) and at the end of March 2026 (₽2.3 trillion, or 2.8% of the debt). The Bank of Russia monitors the status of troubled industries and companies in the banking sector's loan portfolio and takes measures encouraging banks to create loss provisions adequate for a borrower's financial standing.

From 1 October 2025 to 1 April 2026, the proportion of foreign currency claims on corporate borrowers (loans, bonds, and CCS) dropped by 0.1 pp to 12.9%, adjusted for foreign currency revaluation[1] (or by 0.01 pp, if not adjusted for foreign currency revaluation). Contrastingly, in 2026 Q1, the percentage of foreign currency claims increased by 0.2 pp. The demand for foreign currency loans was predominantly demonstrated by exporters. Taking this into account, the Bank of Russia did not set macroprudential risk-weight add-ons for foreign currency claims on legal entities. However, the reduction in banks' foreign currency liquidity amid growth in foreign currency lending might provoke higher volatility in the FX market. Therefore, banks should enhance the quality of liquidity management.

3.1.1. Corporate debt

From 1 October 2025 to 1 April 2026, credit claims (loans and bonds) on the corporate sector increased by 5.7% (adjusted for foreign currency revaluation). The expansion of corporate lending was primarily driven by loans to large non-financial companies. The most significant growth rate was recorded among metallurgical enterprises, oil and gas companies, and retailers (including marketplaces). Developers repaid a considerable amount of their debts in December 2025–January 2026 owing to commissioned buildings and funds released from escrow accounts.

From October 2025 through March 2026, the market for corporate bonds[2] issued by non-financial companies expanded by ₽1.2 trillion (adjusted for foreign currency revaluation), or 5.5%. Over the said period, investment in bonds[3] on banks' balance sheets declined by ₽0.6 trillion (taking into account repos, the increase amounted to ₽0.1 trillion) (Table 6).

---

1 At the exchange rate as of 1 April 2026.

2 According to Cbonds.

3 Taking into account structured debt securities. Excluding bonds transferred under repo agreements and bonds of Limited Liability Company DOM.RF Mortgage Agent.

LEGAL ENTITIES' OUTSTANDING DEBT TO BANKS, BY BORROWER TYPE, FROM 1 OCTOBER 2025 TO 1 APRIL 2026, ADJUSTED FOR FOREIGN CURRENCY REVALUATION *Table 6*

(₽ TN)

Borrower type	Growth in loans	Growth in bonds
Large non-financial companies	4.3	-0.6
of which largest companies with ICR < 3	*1.5*	*-0.1*
Financial companies	-0.6	0.0
SMEs1	0.5	0.0
Developers	0.3	0.0
Non-residents	0.2	0.0
Total[2]	**4.8**	**-0.6**

1 Along with all SMEs operating as of the reporting date, the figures also take into account earlier liquidated companies that had the SME status as of the liquidation date, which banks still had claims on as of the reporting date.
2 The total value may differ from the sum of the components due to rounding.
Sources: Reporting Forms 0409711 and 0409303.

In 2025 and 2026 Q1, the ratio of outstanding debt of the largest companies[4] to the banking sector's capital remained quite high, equalling 72% (Chart 12).

RATIO OF NINE LARGEST COMPANIES' OUTSTANDING DEBT TO BANKING SECTOR'S CAPITAL *Chart 12*

(%)



Sources: Reporting Forms 0409303, 0409711, 0409501, 0409603 and 0409118; National Clearing Centre; Cbonds.

In 2024–2025, highly leveraged large companies were expanding their outstanding debt to banks faster than the corporate sector as a whole (over 2025, the respective growth rates equalled 16.0% and 11.8%). For banks to assess highly leveraged large companies' risks more cautiously and form a macroprudential capital buffer for such claims, the Bank of Russia introduced a macroprudential add-on for growth in such borrowers' debt. From 1 March 2026, the regulator raised this macroprudential add-on by 60 pp to 100%.

As of 1 April 2026, the amount of such companies' debt to the banking sector, which is subject to this add-on, totalled ₽3.8 trillion, while the capital buffer created by banks for these claims reached ₽63 billion (Chart 13). Banks mostly accumulated this buffer in relation to 45[5] groups of companies[6]

4 Groups of companies whose assets and total debt exceeded ₽1 trillion as of 1 January 2026. The list of the groups was revised, compared to the previous Financial Stability Review, and fixed for the entire time series taking into account recent data, and therefore, the values may differ from those available in the earlier issues of the Financial Stability Review.

5 Including 20 companies from the sample of the 89 largest public companies.

6 Groups of companies or individual borrowers and large projects not related to specific groups.

(overall, the add-on is applicable to more than 200 companies at an individual level), having increased it by ₽24 billion over March 2026.

Moreover, in October 2025–March 2026, the growth rate of debt of the largest groups of companies with elevated leverage (7.6%) still exceeded the average growth rate of corporate liabilities (5.7%).

MACROPRUDENTIAL CAPITAL BUFFER FOR CORPORATE CREDIT CLAIMS *Chart 13*
(₽ BN)



Sources: Reporting Forms 0409135 and 0409114.

3.1.2. Quality of the corporate loan portfolio

From 1 October 2025 to 1 April 2026, the amount of NPLs (quality categories IV–V)[7] increased from ₽3.4 trillion to ₽3.5 trillion, whereas the proportion of this debt edged down[8] by 0.1 pp to 3.9% of the corporate loan portfolio, which is slightly below the 2024–2025 average. That was attributable to, among other things, banks selling part of troubled assets, mostly from the coal industry, at a discount in 2025 Q4. More than 70% of NPLs issued to both SMEs and large companies were covered by provisions, which is an acceptable percentage (Chart 14).

According to the survey of risk management units of the largest SIBs,[9] the assessments of creditworthiness in the segment of loans to large enterprises[10] decreased somewhat from October 2025 (Chart 15). Specifically, as of 1 April 2026, the proportion of 'green zone' loans (without signs of impairment) edged down by 2 pp to 72%, while the shares of 'yellow zone' and 'red zone' loans increased by 1 pp to 19% and by 1 pp to 6%, respectively. As for loans to medium-sized businesses, over 2025 Q4–2026 Q1, the proportion of 'green zone' loans contracted as well, namely by 2 pp to 61%, while the share of 'yellow zone' loans was up by 3 pp to 31% and that of 'red zone' loans declined by 1 pp to 5%. Companies in the 'yellow zone' remain solvent, but require monitoring.

7 According to Reporting Form 0409115.

8 By 0.1 pp to 3.1% for large companies and by 0.2 pp to 7.6% for SMEs.

9 As of 1 April 2026, the total loan portfolio covered by the survey amounted to ₽69 trillion, or nearly 70% of the banking sector's overall loan portfolio.

10 Companies are divided into large and medium-sized based on banks' internal methodologies.

SHARE OF LOANS OF QUALITY CATEGORIES IV–V AND PROVISIONING RATIO ACROSS BANKS, EXCEPT BNA *Chart 14*
(%)



Sources: Reporting Forms 0409135 and 0409114.

LARGEST SYSTEMICALLY IMPORTANT BANKS' LOAN PORTFOLIO, BY RISK ZONE* *Chart 15*
(%)



* *The total of the percentages may not necessarily equal 100% due to rounding.*
Source: survey of the largest SIBs' risk management units.

The trends varied across industries (Chart 16): growth in 'green zone' loans was recorded in oil and gas companies (by 7 pp to 74%), consumer goods manufacturing (by 4 pp to 61%), healthcare and pharmaceuticals (by 4 pp to 71%), and trade[11] (by 3 pp to 58%). The most significant reduction in 'green zone' loans was registered in forestry (by 24 pp to 49%), agriculture (by 17 pp to 49%), food manufacturing (by 15 pp to 47%), transportation (by 12 pp to 63%), and metallurgy (by 4 pp to 80%).

The quality of SME loan servicing continues to decline. Specifically, the number of troubled borrowers increased across all segments, especially among micro businesses: from April 2024, as little as 8.1% of borrowers defaulted over the year, whereas from April 2025, this proportion rose to nearly 9.9% (among small enterprises – 3.7% and 5.9%, respectively) (Chart 17). Nevertheless, this trend

[11] Including wholesale and retail trade.

involves no systemic risks to the banking sector since total debt of the SMEs that defaulted from April 2025 through March 2026 remains minor, equalling less than 1% of legal entities' total debt as of 1 April 2026 (3% of the SME portfolio).[12]

BIGGEST CHANGES IN SHARE OF 'GREEN ZONE' LOANS IN LARGEST SYSTEMICALLY IMPORTANT BANKS' PORTFOLIO, BY INDUSTRY *Chart 16*

(%)



Source: survey of the largest SIBs' risk management units.

SME DEFAULT RATIO OVER 12 MONTHS* *Chart 17*

(%)



* *It is calculated as the ratio of the total number of borrowers who had no debt servicing problems, based on the list of borrowers (as of the reporting date) who faced such problems within the next 12 months from the reporting date, to the total number of 'good' borrowers as of the reporting date. The criteria indicating debt servicing problems are as follows: bankruptcy, default on bonds, a substantial part of debt overdue for more than 90 days, transition of a considerable part of debt to quality categories IV–V, writing off a significant part of debt using provisions, assignment of a notable part of debt at a large discount, and a sizeable increase in loss provisions. A borrower is no longer considered 'bad' six months after all of the above criteria cease to apply. From 1 February 2026, the methodology with respect to SMEs changed: along with all SMEs operating as of the reporting date, the calculation also takes into account earlier liquidated companies that had the SME status as of the liquidation date, which banks still have claims on as of the reporting date.*

Sources: Reporting Form 0409303, Cbonds, Unified Federal Register of Bankruptcy Data, Unified Register of Small and Medium-sized Enterprises.

[12] The SME status according to the Unified Register of Small and Medium-sized Enterprises (including liquidated legal entities which have outstanding debt to banks and had the SME status before the liquidation date) without excluding developers and large liabilities of borrowers.

Banks apply a more conservative approach to assessing loans issued to small and micro businesses because the amount of their debt is not large compared to other corporate loans. Banks recognise losses on such loans faster than on loans granted to large borrowers.

3.1.3. Corporate loan restructuring

According to recent weekly data from SIBs, the dynamics of restructured loans generally remained stable in 2025 Q4–2026 Q1 (Chart 18). The average ratio of corporate loans restructured over the past four weeks to legal entities' total loan portfolio equalled 1.7%, compared to 2.5% in 2025 Q2–Q3. However, there were two spikes in the amount of restructured loans in December 2025 and March 2026. Those were mostly loans issued to coal producers and metallurgical companies. Furthermore, in 2026 Q1, there was an increase in the amount of loan restructuring requested by construction and real estate management companies, namely by 10% vs 2025 Q4, which was associated with rescheduled commissioning of buildings and higher project budgets. The proportion of loan restructuring approvals by banks was sustainably high, approximating 85% of the amount of debt. Over the past year, banks approved 83% of loan restructuring requests from large companies, 78% – from medium-sized enterprises, and 40% – from small and micro businesses (vs 90%, 70%, and 47%, respectively, in 2026 Q1).

Some companies request loan restructuring repeatedly. In this case, banks recognise such debt as troubled and, together with borrowers, take measures to restore their financial standing. In order to encourage banks to restructure loans issued to companies facing financial difficulties, the Bank of Russia extended[13] until 1 July 2026 its information letter recommending that banks should restructure loans of those borrowers that can confirm their ability to restore their resilience over the medium-term horizon. The Bank of Russia, on its part, also assesses the position of companies experiencing debt repayment difficulties and, where needed, works with banks for them to create loss provisions adequate for a borrower's actual financial standing.

RATIO OF CORPORATE LOANS RESTRUCTURED OVER FOUR WEEKS TO LEGAL ENTITIES' LOAN PORTFOLIO *Chart 18*
(%)



Sources: SIBs' survey, Reporting Form 0409101.

[13] Bank of Russia Information Letter No. IN-03-23/120, dated 30 December 2025.

3.1.4. Banks' foreign currency lending to companies

In 2025 Q4–2026 Q1, the amount of foreign currency corporate loans and bonds[14] on banks' balance sheets remained close to 1.1 trillion in yuan terms (increasing by 0.5%, or 5 billion in yuan terms, over the reporting period, mostly in 2026 Q1) (Chart 19). The demand for foreign currency loans was primarily demonstrated by financial companies and exporters, predominantly from the energy and precious metal mining industries.

FOREIGN CURRENCY CLAIMS ON LEGAL ENTITIES (FOREIGN CURRENCY LOANS AND BONDS, YUAN CCS) *Chart 19*



Sources: Reporting Form 0409101, National Settlement Depository.

Concurrently, banks expanded indirect (synthetic) lending in foreign currency to non-financial companies. Specifically, from October 2025 to April 2026, the amount of CNY/RUB CCS transactions between banks and non-financial companies increased by ¥33 billion (from ¥27 billion to ¥60 billion). Banks concluded CCS transactions with exporters from oil and gas and chemical industries (34% of the amount of open positions), precious metal mining (24%), and metallurgy (23%). That said, these CCS transactions were mostly concluded on the same dates when banks issued ruble loans to companies in similar amounts. Hence, these transactions actually mean synthetic lending in foreign currency since companies receive ruble loans, while raising yuan funding through CCS. Companies repay ruble loans at an interest rate equalling the key rate plus 2 pp, while under swap transactions they, to the contrary, receive ruble payments at an interest rate equalling the key rate and pay 5–10%[15] for the CNY leg. As a result, the effective cost of borrowing in yuan for a borrower was 7–12%.

Banks' active lending (including synthetic lending) in foreign currency might involve the following risks:

1. Risk of a higher share of foreign currency on banks' balance sheets.

Amid a decline in ruble interest rates, the demand for foreign currency deposits might increase, and therefore, the regulator needs to monitor the risk of growth in the foreign currency share in banks'

[14] Excluding those transferred under repo agreements.

[15] Yuan interest rates on transactions concluded in March 2026, after a period when the cost of yuan liquidity was rising, increased to 13–14%, but these transactions account for no more than 10% of total open positions.

liabilities and, consequently, assets. From the beginning of 2025, the share of foreign currency in the portfolio of corporate loans, bonds, and CCS remained close to 13% (the average from 1 January 2025 to 1 April 2026 was 13.0% at the exchange rate as of 1 April 2026). Over the period under review, the foreign currency share changed only slightly, edging down by 0.1 pp from 13.0% to 12.9%, adjusted for foreign currency revaluation[16] (-0.01 pp, if not adjusted for foreign currency revaluation),[17] while in 2026 Q1, it was up by 0.2 pp (Chart 19).

2. Credit risk related to banks' foreign currency claims.

Over the reporting period, banks expanded lending primarily to exporters which can repay their loans using export earnings. Taking this into account, in 2025 Q4–2026 Q1, the Bank of Russia did not set risk-weight add-ons for foreign currency claims on legal entities.

3. Maturity mismatches between assets and liabilities and foreign currency liquidity deficit.

If banks expand foreign currency lending, while lacking stable sources of foreign currency funding, foreign currency liquidity risk might materialise as a result. A decline in the banking sector's liquid foreign currency assets amid a rise in foreign currency lending contributed to higher volatility in the FX market in March 2026 (see Box 3). Conducting deposit and credit transactions in foreign currency, banks are advised to enhance the stability of their foreign currency liabilities and form a sufficient liquidity buffer in case of their possible outflow.

3.2. Households' debt burden

Cooling in the retail lending market as a result of tight monetary and macroprudential policies helped decrease households' debt burden at the macrolevel. Specifically, the debt service ratio[18] dropped from 10.7% as of 1 January 2025 to 9.1% as of 1 January 2026, primarily because of a reduction in individuals' spending on cash loan repayments. From October 2024, the unsecured loan portfolio shrank by 6.0%. Nevertheless, there is no risk of a credit crunch in retail lending since low demand for unsecured loans is offset by higher demand for mortgages and car loans (as of 1 April 2026, the portfolio in these segments expanded by 12.8% and 20.9% YoY, respectively).

The percentage of NPLs in the unsecured consumer loan portfolio stabilised at 13.1% as of 1 April 2026 (vs 12.9% as of 1 October 2025). The persistently elevated percentage of NPLs in the portfolio is attributable to the maturity of loans issued to borrowers with low creditworthiness or without a credit history and to the contraction of the portfolio amid weak demand in this segment. Delinquencies were more common among borrowers with high DSTI. This proves the reasonableness of the regulatory measures implemented by the Bank of Russia to limit borrowers' debt burden. Additionally, banks' losses may rise due to the spreading practice of voluntary bankruptcies. Debt relief companies' aggressive practices involve threats to both individuals, who lack information about the consequences of bankruptcies, and banks, as well as increase banks' credit losses and encourage them to mitigate these risks by setting higher interest rates for all borrowers.

---

[16] At the exchange rate as of 1 April 2026.

[17] From 1 October 2025 to 1 April 2026, the share of banks' on-balance-sheet foreign currency claims on corporate borrowers contracted by 0.47 pp from 12.73% to 12.27%, adjusted for foreign currency revaluation at the exchange rate as of 1 April 2026 (-0.3 pp, if not adjusted for foreign currency revaluation).

[18] It is calculated as the ratio of households' total scheduled payments on loans to overall household income.

Macroprudential capital buffers accumulated by banks remain at a level adequate for covering banks' losses in case of a large-scale stress. The capital buffer for retail loans totalled ₽1.3 trillion (3.6% of the portfolio net of provisions), staying at this level from late 2025.

Since 2025, banks have started to securitise consumer loans more often. Part of securities in specific issues are purchased by other retail banks. In this case, loans remain within the banking system, while their capital coverage decreases due to the release of the macroprudential add-ons. To reduce the opportunities for regulatory arbitrage, the Bank of Russia introduces amendments to the regulation allowing it to set add-ons for banks' investment in such bonds.

3.2.1. Households' debt burden at the macrolevel

Individuals' debt burden at the macrolevel had been decreasing for six consecutive quarters. Households' spending on cash loans dropped most notably: as of the end of 2025 Q4, people used 3.3% of disposable incomes to repay these loans, which is 0.2 pp less QoQ. This reduction was associated with a decline in such disbursements owing to steadily high interest rates and tight macroprudential measures (for details, see Subsection 3.2.2), as well as demand shifting towards credit cards. In 2025 Q4, individuals' spending on credit card debt servicing edged down to 2.8%, which is 0.1 pp less QoQ. Spending on mortgage and car loan repayments remained unchanged relative to households' disposable incomes.

DEBT SERVICE RATIO IN RETAIL LENDING *Chart 20*
(%)



Sources: CHBs' data; Reporting Forms 0409316, 0409126, 0409128 and 0409102; Rosstat.

Hence, households' debt burden declined by 3 pp vs 2022 Q1, staying at the lowest level since 2019, which is explained by the outpacing growth in citizens' incomes (+17% YoY as of the end of 2025) and the Bank of Russia's measures to limit borrowers' debt burden.

3.2.2. Dynamics of unsecured consumer loan portfolio

In 2025 Q4–2026 Q1, the unsecured consumer loan portfolio continued to contract amid tight monetary policy and strict macroprudential measures limiting risky disbursements. From October 2024 through March 2026, the unsecured consumer loan portfolio shrank by 6.0%. However, in 2026 Q1, there were some signs of a slower reduction in the portfolio. As EIRs on retail loans remain

high, declining more slowly than the key rate, this decelerates the rebound in the demand for credit. By setting higher interest rates, banks thus seek to offset borrowers' credit risk that has risen over recent years. An improvement in the quality of issued loans will help reduce credit risks, which banks will take into account in loan pricing. In 2026 Q1, the number of loan applications dropped to 52 million, which was predominantly associated with lower demand for new credit cards at higher interest rates as borrowers continue using earlier issued cards. That said, the ratio of loan approvals remained nearly the same: in 2026 Q1, banks approved 22% of applications for credit cards and 24% of applications for consumer loans.

The structure of issued unsecured consumer loans is still dominated by credit cards, accounting for 68% of total disbursements in 2026 Q1. Borrowers continue to actively use the grace period and old credit cards issued during the period of low interest rates.

Although the unsecured consumer loan portfolio contracted, there is no risk of a credit crunch in the retail segment since this reduction is offset by growth in mortgage and car lending. As of 1 April 2026, the car loan and mortgage portfolios expanded by 20.9% YoY and 12.8% YoY, respectively.

UNSECURED CONSUMER LOAN PORTFOLIO
(%)

Chart 21



Source: Reporting Form 0409115.

AMOUNT OF ISSUED UNSECURED CONSUMER LOANS

Chart 22



Source: Reporting Form 0409704.

3.2.3. Loan servicing quality and demand for loan restructuring

The proportion of NPLs in the unsecured consumer loan portfolio increased by 0.2 pp over the past six months, reaching 13.1% as of 1 April 2026. That was attributable to the continuing contraction of the portfolio and the maturity of high-risk loans.

The decline in payment discipline among borrowers, observed from 2023 H2, despite high economic growth rates in 2023–2024, was primarily associated with lending to borrowers with higher credit risk. During that period, people's incomes rose significantly (households' per capita money income[19] increased by 13% in 2023, by 19% in 2024, and by 17% in 2025) and uniformly across all income groups (the share of individuals with declining incomes shrank, while that with growing incomes expanded). People's debt burden decreased at both macrolevel and microlevel. However, during that period, riskier borrowers who were ready to raise more expensive loans (including those lacking a credit history) demonstrated elevated demand for credit.

SHARE OF PROBLEM DEBTS IN UNSECURED CONSUMER LOAN PORTFOLIO *Chart 23*
(%)



Source: Reporting Form 0409115.

NUMBER OF CITIZENS WHOSE LABOUR INCOME CHANGED BY SPECIFIED VALUE OVER YEAR *Chart 24*
(MLN PEOPLE)

Source: Federal Tax Service of Russia.

[19] Nominal, according to Rosstat (in Russian only).

Forward-looking indicators suggest that repayment performance on new loans is better than on loans issued in 2024 Q3–2025 Q1. Specifically, the proportion of NPL 30+ after three MOB, which were issued in January 2026, equalled 0.8% of cash loans and 2.7% of credit cards (-1.0 pp and -0.5 pp, respectively, compared to disbursements of January 2025). However, the quality of loans issued to borrowers with high DSTI is notably lower. The share of NPL 30+ after three MOB[20] reached 5.4% of cash loans issued to borrowers with DSTI above 80% (+1.6 pp compared to disbursements of January 2025). This proves the relevance of the measures implemented by the Bank of Russia to limit disbursements to borrowers with high DSTI.

NPL 30+ AFTER THREE MOB FOR ISSUED CASH LOANS, BY DSTI GROUP *Chart 25*

(%)



Source: Reporting Form 0409704.

NPL 30+ AFTER THREE MOB FOR ISSUED CREDIT CARDS, BY DSTI GROUP *Chart 26*

(%)



Source: Reporting Form 0409704.

The amount of loans restructured[21] over the past six months declined by 36% compared to 1 October 2025, accounting for 1.1% of the unsecured consumer loan portfolio as of 1 April 2026 (vs 1.6% as of 1 October 2025). Furthermore, the demand for loan restructuring in the total number of applications decreased slightly. Specifically, over the past six months, the number of applications for cash loan restructuring declined from 2,106,000 as of 1 October 2025 to 1,963,000 as of 1 April 2026. Concurrently, the ratio of approved loan restructuring applications dropped as well.

AMOUNT OF CONSUMER LOANS RESTRUCTURED OVER PAST SIX MONTHS *Chart 27*



Sources: banks' survey, Reporting Form 0409115.

[20] Months on book (MOB) denote the number of months that have elapsed since the origination of a loan.

[21] Excluding loans restructured under Federal Law No. 377-FZ. Compared to the previous Financial Stability Review, the figures on restructured loans were revised downwards.

3.2.4. Dynamics of households' bankruptcies

The deterioration of the quality of the loan portfolio was accompanied by a rising number of bankruptcies. The number of individuals declared bankrupt following court or out-of-court proceedings nearly doubled over the past two years, totalling 636,000 as of the end of 2025 (vs 365,000 as of the end of 2023). The share of bankrupt individuals reached 1.3% of the overall number of borrowers. The rise in bankruptcies was most notable in the cash lending segment.

NUMBER OF INDIVIDUALS DECLARED BANKRUPT *Chart 28*



Sources: Unified State Register of Legally Important Information on Facts of Activities of Legal Entities, Individual Entrepreneurs, and Other Economic Agents (Fedresource); CHBs' data.

Some borrowers apply for bankruptcy even when there is potential to continue debt repayments. This is often the case when a borrower lacks information or mistakenly believes that the consequences of the bankruptcy procedure are insignificant. However, the bankruptcy procedure entails long-term negative implications for a person's business reputation and credit history as well as limitations on financial transactions and career opportunities.

The structure of liabilities under the current bankruptcy procedure leaves out mortgages and enables an individual to keep housing. This is the reason why this practice is becoming increasingly popular among mortgagors. After the procedure, part of borrowers stop fulfilling their obligations on non-mortgage loans, while continuing mortgage repayments.

This practice is also becoming more widespread due to the propagation of services offered by debt relief companies, which provide legal support in the course of bankruptcy proceedings. The expansion of these companies' activity and the persistently rising number of voluntary bankruptcies (in the first place, when debt settlement is possible through restructuring programmes and loan repayment holidays) increase credit losses and have a long-lasting negative effect on the lending market as a whole, by decreasing the accessibility of loans and pushing up interest rates since banks face higher credit risks.

If lenders adopt a more active approach to informing borrowers and provide them more options to settle debts, people facing hardships will be able to cope with them without resorting to such extreme measures as personal bankruptcy. The Bank of Russia's measures, aimed at limiting individuals' debt burden, will also reduce the probability of debt servicing difficulties.

3.2.5. Macroprudential measures

In 2025 Q4–2026 Q1, the Bank of Russia did not tighten the MPLs on risky loans in the unsecured consumer lending segment. In 2026 Q1, disbursements to borrowers with DSTI above 50% accounted for 14% of cash loans and 20% of credit cards. Over the past three years, the MPLs introduced in this segment helped decrease the proportion of unsecured consumer loans issued to borrowers with DSTI above 50% more than three times from 63% as of the end of 2022 Q4 to 18% as of the end of 2025 Q4.

SHARE OF LOANS TO BORROWERS WITH HIGH DSTI IN CASH LOAN SEGMENT *Chart 29*
(%)



Sources: Reporting Forms 0409704 and 0409135.

SHARE OF LOANS TO BORROWERS WITH HIGH DSTI IN CREDIT CARD SEGMENT* *Chart 30*
(%)



* *Part of the funds are related to credit cards issued before the introduction of the MPLs.*
Source: Reporting Form 0409704.

To make the regulation more risk-sensitive, from 2026 Q2, the Bank of Russia switched to MPLs on an inclusion basis. Previously, MPLs were established separately on loans to borrowers with DSTI 50–80% and DSTI above 80% (in mortgage lending, for the DSTI and LTV segments). From 2026 Q2, the regulator sets an MPL on loans issued to borrowers with DSTI above 50%, within which an included sublimit is set on disbursements to borrowers with DSTI above 80%. The MPLs thus become more flexible, enabling banks to shift disbursements to less risky segments.

COMPARISON OF CURRENT MPLS AND MPLS ON AN INCLUSION BASIS USING CASH LOANS AS EXAMPLE *Chart 31*



Source: Bank of Russia (illustrative example).

The prolonged application of the MPLs on loans to borrowers with high DSTI helped significantly improve the structure of the unsecured consumer loan portfolio. Specifically, as of 1 April 2026, loans to borrowers with DSTI above 50% accounted for 35% of total debt in this segment. From late 2022, following the introduction of the MPLs in this segment, the share of risky loans in the portfolio contracted by 28 pp. Further improvement of the portfolio structure, facilitated by macroprudential measures, will help mitigate credit risks and enhance the banking sector's resilience.

STRUCTURE OF UNSECURED CONSUMER LOAN PORTFOLIO, BY DSTI GROUP *Chart 32*
(%)



Source: Reporting Form 0409704.

As for the segment of car loans and general-purpose consumer loans secured by motor vehicles, MPLs are effective from 2025 Q3. Furthermore, the Bank of Russia tightened the MPLs for general-purpose consumer loans secured by motor vehicles for 2025 Q4. Owing to the MPLs, in 2026 Q1, car loans and general-purpose consumer loans secured by motor vehicles to borrowers with DSTI above 50% were restricted to 17% and 10% of total disbursements (vs 20% and 43% in 2025 Q1), respectively. From 2025 Q4, the Bank of Russia also established MPLs for home equity loans. The proportion of disbursements to borrowers with DSTI above 50% declined from 80% in 2025 Q3 to 19% in 2026 Q1. The Bank of Russia tightened the MPLs for 2026 Q3 in the segments of home equity loans and

general-purpose consumer loans secured by motor vehicles to the level applicable to unsecured cash loans, including to reduce the opportunities for regulatory arbitrage.

Macroprudential capital buffers

Owing to macroprudential add-ons, banks have created and maintain substantial capital cushions for retail loans. Specifically, as of 1 April 2026, the macroprudential capital buffer for unsecured consumer loans amounted to ₽886 billion, or 8.3% of the portfolio net of loan loss provisions. Additionally, banks have formed a macroprudential buffer for car loans totalling ₽75 billion, or 2.5% of the portfolio net of loan loss provisions. The Bank of Russia may release the macroprudential capital buffer in full or in part if growth in credit losses, in case of a worsening of the macroeconomic situation, limits banks' capability to continue lending to the economy.

MACROPRUDENTIAL BUFFER FOR UNSECURED LOANS* *Chart 33*
(₽ BN)



* *Only ruble loans.*
Sources: Reporting Forms 0409135 and 0409114.

MACROPRUDENTIAL BUFFER FOR UNSECURED LOANS* *Chart 34*
(% OF PORTFOLIO)



* *Net of loan loss provisions.*
Sources: Reporting Forms 0409135, 0409114, and 0409115.

The amount of asset-backed debt securities collateralised by consumer loans, which were issued from early 2025, reached ₽320 billion, with 19% of these securities bought out by originating banks and their subsidiaries and 4% by other banks. Additionally, in 2026 Q1, about 34% of large earlier issues

of such bonds (worth ₽750 billion) were bought by other banks. In economic terms, banks purchasing such securities actually exchange their consumer loan portfolios to optimise the burden on their capital by releasing the macroprudential capital buffer. For such acquired debt securities, banks are not obliged to have macroprudential add-ons which, before the securitisation transaction, were used by the bank that transferred its consumer loan portfolio to collateralise issued consumer loans.

To avoid a situation where such practices reduce the burden on banks' capital, the Bank of Russia introduces regulatory changes to separate a specific segment of credit claims which may be subject to macroprudential add-ons – banks' investment in asset-backed debt securities collateralised by consumer loans.

3.2.6. Consumer microfinance

The quarterly growth rate of MFOs' consumer portfolio declined notably from 11.5% in 2025 Q1 to 3.6% in 2026 Q1 (Chart 35). These dynamics could be associated with new regulatory requirements affecting MFOs' operations, including the use of official up-to-date information on borrowers' income for DSTI calculations[22] and biometric data from the Unified Biometric System when concluding a consumer microloan agreement in electronic form.[23] Over 2026 Q1, MFOs' cost of risk[24] decreased by 0.9 pp to 29.7%.

Despite a slower increase in MFOs' claims, their share in the total consumer loan and microloan portfolio continues to rise steadily, specifically by 0.4 pp over the past six months, to reach 5.0% as of 31 March 2026. The main drivers of the upward trend, observed over the past two years, were MFOs being part of big tech groups or affiliated with banks, which were actively expanding their operations (40.1% of the consumer microloan portfolio as of 31 March 2026).

Taking into account that the values of the MPLs for unsecured consumer loans (microloans) remained effective, the proportion of microloans issued by MFOs to borrowers with DSTI above 50% over 2026 Q1 stayed nearly the same at 13%.[25] Given the current MPLs set for auto equity microloans, the proportion of such microloans in MFOs' total disbursements continued to decline, equalling 0.5% as of 31 March 2026 (-2.1 pp QoQ). Auto equity microloans issued to borrowers with DSTI above 50% accounted for 17%.

In 2026, the consumer microloan market might cool down further as a result of the measures implemented as part of the MFO market reform aimed at reducing people's debt burden,[26] as well as lenders' stage-by-stage transition to using only official up-to-date information for DSTI calculations (see Subsection 3.2.7). From 1 April 2026, the overpayment limit on a consumer microloan with the repayment period of up to one year as of the agreement date was reduced from 130% to 100% of the initial microloan amount, and from 1 October 2026, MFOs will not be allowed to issue a microloan to a borrower with an EIR exceeding 200% when the borrower already has two other expensive[27] microloans.

---

[22] From 1 January 2026, credit institutions and MFOs are not allowed to use any models to calculate a borrower's DSTI for issuing a loan (microloan) of up to ₽50,000 or an car loan (microloan), if these models have not been validated by the Bank of Russia.

[23] Federal Law No. 41-FZ, dated 1 April 2025, 'On Creating a State Information System to Counter Violations Committed Using Information and Telecommunications Technologies and on Amending Certain Laws of the Russian Federation'.

[24] The ratio of changes in the amount of created provisions, principal assignments and write-offs over a year to the average portfolio over a year.

[25] The figures were calculated based on a comparable sample of the 39 largest MFOs accounting for 79.6% of the market as of 31 March 2026. The figures are given excluding microloan agreements with a credit limit and auto equity microloans.

[26] Consultation paper Microfinance Market Development Prospects for 2025–2027 (in Russian only).

[27] At the first stage of the reform implementation – microloans with an EIR exceeding 200% p.a.

CONSUMER PORTFOLIO DYNAMICS IN MFO MARKET *Chart 35*



Sources: Reporting Forms 0420840 and 0420846.

3.2.7. Further improvement of the DSTI calculation

Following the Russian President's instruction, to make the assessment of borrowers' DSTI more precise, creditors are gradually transitioning to using official income data when extending consumer loans (microloans) to individuals. Specifically, from 1 July 2027, it is planned to prohibit creditors by law[28] from using information on borrower incomes from loan (microloan) applications[29] or internal income assessment models. After the relevant amendments take effect, creditors will be required to calculate DSTI solely based on official data on borrower incomes, obtained from state information systems, including the Digital Profile, directly from the borrower (e.g. certificates issued by employers), or from internal bank data on income credited to the borrower's accounts with that bank in the form of wages, pensions, and/or social payments, as well as rental income.

In addition, the regulator considers expanding the list of mandatory payments to be taken into account when calculating DSTI. For example, on 1 April 2026, the law on instalment services came into force.[30] Instalment service operators are required to submit data on all instalment arrangements to CHBs if a borrower's total outstanding debt under them exceeds ₽50,000. Over the course of the year, CHBs will be updating the data they have, while from 2027, monthly payments under instalment agreements are planned to be factored into the DSTI calculation. The relevant draft law has already been adopted in the first reading.[31]

[28] Draft Federal Law No. 1127712-8, 'On Amending Article 5.1 of the Federal Law 'On Consumer Loans (Microloans)'.

[29] Currently allowed to be used in the DSTI calculation in the amount not exceeding the average per capita income, as reported by Rosstat; from 1 April 2026, a further 10% discount on the resulting figure is to be applied.

[30] Federal Law No. 283-FZ, dated 31 July 2025, 'On Providing Instalment Services' (Federal Law No. 283-FZ).

[31] Draft Federal Law No. 1045978-8, 'On Amending the Federal Law 'On Credit Histories'.

Box 5. Situation in the BNPL market

BNPL[1] services have become widespread in recent years. According to a survey[2] conducted by the Bank of Russia, the volume of BNPL disbursements in 2025 exceeded ₽500 billion, having expanded by almost 80% over the year. The main driver of their growth is the development of e-commerce, particularly marketplaces and ecosystems that are actively offering such services to customers. Despite a considerable rise in its turnover, the BNPL market remains small in terms of outstanding debt, which amounts to ₽100 billion (a 1.4-fold increase over 2025).

The credit quality of BNPL loans is assessed as satisfactory, with the share of bad debts[3] equalling 3.4% as of the end of 2025, which is 1.7 pp higher than a year earlier. This is notably lower than the volume of NPLs in unsecured lending. However, the rise in delinquencies is currently being diluted by the portfolio's fast growth, which should also be taken into account.

Federal Law No. 283-FZ, which entered into force on 1 April 2026 and regulates BNPL operators (intermediaries that help pay for goods, works, and services in instalments), made them subject to the Bank of Russia's supervision. We are primarily focusing on measures aimed at making this sector more transparent:

- from 1 April 2026, BNPL operators are required to report information on customer debts exceeding ₽50,000 to CHBs;
- from 1 January 2027, BNPL operators will be required to submit reports to the Bank of Russia; and
- in 2027, regulation will include provisions requiring to take into account BNPL outstanding debts when calculating borrowers' DSTI.

Furthermore, Federal Law No. 283-FZ, improved the transparency of BNPL products for customers, making them fee-free for consumers and introducing a ban on setting different prices for goods depending on whether they are purchased using the BNPL service or not. From 1 April 2026, the maximum BNPL term is six months, and from 1 April 2028, it will be four months.

These measures will enhance the transparency of the BNPL market and strengthen consumer protection. At the same time, the market will shift towards more subdued dynamics. Its growth rates may decline due to a partial replacement of BNPL services by banks' credit products. Given that loans up to ₽50,000 traditionally account for a significant share of the BNPL market, the Bank of Russia will continue to conduct regular surveys prior to the introduction of mandatory reporting for operators in order to promptly monitor potential risks.

---

[1] BNPL (buy now, pay later) is a service that allows customers to pay for goods, works, and services in instalments.

[2] Four banks and two marketplaces took part in the survey. The survey is estimated to cover 99% of the market.

[3] To evaluate the quality of the rapidly growing BNPL portfolio, the increase in loans overdue for more than 90 days (NPL 90+) over the past 12 months was assessed against the volume of installments issued within the same period. The BNPL portfolio has a high turnover rate, which makes this metric more relevant than the 'share of NPL 90+ in the portfolio', which mixes old and new installments.

3.3. Imbalances in the housing market and project finance risks

Over the past year, the mortgage portfolio on banks' balance sheets gained 11.1% (+12.8% YoY as of 1 April 2026). The most notable increase occurred in 2025 Q4. Subsidised lending programmes still dominate the mortgage market (accounting for 68% of new loans in 2026 Q1), although the segment of market-based mortgages also continued to recover.

Over the past six months, the proportion of non-performing mortgages edged up to 1.8% as of 1 April 2026 (vs 1.2% a year earlier) due to the maturity of loans issued over the period of soaring demand for loans under the non-targeted Subsidised Mortgage programme, as well as market-based mortgages issued at high interest rates in 2023–2024. Part of NPLs were loans issued for single-family home construction, which are lower in quality. To cover the risks associated with previously issued loans, banks formed a macroprudential capital buffer amounting to 1.4% of the mortgage portfolio as of 1 April 2026, or ₽306 billion.

Over 2025, the sales of apartments in buildings under construction reached 25.7 million sq m, which is 2% higher YoY (25.2 million sq m in 2024). In 2026 Q1, sales remained at a high level of 5.6 million sq m (+12% YoY). Instalment plans continue to make up a significant share of the total volume of SCPAs, standing at 17% as of 1 April 2026, with their total amount reaching ₽1.5 trillion. Instalment purchases generally support sales of housing under construction, but they carry risks for all parties involved in case of a buyer's default.

As of the end of 2025, Russia's largest developers continued to build up their revenues (by 15.7% YoY), while maintaining their EBITDA margin at the level of the past four years. The market has overall adapted to the current macroeconomic conditions, although there are signs of oversupply in certain Russian regions. As inflation decelerates and interest rates fall, mortgages will become more affordable, which will help improve the financial position of the sector's companies.

3.3.1. Mortgage lending dynamics

In 2025 Q4, mortgage lending started growing actively prior to the tightening of the Family Mortgage programme terms, as the Russian Ministry of Finance announced the introduction of the new 'one subsidised loan per family' rule from 1 February 2026. In December 2025, the increase in the mortgage portfolio on banks' balance sheets reached 2.7% MoM vs 1.4–1.5% MoM in October–November 2025. In 2026 Q1, mortgage growth decelerated as expected, coming in at 0.4% MoM in February–March 2026. By the end of March 2026, the total volume of the mortgage portfolio on banks' balance sheets climbed to ₽22.1 trillion (+12.8% YoY), while households' outstanding mortgages (including securitised loans) amounted to ₽24.1 trillion (+10.5% YoY).

Over 2025, mortgage disbursements totalled ₽4.5 trillion, which is just 9% lower as compared to 2024 (₽4.9 trillion) when loans under the non-targeted Subsidised Mortgage programme were issued until the middle of the year. In 2025, the Family Mortgage programme accounted for the bulk of new mortgages, with such loans making up 72% of total disbursements and 82% of all new subsidised loans. In 2026 Q1, the segment of market-based mortgages continued to rebound owing to declining interest rates. Namely, in January–March 2026, the proportion of market-based mortgages reached 32% (vs 18% in 2025) (Chart 36). A further reduction in interest rates will be contributing to the recovery in market-based mortgage issuance.

STRUCTURE OF ISSUED SUBSIDISED AND MARKET-BASED LOANS IN MONEY TERMS *Chart 36*
(%)



Sources: JSC DOM.RF's analytics, Reporting Form 0409316.

3.3.2. Credit quality of mortgage loans

Mortgage repayment performance was deteriorating at a slower pace in 2025 Q4–2026 Q1, as compared with 2025 H1. The proportion of NPLs rose by 0.6 pp over the year, reaching 1.8% as of 1 April 2026. The increase was mainly associated with the maturity of older loans issued over 2023–2024. Loans for single-family home construction granted under the non-targeted subsidised mortgage programme during the period of soaring demand in 2023–2024 (+0.2 pp) and market-based mortgages (+0.3 pp) raised in 2024 at higher rates accounted for the bulk of the overall growth of NPL 90+ observed since early 2025 (+0.7 pp). Nevertheless, the credit quality of loans issued since 2025 remains at a sound level.

As of 1 April 2026, the share of NPL 90+ in the portfolio of single-family construction loans was five times higher than in the portfolio of loans issued to purchase apartments in residential buildings, equalling 4.6% and 0.9%, respectively (Charts 39 and 40). This was attributable to contractors frequently failing to perform their obligations under single-family home construction agreements. To protect consumers, on 1 March 2025, a mechanism for using escrow accounts when issuing mortgages for single-family home construction was introduced[32] (which is mandatory for loans issued under subsidised lending programmes) to prevent such incidents in the future. The Bank of Russia considers it advisable to extend the mechanism to market-based mortgages in cases where houses are built with the involvement of contractors.

[32] Federal Law No. 186-FZ, dated 22 July 2024, 'On Building Single-family Homes Under Construction Contracts Using Escrow Accounts'.

NPL 90+ DYNAMICS FOR ALL TYPES OF MORTGAGE LOANS IN VINTAGES, BY CLAIM START DATE *Chart 37*

(%)



Source: CHBs' data and the Bank of Russia's survey of the three largest banks in mortgage lending, accounting for 81% of outstanding mortgages as of 1 April 2026.

NPL 90+ DYNAMICS IN MORTGAGES ISSUED FROM 2021, BY MORTGAGE PROGRAMME *Chart 38*

(%)



Source: CHBs' data and the Bank of Russia's survey of the three largest banks in mortgage lending, accounting for 81% of outstanding mortgages as of 1 April 2026.

NPL 90+ DYNAMICS IN MORTGAGES ISSUED FROM 2021 FOR SINGLE-FAMILY HOME CONSTRUCTION,* BY MORTGAGE TYPE AS OF REPORTING DATE *Chart 39*

(%)



* *Market-based mortgages for single-family home construction made up a minor share in total market-based loans, namely 0.6% as of 1 April 2026.*

Source: CHBs' data and the Bank of Russia's survey of the three largest banks in mortgage lending, accounting for 81% of outstanding mortgages as of 1 April 2026.

NPL 90+ DYNAMICS IN MORTGAGES ISSUED FROM 2021 FOR PURCHASING APARTMENTS, BY MORTGAGE TYPE AS OF REPORTING DATE *Chart 40*

(%)



Source: CHBs' data and the Bank of Russia's survey of the three largest banks in mortgage lending, accounting for 81% of outstanding mortgages as of 1 April 2026.

LOANS BY DSTI (SCPA) *Chart 41*

(%)



Sources: Reporting Forms 0409704 and 0409135.

LOANS BY DSTI (NON-SCPA) *Chart 42*

(%)



Sources: Reporting Forms 0409704 and 0409135.

LOANS BY LTV (SCPA) *Chart 43*

(%)



Sources: Reporting Forms 0409704 and 0409135.

LOANS BY LTV (NON-SCPA) *Chart 44*

(%)



Sources: Reporting Forms 0409704 and 0409135.

As a result of the macroprudential policy measures implemented by the Bank of Russia, the mortgage lending standards remain good. Specifically, over 2026 Q1, the proportion of mortgages granted to borrowers with DSTI above 80% in the housing under construction segment (under SCPAs) remained close to the 2025 level of around 3% (Chart 41). The share of such mortgages in the existing housing segment was 6% (vs 13% a year before) (Chart 42). From 2025, the share of mortgages with a small down payment (below 20%) in the housing under construction segment stayed modest, making up less than 2% (Chart 43), while that in the existing housing segment dropped to 1% in 2026 Q1 from 14% a year before (Chart 44).

The macroprudential add-ons enabled banks to accumulate a macroprudential buffer for mortgage loans, amounting to 1.4% of the portfolio, net of loss provisions, as of 1 April 2026.

The MPLs on an inclusion basis for mortgages issued to purchase housing under construction or existing housing in apartment buildings was introduced from 1 April 2026 and tightened from 1 July 2026. It makes regulation more flexible while maintaining the overall tightness. For example, banks may flexibly spread the 5% limit across different types of risky loans for housing under construction, but no more than 1% for the riskiest subcategory (DSTI above 50% and a down payment not exceeding 20%).

A considerable proportion of mortgages in the single-family home construction segment are raised by borrowers with high DSTI who more often fail to timely repay their loans. To curb lending to borrowers with elevated debt burdens, the Bank of Russia set the first MPLs for single-family home construction mortgages from 1 October 2025 and tightened them from 1 April 2026. Starting 1 July 2026, disbursements to borrowers with DSTI above 50% will be additionally limited. Similarly to other lending segments, MPLs in single-family home construction will be established on an inclusion basis. This means that when a limit is set for the segment of loans to borrowers with DSTI above 50%, it will include a sublimit for loans to borrowers with DSTI above 80%. Thus, in 2026 Q1, mortgages for single-family home construction issued to borrowers with DSTI above 50% and above 80% accounted for 44% and 13%, respectively. For 2026 Q3, the Bank of Russia set MPLs at the level of 28% for single-family home construction mortgages issued to borrowers with DSTI above 50%, but at no more than 3% for loans to borrowers with DSTI above 80%.

3.3.3. Housing affordability

Over the period from 2025 H2, price growth in the primary housing market accelerated. According to Rosstat, in 2026 Q1, primary market prices gained 3.9% (vs +3.4% in 2025 Q4). These dynamics were associated with greater demand for loans issued under the Family Mortgage programme, in anticipation of changes in its terms. In the secondary housing market, price growth rates equalled 1.8% in 2026 Q1 (vs 1.0% in 2025 Q4).

As of 1 April 2026, the cyclical deviation of actual prices from the long-term trend, measured based on the HP filter, was 11.9% and 1.2% in the primary and secondary housing markets, respectively, compared to 9.1% and 1.1%, respectively, a year before (Chart 46).

According to Rosstat, the gap between primary and secondary housing prices remains substantial at 52.5% as of 1 April 2026 (vs 59.6% as of 1 April 2025). However, it is attributable, among other factors, to objective structural differences: the secondary housing market is predominantly represented by older homes, which have poorer infrastructure and are worse in terms of other parameters as compared to housing under construction. In addition, the share of Moscow (where flats are more expensive) in apartment purchase transactions across Russia is higher in the primary housing market than in the secondary housing market. Therefore, it gives rise to the effect of different regional contributions to the calculation of housing prices.

When comparing prices for flats in new apartment buildings with those for 'new' existing housing built within the past seven years, the average price gap is about 10–20%.

NOMINAL HOUSING PRICES *Chart 45*
(₽ THS PER SQ M)



Sources: Rosstat, SberIndex, Bank of Russia calculations.

CYCLICAL COMPONENT OF HP-400000 FILTER-BASED INDEX OF REAL HOUSING PRICES *Chart 46*
(%)



Sources: Rosstat, Bank of Russia calculations.

HOUSING AFFORDABILITY INDEX FOR MORTGAGE IN RUSSIA *Chart 47*
(SQ M)



Sources: Reporting Form 0409316, Rosstat, JSC DOM.RF, Bank of Russia calculations.

HOUSING AREA (DOWN PAYMENT) THAT CAN BE FINANCED FROM DEPOSITS
(SQ M)

Chart 48



Sources: Rosstat, households' saving rate, Bank of Russia calculations.

The affordability of market-based mortgages increased owing to lower mortgage rates, while that of subsidised mortgages declined due to a rise in new housing prices. For example, individuals can afford 43 sq m of housing using the family combined mortgage scheme (Chart 47). Due to the outpacing price growth, people's capability to buy housing using their own funds (make a down payment)[33] remained at the level of late 2024, when on average, households could afford 8 sq m in the new and 10 sq m in the existing housing market[34] (Chart 48).

3.3.4. Demand and supply in the housing market

Based on the data from the Unified Housing Construction Information System, the sales of housing under construction amounted to ₽5.2 trillion over 2025, which is 11% more YoY. In January 2026, the sales of apartments in buildings under construction reached 2.5 million sq m (+75% YoY), totalling ₽506 billion (+80% YoY), which is an all-time high for January. Over February–March 2026, apartment sales dropped, as expected, to 1.6 million sq m (₽341 billion) and 1.5 million sq m (₽321 billion), respectively. The downturn in sales was associated with the dissipation of the effect of soaring demand, which occurred in late 2025 prior to the tightening of the Family Mortgage programme terms. Nevertheless, over 2026 Q1, housing sales totalled 5.6 million sq m, which is 12% higher YoY.

Instalment plans still account for a considerable proportion in housing sales. According to the Bank of Russia, in 2025, individuals purchased around 37% of housing under construction using their own funds or under instalment schemes (vs 32% in 2024 and 16% in 2023). In January–March 2026, the share of sales under instalment plans and using households' funds amounted to 38%. As of 1 April 2026, households' total liabilities under instalment plans was around ₽1.5 trillion, or 17% of the value of signed SCPAs. That said, about 50% of this amount is planned to be repaid within 2026 and 80% by 2028.[35]

[33] The calculation of the indicator includes the following financial assets of households: cash, deposits, debt securities, equity securities, excluding unlisted securities, and money in brokerage accounts.

[34] The indicator was calculated as the ratio of the average volume of household financial assets to the average price for a square metre. The average volume of household financial assets equals the sum of household financial assets divided by the number of working-age people.

[35] According to the largest banks in mortgage lending, accounting for around 84% of the mortgage portfolio as of 1 February 2026.

In 2025–2026 Q1, the percentage of sold new housing remained at 31–32%. The ratio between the percentage of sold housing and the stage of construction completion remained at an acceptable level of 72% as of 1 April 2026 (vs 73% in 2025). As of 1 April 2026, about 52% of apartments were sold in the buildings to be commissioned this year, with the indicator staying the same as in the previous year, while differing across Russian regions. Among the largest regions, the rate remains high in Moscow (47%) and St Petersburg (40%) but low in the Krasnodar Territory (20%). As market interest rates go down in the regions with a low proportion of sold housing, the surplus of supply will be decreasing gradually.

NEW HOUSING AREA, NEW PROJECTS FOR SALE, AND ACTUAL SALES OF NEW HOUSING IN RUSSIA *Chart 49*
(MLN SQ M, THREE-MONTH MOVING AVERAGE)

Source: Unified Housing Construction Information System.

In 2025 H1, declining demand prompted developers to slightly reduce the area of new construction projects. As of the end of 2025, it totalled about 41.0 million sq m, which is 12% less than in 2024. That said, over January–March 2026, projects totalling 10.6 million sq m were launched, which is 37% more YoY. As of 1 April 2026, the area of housing under construction equalled 118.9 million sq m, which is 4% more than a year before. Growth in construction volumes was largely associated with the slowdown in and postponement of the commissioning of buildings.

On 1 January 2026, the most recent moratorium[36] on penalising developers, which was introduced in March 2024, expired. Its cancellation will likely help home equity holders receive keys to their apartments in time more frequently. This factor encourages developers to improve their project management and set realistic construction and sales deadlines when planning a project. Thus, by the end of 2026 Q1, the monthly volume of postponements had already decreased to 3 million sq m, which is 26% less than in late 2025.[37]

3.3.5. Assessment of major developers' financial resilience

Most of the largest companies in the industry remained profit-making, having managed to maintain or even improve their year-end performance, while the problems of certain developers were not systematic. As of the end of 2025, the aggregate revenue of the largest developers rose by 15.7% YoY. Companies' operating margin also remained at a high level of 26%, whereas their net profit dropped by 13.9% YoY.

[36] Resolution of the Government of the Russian Federation No. 326, dated 18 March 2024.

[37] According to JSC DOM.RF.

LARGEST DEVELOPERS' FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE *Chart 50*
(%)



Source: the largest developers' IFRS statements for 2018–2025.

Despite a reduction in companies' profits according to IFRS statements, the net financial result of the construction sector based on RAS statements increased over 2025 to ₽881.2 billion (+57.5% YoY), of which ₽384.9 billion (2.7-fold rise YoY) was accounted for by the construction of buildings. As monetary conditions ease, followed by a decline in interest rates, market-based mortgages will become more affordable, contributing to the improvement in developers' financial position and supporting the sector's resilience.

3.3.6. Credit quality of project finance

As of 1 April 2026, the share of project finance in banks' corporate credit portfolios was 10.5%, having lost 0.1 pp since the beginning of the year, but gaining 0.6 pp YoY.

Owing to increasing sales of housing under construction and a rising percentage of mortgage sales, the ratio of debt coverage with funds in escrow accounts stabilised at the level of 68–69% (Chart 51). After rising to 10.8% in 2025 Q2, the average interest rate on loans to developers continued to decline in 2025 Q4–2026 Q1 to equal 10.0% as of 1 April 2026.

According to banks, the quality of the project finance portfolio remains high, with the proportion of bad loans[38] making up 1.2% of the portfolio, which is below the figures for the corporate sector as a whole (3.9%). The provisioning rate for these loans was at the comfortable level of 49% as of 1 April 2026. The share of the portfolio with LLCR below 1.1 edged up slightly by 0.4 pp to 6.5% (from 1 October 2025 to 1 April 2026), driven by the growing financing of projects, with the largest of them implemented in Moscow, St Petersburg, the Moscow and Leningrad Regions, as well as the Krasnodar and Primorye Territories (Chart 52).

In early 2026, the Bank of Russia conducted a stress test of the project finance portfolio jointly with banks that are the largest creditors.[39] In the course of the study, the Bank of Russia analysed the distribution of projects by LLCR levels and by stress testing scenarios assuming various levels of a decline in cash flows from sales and changes in the key rate.

[38] Quality categories IV–V, or a low level of creditworthiness.

[39] The aggregate portfolio of these banks makes up 90% of the project finance market.

COVERAGE RATIO FOR DEVELOPERS' LOANS WITH FUNDS IN ESCROW ACCOUNTS AND ESCROW ACCOUNT BALANCES *Chart 51*



Source: survey by the Bank of Russia.

BREAKDOWN OF PROJECT FINANCE LOAN PORTFOLIO BY LLCR, ACCORDING TO BANK OF RUSSIA SURVEY *Chart 52*
(%)



Source: survey by the Bank of Russia.

According to the estimates, the sensitivity of developers in the largest creditors' loan portfolio[40] to the key rate increase (at the upper bound of the risk scenario outlined in the Monetary Policy Guidelines) is almost equal to a 5% decline in cash flows. The stress test showed that in the scenario of a key rate rise, the share of debts in the risky zone (LLCR < 1) and lower resilience zone (1 < LLCR < 1.1) will go up by 7.1 pp in total to 16.1%, while in the scenario of a 5% cash flow reduction, it will gain 6.7 pp to reach 15.7%.

However, a low LLCR for a project does not mean that a bank will incur substantial losses. If a negative scenario unfolds, the bank may sell the project to another developer or complete it independently by engaging a general contractor and sell out apartments gradually. Therefore, the project finance market has proven its resilience in case of stress.

[40] According to the lending banks accounting for at least 4% of all project finance loans; the distribution reflects data on the projects that have received construction permits.

4. ASSESSMENT OF THE FINANCIAL SECTOR'S RESILIENCE

4.1. Assessment of the banking sector's resilience

Over the period under review, banks' reinvestment of profit allowed the sector to increase its CAR by 1.0 pp from 12.9% to 13.9% as of 1 April 2026. As a result, banks' capital expanded to 4.4 pp of N1.0(+0.2 pp) relative to the minimum value of the regulatory capital including surcharges, despite the scheduled rise in the capital surcharges by 0.75 pp for SIBs and by 0.5 pp for other banks from 1 January 2026. Banks' additional capital in the form of accumulated macroprudential buffer (₽1.3 trillion) accounted for 0.9 pp of N1.0. The scheduled restoration of the surcharges to banks' CARs is aimed at enhancing their resilience.

The situation with liquidity at SIBs remained stable. As of 1 April 2026, SIBs' national LCR equalled 117%. Banks did not record elevated volatility in attracted clients' funds and maintained their liquid assets at an adequate level.

4.1.1. Banks' returns on assets

Over the period under review, the banking sector's annual ROA rose from 1.9% to 2.0% by 1 April 2026. The key profit factor[1] and the driver of ROA was NII (Chart 54), which accounted for 68% of operating income in 2026 Q1 (with its average share over 2020–2025 equalling approximately 66%). NII contributed 0.4 pp to the increase in annual ROA (Chart 55).

The second major growth driver was the rise in NFCI (+0.06 pp). Despite the positive revaluation of debt securities in 2025 Q4–2026 Q1, the contribution of transactions with securities to the dynamics of annual ROA over this period was negative (-0.1 pp) due to the high base effect.

BANKING SECTOR'S NET PROFIT AFTER TAX IN REAL TERMS, CUMULATIVE YEAR-TO-DATE (JANUARY 2026 = 100%) *Chart 53*
(₽ TN)



Note. For all banks, except the BNA, adjusted for Russian subsidiary banks' dividends.
Sources: Reporting Form 0409101, Rosstat.

[1] For all banks, except the BNA. Adjusted for dividends from Russian subsidiary banks.

STRUCTURE OF BANKING SECTOR'S PROFIT

Chart 54

(₽ TN)



Note. For all banks, except the BNA, adjusted for Russian subsidiary banks' dividends. Reserves include foreign currency revaluation.
Source: Reporting Form 0409102.

FACTORS OF CHANGES IN BANKING SECTOR'S ANNUAL ROA FROM 1 OCTOBER 2025 TO 1 APRIL 2026

Chart 55

(PP)



Note. Across all banks, except the BNA.
Sources: Reporting Forms 0409101 and 0409102.

BREAKDOWN OF BANKING SECTOR'S ANNUAL ROA

Chart 56

(%)



Note. Across all banks, except the BNA.
Source: Reporting Form 0409101.

The distribution of ROA across banks barely changed (Chart 56), with the weighted average ROA for the sector being comparable to the median (2.2%).

4.1.2. Net interest margin

Over the period under review, a quarterly NIM went up from 4.6% to 5.1% (Chart 57). Its dynamics were predominantly attributable to the rapid decline in funding costs due to the decrease in interest expenses relating to corporate and household deposits amid monetary policy easing. An upturn in the NIM was also recorded for banks with a lower margin compared to the sector as a whole (20% by the number and 45% by performing assets (Charts 58 and 59).

QUARTERLY NIM OF BANKS *Chart 57*
(%)



Note. Across all banks, except the BNA.
Sources: Reporting Forms 0409101 and 0409102.

QUARTERLY NIM ACROSS GROUPS OF BANKS AS OF 1 APRIL 2026 *Chart 58*
(%)



Note. Across all banks, except the BNA.
Sources: Reporting Forms 0409101 and 0409102.

However, banks remain exposed to interest rate risk, taking into account the mismatch in the maturity structure of assets and liabilities. As of 1 April 2026, the banking sector's interest rate gap risk in the banking book in rubles (a decline in NII) over a one-year horizon in case of a 4 pp rise in interest rates is comparable to the previous period, equalling approximately 2.0–3.7% of the banking sector's annual

NII (vs 3.0–5.3% as of 1 October 2025), around 0.7–1.4% of its capital (vs 1.1–1.9% as of 1 October 2025), and about 0.1–0.2 pp of its NIM[2] (vs 0.1–0.2 pp as of 1 October 2025). For the group of banks with negative gap risk, this assessment was approximately 5.1–6.0% of the banking sector's annual NII. There are banks with a positive interest rate gap over a one-year horizon. Declining interest rates can lead to a downturn in these banks' NII (its decrease might equal up to 3.1% of the banking sector's annual NII and around 11.1% of annual NII of banks with a positive gap risk).

QUARTERLY NIM ACROSS GROUPS OF BANKS *Chart 59*
(%)



* *Banks with a quarterly NIM below 5.1% as of 1 April 2026.*
Note. Across all banks, except the BNA.
Sources: Reporting Forms 0409102 and 0409101.

The high NIM across the banking sector as a whole means that it will remain resilient in case of risk materialisation, but banks with a low NIM need to improve their interest risk management practices.

4.1.3. Banks' capital adequacy

Over the period from 1 October 2025 to 1 April 2026, banking sector's CAR was up by 1.0 pp from 12.9% to 13.9%, mainly due to the capitalisation of this year's profits (+1.2 pp to N1.0), while the level of risk in the N1.0 denominator increased less notably (-0.1 pp to N1.0) (Chart 60).

Over the reporting period, growth of assets at risk (RWAs N1.0) decelerated against the background of an outpacing increase in balance sheet risk assets[3] (0.9% and 3.9%, compared to 5.1% and 5.4%, respectively, over 2025 Q3–Q4). The decline in the ratio of RWAs to balance sheet risk assets means that banks lowered their risk appetite (Chart 63).

[2] The basic assessment and the assessment incorporating behavioural assumptions according to Reporting Form 0409127. The assessment varies depending on the chosen assumptions regarding changes in the maturity structure of raised funds due to an interest rate shock and current accounts' exposure to interest rate risk.

[3] Balance sheet risk assets are calculated as net assets (assets net of loss provisions), adjusted for highly liquid assets (cash, including cash equivalents, deposits with the Bank of Russia, investments in OFZ, and settlements with exchanges).

From 1 January 2026, pursuant to the schedule,[4] capital surcharges were raised as follows, with the CCyB staying at 0.5 pp:

- the capital buffer for SIBs was up from 0.25 pp to 0.5 pp; and
- the capital conservation buffer was up from 0.5 pp to 1 pp.

The increase in capital adequacy allowed banks to preserve capital cushions above surcharges, despite the rise in the latter. Banks' total capital cushion above surcharges to CARs, excluding the macroprudential capital buffer, went up from 4.2 pp to 4.4 pp, while that including the macroprudential capital buffer (₽1.3 trillion) increased from 5.0 pp to 5.3 pp (Chart 61). Most of the largest banks (with assets from ₽1 trillion, accounting for around 90% in the sector's total assets) maintain their capital cushions at over 2 pp above the required level of surcharges (Chart 62).

BANKS' CAPITAL ADEQUACY FROM 1 OCTOBER 2025 TO 1 APRIL 2026 *Chart 60*
(PP)



* *Including the share premium.*
Note. Across all banks, except the BNA.
Sources: Reporting Forms 0409123 and 0409135.

REQUIREMENTS FOR CAPITAL ADEQUACY BUFFERS AND CAPITAL CUSHION *Chart 61*
(PP OF N1.0)



Note. The capital cushion exceeds the actual N1.0 value as it takes into account the effect of a reduction in RWAs on N1.0 in case of credit risk materialisation.
Sources: Reporting Forms 0409123 and 0409135.

[4] In accordance with Bank of Russia Instruction No. 220-I, dated 26 May 2025, 'On Required Ratios and Capital Adequacy Buffers for Banks with a Universal Licence and on the Bank of Russia's Supervision over Compliance with Them'.

DISTRIBUTION OF ACTUAL CAPITAL CUSHION (ABOVE REQUIRED CAPITAL), PP OF N1.0 *Chart 62*
(%)



Note. Across all banks, except the BNA.
Sources: Reporting Forms 0409101 and 0409135.

RATIO OF RISK-WEIGHTED ASSETS TO BALANCE SHEET RISK ASSETS* *Chart 63*
(%)



* *Balance sheet risk assets are calculated as net assets (assets net of loss provisions) excluding highly liquid assets (cash, including cash equivalents, deposits with the Bank of Russia, investments in OFZ, and settlements with exchanges).*
Note. Across all banks, except the BNA.
Sources: Reporting Forms 0409123 and 0409135.

4.1.4. Banks' liquidity

Over the period under review, the situation with liquidity in the banking sector remained stable. Banks' liquid assets stayed at the level that is sufficient to cover the unexpected outflow of client funds. As of 1 April 2026, SIBs' LCR equalled 117%.

The approaches to assessing situation with banks' regulatory liquidity changed upon their transition to the national LCR. From November 2025 to April 2026, SIBs' level of the national LCR was down by 4 pp from 121% to 117% (Chart 64), against the backdrop of the outstripping growth of the credit portfolio as compared to the increase in client funds. This gap was largely compensated by the borrowings in the financial market, with the factor reducing the balance of transactions in financial markets as part of the national LCR's denominator amounting to -9 pp vs the national LCR value, while highly liquid assets in the denominator were up by ₽497 billion (+3 pp to the national LCR).

SIBs comply with the national LCR mainly by using market instruments, demonstrating low demand for ICLs over the period under review. In certain days, SIBs included ICLs in the ratio calculation to comply with the national LCR. The average daily level of the use of ICLs made up 3.5% of the ENCO (the weighted average was calculated only for the days when ICLs were actually used by banks and only for banks that used them), with the one-time maximum level of 10%. The stable liquidity situation is also evidenced by the negative spread between the maximum deposit rates offered by major banks and the Bank of Russia key rate (the indicator of competition between banks for household deposits). The average spread for the period from October 2025 to March 2026 was -1.2 pp (Chart 65).

SYSTEMICALLY IMPORTANT BANKS' NATIONAL LCR *Chart 64*



Note. Over the period from 1 November 2025 to 31 January 2026, information on the compliance with the national LCR was given in notes to Reporting Forms 0409135 and 0409805.
Sources: until 1 February 2026 – Reporting Forms 0409135 and 0409805; from 1 February 2026 – Reporting Form 0409136.

AVERAGE MAXIMUM INTEREST RATE ON RETAIL DEPOSITS AMONG LARGEST BANKS *Chart 65*



* *The average maximum interest rate is calculated as an arithmetic mean of the maximum interest rates (on ruble deposits) of the top 10 CIs attracting the largest amount of retail deposits.*
Source: the Bank of Russia monitoring of banks' maximum interest rates.

4.1.5. Revaluation of credit institutions' bond portfolio

For the most part of 2025 Q4–2026 Q1, amid gradual monetary policy easing, both OFZ and corporate bond yields demonstrated a downturn. Overall from October 2025–March 2026, OFZ yields dropped by 52 bp, on average, along the curve, whereas the reduction in corporate bond yields (RUCBTRNS) was more considerable, specifically 158 bp. The decrease in yields was recorded in both of these markets over the entire period, except for a slight uptick in late December 2025–January 2026.

The continuing downward trend in yields had a positive effect on the value of banks' bond portfolios. As of the end of the period under review, the positive revaluation of banks' portfolio of bonds measured at fair value amounted to ₽165 billion, which equalled 0.09 pp of the banking sector's CAR. The positive revaluation increased most significantly in November 2025 and in March 2026 (₽67.3 billion and ₽88.5 billion, respectively). The only exception was January 2026 when, amid the rise in bond yields, the revaluation of the securities portfolio was negative, amounting to ₽62.9 billion.

Overall, in 2025 Q4–2026 Q1, the accumulated but unrecognised negative revaluation of the banking sector's ruble bond portfolio (the HTM portfolio) declined by ₽125 billion to ₽367 billion (0.20 pp of the banking sector's CAR N1.0) (Chart 66).

ACCUMULATED BUT UNRECOGNISED REVALUATION (FOR HTM PORTFOLIO) AND NEGATIVE REVALUATION OF BANKS' PORTFOLIO OF BONDS MEASURED AT FAIR VALUE (CUMULATIVE) *Chart 66*
(₽ BN)



Source: Reporting Form 0409711.

Box 6. Budget situation

As of the end of January–April 2026, the budget deficit totalled ₽5.9 trillion (2.5% of GDP),[1] which significantly exceeds the indicators of the same period last year (over January–April 2025, the budget deficit was ₽2.9 trillion). The current deficit level is 55.2% higher than assumed in the budget for the entire 2026 (₽3.8 trillion). The increase in the budget deficit in January–April 2026 occurred against the backdrop of a surge in government expenditures, namely from ₽15.2 trillion over January–April 2025 to ₽17.6 trillion over the same period in 2026 (15.7% YoY). The growth was driven by advanced financing associated with the prompt conclusion of contracts. In January–April 2026, fiscal revenues from VAT rose by 20.2% YoY, including on account of a higher tax rate. However, given a decline in oil and gas revenues (-38.3% YoY) pushed down by plummeting average oil prices, the total income contracted from ₽12.3 trillion in 2025 to ₽11.7 trillion in 2026 (Table 7).

BUDGET REVENUES / EXPENDITURES AND SURPLUS / DEFICIT IN JANUARY–APRIL 2026 *Table 7*
(₽ BN)

	January–April 2026	January–April 2025	YoY	Approved by Federal Law No. 426-FZ, dated 28 November 2025
Revenues	**11,721**	**12,279**	**-4.50%**	**40,283**
Oil and gas revenues, of which:	2,298	3,727	-38.30%	8,919
Basic oil and gas revenues	2,847	3,424	-16.80%	8,957
Non-oil and gas revenues, of which:	**9,423**	**8,552**	**10.20%**	**31,365**
VAT (production and imports)	5,313	4,419	20.20%	17,519
Expenditures	**17,598**	**15,210**	**15.70%**	**44,070**
Public procurement	5,720	4,045	41.40%	10,279
Deficit	**-5,877**	**-2,931**	**-2,946**	**-3,786**
% of GDP	-2.50%	-1.40%		-1.60%

Source: Ministry of Finance of the Russian Federation.

To finance the deficit, the Russian Ministry of Finance plans to raise ₽5.5 trillion by issuing domestic government bonds in 2026 (net borrowings will amount to ₽4.2 trillion, or 1.8% of GDP), whereas in 2027–2028, gross borrowings are planned at the level of ₽5.4 trillion and ₽6.2 trillion, respectively. As a result, the domestic government debt will grow from 14.3% of GDP for 2025 to 17.2% of forecast GDP at the end of 2028, i.e. it will remain at the economically safe level. The budget deficit in 2027–2028 is projected to be at the levels comparable to 2022–2024 (relative to GDP – 1.2% and 1.3%, respectively) (Chart 67), assuming a return to the fiscal rule parameters and a decline in the base crude price to a more sustainable level over the long term.

Overall, risks to fiscal resilience are limited due to sovereign debt being low by international standards and the effect of the fiscal rule. For the bond market to remain stable, inflation should be brought back to the target, which will be facilitated by the Bank of Russia's monetary policy.

[1] Hereinafter in Box 6, GDP over the forecast horizon is given according to the social and economic development forecast by the Russian Ministry of Economic Development.

BUDGET DEFICIT / SURPLUS IN ABSOLUTE TERMS AND RELATIVE TO RUSSIA'S GDP *Chart 67*



* *Forecast values according to Federal Law No. 426-FZ, dated 28 November 2025, 'On the Federal Budget for 2026 and the 2027–2028 Planning Period'.*
Sources: Ministry of Finance of the Russian Federation, Rosstat.

OFZ OFFERINGS AND KEY BUYERS AT OFZ AUCTIONS BY PARTICIPANT CATEGORY *Chart 68*



Sources: Ministry of Finance of the Russian Federation, Moscow Exchange, SPCEX SC.

4.2. Assessment of non-bank financial institutions' resilience

Over the period under review, assets continued growing across all segments of the NBFI market, except for leasing companies. In the NPF segment, key drivers were still inflow of money into the long-term savings programme and returns on invested pension savings and pension reserves. Insurers' assets were up due to the rise in premiums for life insurance products. The financial resilience of insurance companies and NPFs remains high, while their exposure to credit risk is low owing to high credit quality of their assets. The segment of UIFs saw an upturn, predominantly on account of an inflow of funds into retail closed-end UIFs investing in commercial real estate and into money market exchange-traded UIFs.

Leasing companies' assets continued to fall amid contracting demand for lease services and structural problems in certain business segments. Although the share of bad debts in the total lease portfolio is increasing, the sector remains resilient.

NON-BANK FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS' ASSETS *Table 8*

	Assets, ₽ tn		Growth, %	Share in financial sector's assets as of 31 March 2026, %
	30.Sep.25	31.Mar.26		
UIFs[1]	20.7	23.1	11.8	9.1
Insurance companies	6.87	6.91	0.5	2.7
NPFs	6.5	7.1	9	2.8
Brokers – NBFIs (balance sheet assets)	2	2.3	15	0.9
Memo item: brokers – NBFIs (clients' assets)	*13.4*	*14.1*	*5*	–
MFOs[3]	0.64	0.67	4.2	0.3
Leasing companies[4]	5.6	5.3[2]	-5.3	2.1
Total for NBFIs	42.3	45.4	7.3	17.8
Memo item: banking sector	203	209	3.2	82.2

[1] *Net asset value.*
[2] *Clients' assets of leasing companies are given according to data as of 31 December 2025.*
[3] *MFOs' consumer microloan portfolio.*
[4] *Assets according to RAS statements of 45 leasing companies surveyed by the Bank of Russia as of 1 January 2026. The surveyed companies' total lease portfolio as of 1 January 2026 is estimated at ₽10 trillion, which is 85% of the market. The lease portfolio is recognised in leasing companies' assets at a discount rate within the value of net investment in lease (leasing).*
Source: Bank of Russia.

4.2.1. Insurance companies

In 2025, insurance companies maintained their financial resilience at a high level, with the regulatory equity-to-liabilities ratio exceeding the threshold significantly.[5] In the segment of non-life insurance, the indicator remained virtually unchanged over the year, equalling 177% (-2 pp), whereas in life insurance, it soared to 251% (+42 pp). The regulatory ratio dynamics in life insurance were influenced by changes in the approach to calculating insurance risk applicable from July 2025.[6] The regulation was amended as part of the transition to a risk-oriented approach, enabling a more accurate assessment of the portfolio structure and insurance risks of each insurer.

In 2026 Q1, the regulatory ratio demonstrated similar dynamics: in non-life insurance, it changed only slightly (+1 pp), while in life insurance, it was up by 18 pp to 269% due to the capitalisation of insurers' profits.

Insurance companies' net profit for 2025 totalled ₽502 billion, with its growth rates decelerating to 8.5% vs 44% a year before. In 2026 Q1, the financial result of insurers contracted by 29% YoY to ₽109 billion.

Both in 2025 and 2026 Q1, insurance companies earned large investment and financial incomes. In 2025, insurers' interest income gained 48%, and they continued scaling up their investments in bonds in 2025 Q4, as compared to the previous quarter, namely by 8.4% in OFZ and by 12.5% in corporate bonds. Their investment income was also supported by the positive revaluation of bonds in the trading portfolio against the background of monetary easing. Over the given period, insurers recorded losses from the negative foreign currency revaluation of assets amid the strengthening of the ruble, which were nevertheless offset by the said factors.

[5] The threshold of the regulatory ratio is 105% pursuant to Bank of Russia Regulation No. 858P, dated 17 June 2025, 'On the Requirements for Insurers' Financial Stability and Solvency'.

[6] Due to the changes in the approach to assessing insurance risk when calculating the regulatory ratio, the reduction in the required solvency margin, included in the regulatory ratio's denominator, amounted to ₽64.8 billion as of the end of 2025.

Lower growth rates of insurers' net profit in 2025 were associated with the decline in the financial result from insurance, which was largely attributable to negative dynamics in non-life insurance. This segment saw a contraction in the volume of premiums for borrower insurance products (accident and health insurance, voluntary medical insurance) and CMTPLI. In borrower insurance, the reduction in premiums was caused by a decrease in mortgage disbursements, while in CMTPLI, it was the result of cheaper policies due to competition among insurers as well as greater demand for short-term insurance policies replacing standard annual ones. At the same time, insurance payouts in non-life insurance increased by 20%.

In 2025, the amount of premiums in ELI was also down, affected by the high base effect of 2024 when demand for ELI products was high. However, this contraction was offset by an increase in premiums for ILI products, fuelling the rise in insurance income in the segment of life insurance. Demand for ILI was supported by insurers actively promoting these products, including in anticipation of a ban to conclude new ILI contracts from 1 January 2026.[7]

The downturn in insurers' net profit in 2026 Q1 was associated with certain insurance companies building up their loss provisions. That said, in 2026 Q1, the financial result from insurance in life insurance doubled, driven by, among other things, an increase in premiums for ELI products.

Credit risks associated with investments made by insurance companies remain low. Specifically, the average credit rating of the insurers' investment portfolio is 'AA+' in life insurance and 'A+' in non-life insurance according to the national rating scale.

REGULATORY EQUITY-TO-LIABILITIES RATIO IN LIFE INSURANCE *Chart 69*
(₽ BN)



Source: Reporting Form 0420156.

REGULATORY EQUITY-TO-LIABILITIES RATIO IN NON-LIFE INSURANCE *Chart 70*
(₽ BN)



Source: Reporting Form 0420156.

[7] In 2025, unit-linked life insurance was introduced, designed to meet demand for life insurance with an investment component, following the withdrawal of ILI products from the market.

FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE IN LIFE INSURANCE
(₽ BN)

Chart 71



Source: Reporting Form 0420126.

FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE IN NON-LIFE INSURANCE
(₽ BN)

Chart 72



Source: Reporting Form 0420126.

4.2.2. Non-governmental pension funds

As of the end of 2025, NPFs' weighted average returns increased significantly, with the indicator rising by 5 pp to 14.0% for pension savings and nearly doubling to 16.2% for pension reserves. NPFs' income was primarily accounted for by coupon payments on bonds (₽525 billion, +30%) and a positive revaluation of bonds measured at fair value amid monetary easing (vs ₽122 billion, with the negative revaluation a year ago). Over 2026 Q1, their returns went down by 0.9 pp to 13.1% for pension savings and by 2.3 pp to 13.9% for pension reserves against the background of a negative revaluation of shares and a slowdown in the bond market, which dominate NPFs' portfolios.

Credit risk of NPFs' investments remains low owing to high credit quality of assets in portfolios of pension savings and pension reserves, equalling 'AA+' according to the national rating scale.

The financial resilience of NPFs remains high. Based on NPFs' data as of 31 March 2026, the results of the regular stress testing conducted according to the Bank of Russia scenarios showed that none of the NPFs had a deficit of equity.

STRUCTURE OF NON-GOVERNMENTAL PENSION FUNDS' RETURNS ON PENSION SAVINGS *Chart 73*
(₽ BN)



Source: Reporting Form 0420255.

STRUCTURE OF NON-GOVERNMENTAL PENSION FUNDS' RETURNS ON PENSION RESERVES *Chart 74*
(₽ BN)



Source: Reporting Form 0420254.

4.2.3. Leasing

In 2025 Q4, growth in new transactions in the leasing market continued. Over the period under study, the volume of new transactions gained 10%[8] QoQ, primarily on account of automobile leasing. The market was supported by monetary easing and expectations of the rise in the car recycling fee as well as the introduction of localization requirements for taxi cars in 2026. Despite the above, as old contracts expired, the lease portfolio continued to contract by 2.1% over 2025 Q4 and by another 3.7%[9] over 2026 Q1, most notably in the segments of freight transport and construction machinery.

Following the decline in the lease portfolio, the volume of bank financing for leasing companies decreased as well, with their outstanding debts to CIs dropping by 0.4% in 2025 Q4 and by another 3.2% in 2026 Q1.

[8] According to the quarterly survey included in the Bank of Russia's Survey Programme. The sample for the analysis comprises 18 companies that submitted their IFRS statements for the past seven quarters (their market share in terms of the portfolio is 74%).

[9] Based on recent data of the monthly survey by the Bank of Russia. The recent (preliminary) data are given for the sample of 12 companies (the market share in terms of the portfolio is 70%).

The proportion of companies' problem debts[10] continues to grow against the backdrop of the contraction of the lease portfolio and implementation of restructuring measures (primarily in rail transportation). The share of problem debts was up by 1.4 pp over 2025 Q4 and by another 4.8 pp to 18.2% over 2026 Q1.

Growth in the proportion of bad debts is accompanied by organisations' active efforts to manage seized assets. From October 2025, the volumes of assets sold and put back on lease were on average higher than those of new seized assets, leading to a downturn in inventories following their continued rise since early 2025. As a result, the share of seized assets on leasing companies' balance sheets stabilised at 1.7–1.8% of the total lease portfolio.

Against the backdrop of deteriorating credit quality, the leasing market ended 2025 with an aggregate near-zero loss for the first time since 2022. For the sample of companies covered by the Bank of Russia's monitoring, the total net loss for 2025 amounted to ₽3 billion, compared to the net profit of ₽100.2 billion as of the end of 2024. The financial result was largely pushed down by a contraction in net profit among bank-affiliated leasing companies, which is explained by their predominant market share. This category of companies saw a decline in sales margin[11] from 11.8% to 0.4% over 2025.

Private leasing companies not affiliated with banks experienced a 12 pp downswing in sales margin to 7% over the year. The higher profitability level as compared to bank subsidiaries was attributable to the fact that independent firms usually maintain lower loss provisions than bank-owned companies (3.7% for private and 7.1% for bank-affiliated companies as of the end of 2025). An additional factor supporting private companies' profits was a rebound in demand for automobile leasing services in 2025 H2, which is the primary focus of most of these companies.

Unlike bank subsidiaries and independent firms that managed to secure positive financial result, state-owned leasing companies finished the year with the net loss, including due to the portfolio concentration on the most problematic segment, i.e. railway transportation.

The industry's CAR[12] decreased by 0.6 pp to 9.7% over 2025 Q4, while remaining above the minimum level of 2023 (8.2%).

Given positive dynamics in terms of new transactions, the leasing market might rebound moderately in 2026. That said, key constraining factors still include clients' solvency and structural problems in certain business segments.

4.2.4. Brokers

The brokerage industry remains highly concentrated, with the situation in the sector determined by a number of leading organisations, which reduces the diversification of risks. Namely, in late 2025, the three largest brokerage market participants[13] and the three largest brokers that are NBFIs accounted for nearly 70% and 10%[14] of the total number of clients, respectively.

---

[10] Problem debts are restructured agreements, agreements overdue for 90+ days, and unsettled debts under cancelled agreements.

[11] Measured as the 12-month net profit-to-total revenue ratio.

[12] It is calculated as the equity-to-liabilities ratio according to IFRS statements.

[13] Including bankss licensed to operate as a broker.

[14] The analysis does not include the group of clients whose account balance is ₽10,000 or less.

As of 31 March 2026, most brokers that are NBFIs complied with the CAR, LCR, and equity adequacy ratio, except for three brokers – NBFIs failing to comply with the minimum equity requirements. Two of them eliminated the violations detected, with the licence of the third one cancelled.

According to the results of the internal[15] stress testing of PSMPs – NBFIs' CARs, 95% of companies that submitted[16] accurate reporting on their CARs[17] have successfully passed the stress testing: the calculated values of their CARs in the scenarios under consideration exceed the threshold. Those PSMPs – NBFIs that failed to pass the stress testing of CARs are subject to supervisory measures.

4.2.5. Unit investment funds

In 2025 Q4–2026 Q1, the market of UIFs continued to expand, with the total net inflow of funds equalling ₽1.7 trillion (closed-end UIFs: +₽746.3 billion; open-end UIFs +₽272.4 billion; and exchange-traded UIFs: +₽514.7 billion). In 2025 Q4, the bulk of inflows of funds into closed-end and exchange-traded UIFs was accounted for by retail funds mainly focused on commercial real estate and money market funds, respectively. Growth in the segment of open-end UIFs was primarily attributable to inflows into bond funds[18] amid expectations of monetary policy easing (+₽254.7 billion over 2025 Q4–2026 Q1). In 2026 Q1, the structure of inflows changed partially, with corporate funds now accounting for the bulk of inflows into closed-end UIFs, while exchange-traded UIFs and open-end UIFs were growing due to inflows into funds investing in bonds and money market instruments.[19] As of 31 March 2026, the structure of bond funds' assets was mainly represented by bonds of Russian companies (58%) and OFZ (32%). The majority (95%) of these securities have high ratings,[20] indicating a relatively low level of credit risk. Exchange-traded UIFs' investments predominantly included repo transactions with the central counterparty, curtailing potential risks in the segment.

The volumes of closed-end UIFs intended for the retail segment of collective investments continue to expand. In particular, real estate closed-end UIFs were one of the key drivers of the UIF market's growth as they are increasingly used as an alternative to direct transactions with commercial real estate. Inflows of funds into retail closed-end UIFs mainly focused on commercial real estate totalled ₽120 billion in 2025 Q4, which is the maximum level since 2022, and ₽43 billion in 2026 Q1.

---

15 The stress testing of CARs is not a regulatory requirement and is conducted by the Bank of Russia as part of supervision over PSMPs' activity and assessment of PSMPs' financial resilience.

16 The frequency of the reporting depends on PSMPs' size: large and medium-sized PSMPs are to submit it quarterly and small PSMPs – annually.

17 The stress testing of CARs is conducted, provided that PSMPs comply with the procedure for compiling the reporting on CARs. If PSMPs fail to comply with all the requirements for the reporting on CARs, the Bank of Russia communicates with such PSMPs for them to eliminate the errors in their reporting.

18 Funds were categorised as bond funds if bonds constituted 80% or more of their investment portfolios.

19 More details are available in the Review of Key Indicators of Management Companies.

20 With ratings 'A (RU)' and 'ruA' or higher according to the scales of ACRA (JSC) and JSC Expert RA, respectively.

Box 7. Households' saving and investment behaviours

Ruble deposits with banks remain the priority saving option for Russian households. Over 2025 Q4–2026 Q1, their upward trend continued, significantly outpacing the dynamics of other saving instruments. Namely, as of 1 April 2026, total ruble deposits stood at ₽66.7 trillion vs ₽62.0 trillion as of 1 October 2025 (Table 9). Despite falling deposit rates,[1] their overall level remains high relative to the forecast inflation rate.

INDIVIDUALS' INVESTMENTS (INFLOWS) BY FINANCIAL INSTRUMENT *Table 9*
(₽ BN)

Type	Instrument	01.Apr.26	01.Oct.25	Inflow in October 2025–March 2026	Inflow in April–September 2025
Ruble instruments	Ruble deposits	66,712	61,978	4,734	3,559
	Cash rubles	17,180	16,194	1,112	673
	Residents' shares	7,772	7,687	44	112
	Residents' ruble bonds	3,447	3,111	627	569
	Residents' units: residents' assets	3,327	2,864	577	603
	Funds in brokerage accounts	344	380	40	-25
	Insurance reserves	3,600	3,070	356	216
	Assets in trust management	2,354	2,216	138	77
	Investments in futures	335	381	-46	67
Memo item:	*Funds in escrow accounts*	*7,196*	*7,014*	*182*	*741*
	Pension reserves and savings	*6,236*	*5,403*	*832*	*127*
	Total	**105,071**	**97 882**	**7,582**	**5,851**
Foreign currency instruments	Foreign currency deposits	3,306	3,396	-146	-32
	Residents' foreign currency bonds	1,806	1,757	-5	164
	Foreign cash	7,480	7,812	-111	8
	Foreign currency deposits with non-resident banks	6,046	6,368	-194	-99
	Funds with foreign brokers	1,054	892	186	166
	Non-residents' shares	636	758	16	-18
	Non-residents' bonds	285	349	-8	-41
	Non-residents' units	209	225	13	2
	Residents' units: non-residents' assets	82	96	-14	3
	Total	**20,905**	**21,654**	**-263**	**153**
Total		**125,976**	**119,536**	**7,319**	**6,003**

Note. Investment amounts are calculated based on prices and exchange rates as of the calculation date, and inflows are calculated based on average prices and exchange rates over a month.
Sources: Reporting Forms 0409711, 0420415 and 0409405, and Households' savings.

Over the period under review, investments in bonds edged up as well, with purchases amounting to ₽627 billion over October 2025–March 2026. Bonds allow investors to lock in yields for a longer term, which

[1] The maximum interest rate on deposits in Russian rubles over 2025 Q4–2026 Q1 decreased by 2 pp to 13.6% p.a.

explains current growth in such investments. As interest rates decline, households will likely shift their demand towards instruments with potentially higher yields, such as shares and UIFs.

INFLOWS OF INDIVIDUALS' FUNDS BY SECURITY TYPE *Chart 75*
(₽ BN)



Sources: Reporting Forms 0409711 and 0420415.

INDIVIDUALS' NET TRANSFERS TO NON-RESIDENT BROKERS (CUMULATIVE YEAR-TO-DATE) *Chart 76*
(₽ BN)



Source: Households' savings.

To make the securities market more attractive to retail investors, efforts should be made to further develop professional asset management activities (trust management, UIFs), increase IPO volumes, as well as enhance transparency and corporate governance in the market, which might become an additional driver of the market's growth. The analytical infrastructure is also coming to play an increasingly important role in the market, namely through social media development (finfluencers, telegram channels), along with the need to ensure the quality of information shared there.

The proportion of savings in foreign currency[2] continues shrinking, having declined by 1.1 pp to 16.6% over October 2025–March 2026. Furthermore, inflows into foreign currency instruments were negative (-₽266 billion) due to the decrease in foreign cash holdings of households and balances in deposits with non-resident banks. Contrastingly, money transfers to foreign brokers were on the rise, having gone up by ₽20 billion over October 2025–March 2026 as compared to April–September 2025 to reach ₽186 billion.

[2] Excluding foreign currency revaluation at the exchange rate as of 1 April 2026.

Russians' participation in the cryptoasset market. As of 1 April 2026, total synthetic cryptoasset investments of households (via Russian instruments pegged to cryptoasset prices) equalled about ₽3.8 billion, which does not pose risks to financial stability. The amount of traded bonds with yields linked to the value of digital currencies[3] reached ₽4.1 billion, of which ₽1.7 billion (42%) was accounted for by households and non-profit organisations providing services to households. As of early April 2026, the amount of retail investors' open net position in cryptocurrency futures contracts was ₽1.7 billion (around 5,600 people).[4] The volume of individuals' investments in cryptocurrency DFAs as of 1 April 2026 reached ₽354 million (around 3,800 people). In addition, as part of mirror trading strategies, individuals invested ₽85.6 million (271 people) in assets pegged to cryptoassets.

Russian investors continue to use the foreign infrastructure to buy cryptoassets. However, according to Transparent Blockchain,[5] the period under review recorded a decrease in the web traffic of Russians on websites of centralised cryptocurrency platforms as compared to the previous two quarters, namely by 32% to 56.5 million visits. This downward trend correlates with the global one. Over the given period, Russians' activity on centralised cryptocurrency exchanges, measured as cryptoasset inflows accounted for by Russians, declined by 23%.[6]

According to the blockchain analytics service Transparent Blockchain, amid dropping prices for key cryptocurrencies, the average monthly amount of the assumed balances of Russians' funds on centralised crypto exchanges decreased as well, compared to the previous two quarters, namely by 23%, or ₽219.1 billion, reaching ₽720 billion. As of late March 2026, Bitcoin continued to account for a substantial proportion of Russians' funds in crypto exchange wallets, i.e. 60% (₽350 billion), with Ethereum making up 8%, or ₽44 billion, while other cryptoassets collectively represent 32% (₽186 billion).

Possible reasons for the observed decline in Russians' demand for centralised crypto intermediaries include a lack of motivation to invest in cryptoassets due to high volatility of this market as well as increasing activity on decentralised platforms that are not included in the assessment methodology.

Over the period under review, the market of cryptoassets did not rebound after the flash crash of October 2025, unlike the securities market. In April 2026, average monthly prices for major cryptoassets were yet to reach the levels of October 2025, with Bitcoin and Ethereum costing $73,500 (-36% vs October 2025) and $2,300 (-45% vs October 2025), respectively. The main factors contributing to these dynamics included investors preferring traditional assets (e.g. gold, government bonds) amid geopolitical uncertainty and market participants expecting leading central banks to pursue tighter monetary policies. In addition, cryptoasset prices were affected by miners actively selling Bitcoin due to higher mining costs.

Despite the volatility of the cryptoasset market, the market of stablecoins demonstrates resilience. Specifically, the capitalisation of this segment has stayed at $300 billion since October 2025,[7] while the amount of transactions reached $1.5 trillion[8] in March 2026.

---

[3] Payments on these structured bonds are linked to the prices of shares of the funds iShares Bitcoin Trust ETF and iShares Ethereum Trust ETF from BlackRock Inc., which follow the dynamics of Bitcoin and Ethereum, respectively.

[4] In November 2025, Moscow Exchange started trading in Bitcoin Index (MOEXBTC) and Ethereum Index (MOEXETH) futures contracts in addition to the existing futures contracts on cryptocurrency ETF shares (IBIT, ETHA).

[5] A system monitoring cryptocurrency transactions developed with the support of the Federal Financial Monitoring Service and the Bank of Russia.

[6] The amount of cryptoasset inflows and outflows (flows) on a crypto exchange is calculated as the product of (i) the total amount of cryptoassets (BTC, ETH, USDT, and USDC on Ethereum, Tron, and Solana) deposited in or withdrawn from crypto exchange accounts; (ii) the percentage of Russians in the web traffic of crypto exchanges' websites; and (iii) the bounce rate.

[7] RWA.xyz.

[8] Visaonchainanalytics.

ANNEX. GLOBAL TRENDS IN MACROPRUDENTIAL REGULATION AND FINANCIAL STABILITY MEASURES

Over 2025 Q4–2026 Q1, foreign regulators were enhancing their targeted macroprudential measures to curb risks in certain lending segments, while simultaneously moving towards simplifying the regulation of the financial sector. New challenges to financial stability remain in focus – the regulation of cryptoassets, stablecoins, and the use of AI, as well as the incorporation of climate-related and ESG risks into supervision, stress testing, and information disclosure requirements.

Development of macroprudential instruments to limit risks in mortgage and consumer lending

Over the period under review, foreign regulators were expanding the range of macroprudential instruments and updating the existing requirements to ensure the stability of the financial system.

Introduction of new instruments of macroprudential regulation

In Australia, debt-to-income limits were implemented for the first time with respect to mortgage loans issued to borrowers with a high debt burden, limiting the maximum share of mortgages to borrowers with a DTI over 6 to 20% of new disbursements per quarter. The measure is due to a rise in new high-risk mortgages issued against the backdrop of falling interest rates.

Given growing credit activity in the housing segment and persistently high risks in the segment of commercial real estate, the Magyar Nemzeti Bank (Hungary's central bank) introduced two new sectoral SyRBs at a rate of 1 per cent each for exposures backed by domestic residential and commercial real estate.

In Uzbekistan, the regulator established a new requirement for the calculation and the maximum level of DTI ratio when issuing consumer loans. If a borrower's income can be confirmed by official documents and data, the ratio of the total debt on consumer loans, microloans, and car loans to the monthly income must not exceed eight; otherwise, it must not exceed five.

As regards the **adjustment of the existing instruments**, the efforts were aimed at both easing and tightening the requirements, depending on the situation in domestic markets. For example, the Czech National Bank recommends that banks apply stricter limits when issuing loans for the purchase of investment residential property to curtail potential systemic risks. With respect to these loans, banks are advised to limit the maximum LTV to 70% (instead of a mandatory limit of 80%) and the maximum DTI to 7 (instead of 8). By contrast, Sweden eased its macroprudential policy measures to boost the real estate market and increase housing affordability by cancelling the requirement for the annual amortisation of 1% for mortgages to borrowers with DTI over 4.5 and raising the maximum LTV from 85% to 90% when buying a new home. In New Zealand, loan-to value ratio (LVR) restrictions were also eased. Namely, for owner occupiers the share of new mortgages allowed with a down payment below 20% (LVR above 80%) was raised from 20% to 25%, and the share of new investment mortgages with a down payment below 30% (LVR above 70%) was raised from 5% to 10%.

Streamlining of the US financial sector regulation and similar trends in other countries

Since 2025 Q4, the US has been recording a sustainable trend towards streamlining (modernising) the existing legal framework for the regulation and supervision of the financial sector. The country's regulators emphasise that these efforts are not aimed at deregulating the financial sector.

Regulatory easing in the US banking sector

In November 2025, the US regulators issued a final rule to modify certain leverage capital standards applicable to US GSIBs. The enhanced supplementary leverage ratio (eSLR) equals to 50 percent of the parent GSIB's method 1 surcharge instead of the previous leverage buffer standard of two percent.

According to the regulators, this measure could lead to a notable aggregate capital release (around 28% of Tier 1 capital, or $219 billion, for GSIB subsidiaries and 2%, or around $13 billion, for GSIBs).

Simultaneously, proposals were made[1] to ease the requirements for the capital of community banks:[2] to apply the simplified requirements, the community banks leverage ratio (CBLR)[3] should be within the range of 8–10% (before that, the lower bound was at 9%).

According to estimates, this measure will help another 475 banks to meet the criteria for transitioning to the simplified requirements.

In 2025, following a stress test, the US Fed lowered the stress capital buffer requirement for one GSIB. Proposed changes to the framework for the annual stress test of the largest banks were also released. They provide for, among other things, updating the stress buffer calculation methodology to make the calculation less volatile from year to year.

In March 2026, US regulators published three proposals to ease capital requirements for banks[4] as follows:

- to optimise the risk measurement framework by replacing two mandatory risk calculation methods (the standardised and IRB approaches) by one expanded risk-based approach (only for the largest banks);
- to reduce risk weights for corporate loans (for small banks); and
- to change the procedure for the GSIB capital buffer calculation, providing for, among other things, a 20% downward adjustment in the systemic indicator coefficients.

It is expected that the introduction of the proposed measures will ensure an additional reduction in Tier 1 capital requirements by 4.8% for Category I and II banks, by 5.2% for Category III and IV banks, and by 7.8% for small banks.

---

1 As of the end of 2026 Q1, they had not yet come into force.

2 Banks with assets worth less than $10 billion.

3 It is calculated as the ratio of Tier 1 capital to average total assets.

4 Banking organisations in the US are classified into the following categories: Category I – GSIBs; Category II – banks with total assets worth $700 billion or more, or with cross-jurisdictional activity for $75 billion or more; Category III – banks with total assets worth $250 billion or more, or any of the three indicators of $75 billion or more (non-bank assets, weighted short-term wholesale funding, or off-balance sheet exposure); Category IV – banks with total assets worth from $100 billion to $250 billion that do not qualify as Category III banks; other banks with total assets from $50 billion to $100 billion.

The banking supervision framework was modernised as well, with the focus shifting to the supervision of significant financial risks. The following initiatives were announced: to cancel horizontal reviews[5] of major banks; to adopt a proportionate approach to supervision; and to tighten the requirements for issuing MRAs[6] to banks in order to reduce the regulatory burden on the latter.

Streamlining of financial market regulation

In 2025, the US regulators withdrew 14 final rules developed in 2022–2023 for financial market regulation, aimed at tightening the regulation of investment advisers as well as changing the rules and forms of reporting by investment advisers, investment companies, and funds following ESG strategies.

Streamlining of regulation in other countries

A trend towards streamlining and simplifying regulation is observed in other countries as well, albeit less notably and mainly in the form of general recommendations or plans to revise the existing requirements:

In December 2025, the ECB issued recommendations to simplify the prudential regulatory, supervisory, and reporting framework. To this end, it proposed measures to merge capital buffers, reduce the number of elements in the leverage ratio framework, introduce a simpler prudential regime for small banks, and simplify the EU-wide stress test methodology. A number of national banks have already started to implement these recommendations. For example, the Central Bank of Ireland issued a roadmap for simplifying regulation and making it more efficient. The National Bank of Belgium announced a deactivation of the sectoral SyRB for mortgages and a simultaneous rise in the overall CCyB from 1% to 1.25%. One of the arguments to support this decision was the intention to simplify the approach to macroprudential policy by combining two buffers into a single one.

In December 2025, New Zealand eased the requirements for banks' capital, stipulating a reduction in risk weights as part of the standardised approach to credit risk assessment as well as the adjustment of capital requirements for different categories of banks.

In the UK, in December 2025, the financial regulator announced a decrease in the appropriate benchmark for the system-wide level of Tier 1 capital requirements[7] from 14% to 13% of RWAs (to become effective from 2027). February 2026 saw the start of consultations to revise regulatory reporting requirements and the adoption of changes to the bank resolution regime to ensure a proportionate approach in accordance with the risk profile of each financial institution.

Australia plans to review prudential requirements for banks' capital and liquidity, namely to adjust credit risk capital requirements and liquidity risk standards as well as to introduce a simplified version of the Basel Committee's Fundamental Review of the Trading Book.

In its Global Financial Stability Report, the IMF notes that regulation modernisation can help reduce administrative costs and support lending to the economy. However, the easing of capital requirements

[5] A supervision method used by a regulator to examine one and the same issue or risk simultaneously across several banks belonging to a specific group.

[6] MRAs (matters requiring attention) are formal directives issued to banks by supervisory agencies to fix deficient practices.

[7] Appropriate benchmark level for system-wide Tier 1 capital requirements is a benchmark set by the Bank of England's Financial Policy Committee for the aggregate level of Tier 1 capital across the UK's entire banking system. It is not mandatory for individual banks, but rather is used by the regulator as a benchmark for calibrating capital buffer requirements.

carries risks, while reforms that are poorly coordinated at the global level could increase regulatory arbitrage and weaken prudential standards.

Cryptoasset market regulation

Foreign countries continue to actively develop regulation of various activities involving cryptoassets:

- Regulators maintain their focus on **stablecoins**. The Bank of England proposed a regulatory regime for sterling-denominated systemic stablecoins. The key proposals are to establish holding limits per coin both for individuals and businesses as well as requirements for issuers regarding holding stablecoin backing assets. The US regulators (Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, National Credit Union Association, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency) released proposed requirements and rules for issuing stablecoins by banking organisations in accordance with GENIUS Act. Canada announced plans to create a legal framework for the stablecoin market (the principal law, which sets out obligations of issuers of stablecoins pegged to fiat currencies as well as regulators' powers, was adopted in late March 2026, with the development of subordinated legislation already commenced). The Bank of Korea expressed support for restricting stablecoin issuance to regulated entities, including commercial banks. The National Bank of Georgia approved the rules and requirements for the issuance and redemption of stablecoins, obliging issuers to ensure that each stablecoin is 100% backed by reserve assets.

- The largest EMEs take a more cautious stance in this regard. The People's Bank of China declared that stablecoins failed to satisfy key financial security requirements. Similarly, the Reserve Bank of India highlighted financial stability risks associated with stablecoins, particularly those relating to their price volatility and mass withdrawals from stablecoins and reserve assets.

- Countries are developing **cryptoasset requirements**, introducing new regimes and adapting the existing laws. The UK released draft requirements for tokenised investment funds, investments in cryptoassets, and cryptocurrency companies, with the UK government issuing the finalised draft of cryptoasset regulation. **Australia** published requirements for crypto exchanges and tokenised custody platforms as well as a guidance on cryptoassets. In Switzerland, the government drafted amendments to the Financial Institutions Act to incorporate new activities involving cryptoassets. Brazil tightened its supervision of cryptocurrency companies. In Kazakhstan, an updated draft law on banking activities was presented, providing for DFA[8] regulation. In addition, Kazakhstan's president signed a law establishing the legal status of the national digital financial infrastructure, DFAs, and cryptoassets. The president of Belarus signed a decree on crypto banks and tokens. A number of measures to develop the cryptoasset market were adopted in Hong Kong. For example, licensed brokers were allowed to provide virtual asset financing to their securities margin clients. Laws on regulating cryptoassets were also adopted in Poland and Turkmenistan.

- **The US** continue developing opportunities for banks and exchanges to conduct transactions with cryptoassets. Namely, the country's regulators announced easing for banks in terms of cryptoasset custody and conducting riskless principal transactions with cryptoassets. Furthermore, the Commodity Futures Trading Commission allowed spot cryptoassets to trade on regulated exchanges, while the US Fed enabled state member banks to engage in cryptoasset activities.

[8] In Kazakhstan, DFAs cover three categories of digital assets: stablecoins; digital assets backed by financial instruments, property rights, goods, or other types of property; and financial instruments issued in electronic form on digital platforms.

- Another important area of the cryptoasset sector's development is asset **tokenisation in financial markets**. In the US, the launch of the pilot securities tokenisation programme was approved, with the clarifications regarding the capital treatment of tokenised securities released. The ECB announced that it is working on expanding the eligibility of securities issued using the distributed ledger technology. New provisions regulating tokenised securities were adopted in the Republic of Korea. The China Securities Regulatory Commission introduced rules governing the issuance of tokenised securities, backed by assets of Chinese issuers, in foreign markets. Malaysia held consultations on approaches to developing asset tokenisation in the financial market. In Thailand, proposals for the regulation of tokenised funds were released.

- **CASP licensing and supervision** can be identified as separate regulation development areas. **The EU** published an approach to supervising CASPs as well as guidelines on the assessment of knowledge and competence of CASP employees. In Brazil, comprehensive regulation of CASPs' activities took effect, including requirements related to licensing, customer protection, and AML/CFT. Similarly, integrated requirements for CASPs came into force in Armenia. A provisional procedure for regulating and licensing CASPs was developed in Kazakhstan. In **Hong Kong**, the regulator published recommendations for platform operators to increase liquidity in the cryptoasset market and diversify their assets, as well as held consultations on virtual asset dealer and custodian regimes. In Switzerland, the supervisory authority released guidance on risks associated with the custody of cryptobased assets. A digital asset custody framework was introduced in Canada.

- As for **international organisations**, they continued to explore risks associated with cryptoassets and analyse the implementation of the relevant global recommendations. **The FSB** released a report assessing the implementation of the global regulatory framework for cryptoasset activities presented by the FSB in July 2023. **The International Organization of Securities Commissions** published a review assessing the implementation of recommendations for crypto and digital asset markets as well as a report on tokenisation of financial assets, analysing use cases of such instruments and the related risks. IMF experts studied the market of stablecoins and its regulation and assessed the impact of stablecoins on global financial stability. As for the role of stablecoins in the market, it was examined in the paper by **the International Capital Market Association**. **BIS** experts prepared a publication on the regulation of payment stablecoins. **The Financial Action Task Force** published a report on criminals' misuse of stablecoins.

International experience in regulating AI-related risks in finance and promoting responsible AI use

Foreign regulators are making extensive efforts to assess and **mitigate risks associated with AI adoption**, including systemic ones, and promote responsible AI use.[9] This work is at different stages: some regulators are just beginning to explore AI-related risks and opportunities, while others have already started deploying AI-based solutions stepwise.

A widespread approach is **soft regulation** as it enables authorities to respond to arising risks without constraining technological advancement. Recommendations to the financial sector regarding AI use (risk assessment, competency development, and ethics) were released in Israel, Hungary, and the United Arab Emirates.

[9] International experience of AI regulation in the financial market is also described in the consultation paper Artificial Intelligence in the Financial Market: Current Status and Prerequisites for Further Development.

The USA, as part of the work aimed at updating the regulation and supervision, is easing supervision over AI-related companies. Specifically, in December 2025, the USA released an executive order to establish a single regulatory framework in the AI area in order to avoid fragmentation of laws and encourage adoption of AI technologies by US companies. The main objective is to remove excessive regulation, which is typical of this area in the USA.

Other regulators are also advancing initiatives aimed at **fostering AI adoption in the financial sector**. Hong Kong launched an initiative aimed at encouraging financial institutions to use AI in order to enhance the quality of their services, combat fraud, and mitigate risks, including using 'AI vs AI' strategies, e.g. when one AI solution checks the quality of the results generated earlier by another AI solution. Participating financial institutions will receive targeted supervisory guidance, technical support, and complimentary access to computing resources. The UK's regulator urged mortgage market participants to use the existing regulatory sandbox for AI-based solutions more extensively.

Despite active AI development, regulators increasingly recognise its inherent risks and the need to supervise them. As reported by the FSB **monitoring of AI adoption and assessment of related vulnerabilities require coherent and comprehensive approaches**. According to the report, most regulators are already monitoring AI use through outreach meetings and data collection, but these methods are of a fragmentary nature. The FSB recommends exploring methods to address data gaps and working towards more reliable approaches to monitoring AI-related vulnerabilities and emphases the need for cross-border coordination to harmonise the approaches.

The European Systemic Risk Board released a report assessing whether AI creates systemic risks and examining potential sources of vulnerabilities. The report stresses that current prudential regulation is generally adequate, but should be complemented by specific adjustments, while for efficient risk management, regulators need sufficient resources, including the capacity to create their own independent AI tools.

Furthermore, financial regulators are exploring the reasonableness of using AI in their work, and a number of countries have already implemented such solutions. As reported by the BIS, regulators use AI in information collection, macroeconomic and financial analysis, oversight of payment systems, and financial stability analysis. The report highlights the main challenges such as interpretability of models, the risk of 'hallucinations' of AI models, high costs, and dependence on a handful of external providers. The UK's regulator set out plans for using AI in its work (AI integration into work processes to speed up regulatory decision-making and deployment of AI-based tools enabling preventive supervision). Belarus outlined initiatives related to AI adoption by the regulator, planning to create an infrastructure, meant for deployment of AI models that could be used in the regulator's work, by 2030, monitor AI adoption in the banking sector, and maintain a regulatory environment encouraging banks to use AI. The Bank of Korea became the first regulator to launch its own internal AI-based model functioning in the regulator's protected local perimeter, which enables secure processing of confidential financial data and AI use to analyse macroeconomic indicators when preparing policy rate decisions.

Analysing climate risks and factoring them into regulation

The climate agenda is one of the main priorities for financial market regulators and international organisations. They continue elaborating approaches to analysing climate risks, primarily physical risks, and increasingly integrate ESG and climate factors into supervision, stress testing, and measures aimed at supporting financing of sustainability projects. Concurrently, they are making efforts to enhance

climate risk disclosures, streamline national requirements and international standards, and expand a carbon regulation framework from tax introduction to carbon market development.

The focus of **climate risk analysis** has shifted towards physical risks. Specifically, the International Association of Insurance Supervisors released its Global Insurance Market special topic edition examining financial stability implications from natural catastrophe (NatCat) insurance protection gaps. The **EU** put forward a proposal for a NatCat risk awareness and prevention tool designed to reduce the vulnerability of buildings to natural hazards and suggested assessing whether insurers adequately take into account climate adaptation measures in their NatCat risk assessment models. Additionally, the **EU's** supervisory authority published its guidelines on environmental scenario analysis for financial institutions and guidelines on embedding ESG risks into banks' and insurers' stress testing methodologies. The UK released supervisory expectations for banks' and insurers' management of climate-related risks. Australia conducted a prudential stress test among its five largest insurers to explore how a changing climate could affect the insurance protection gap over coming decades, which showed that it might widen from 15% of uninsured households in 2025 to 25% in 2050.

Regulators are **increasingly incorporating** ESG risks, especially climate risks, in their frameworks. The Philippines extended until January 2028 its regulatory incentives allowing banks to boost lending for eligible green or sustainable projects or activities. The incentives, first released in 2023, allow banks to exceed the 25% single borrower's limit by up to an additional 15% for eligible sustainable projects. China expanded the area of using its support framework under which commercial banks issuing green loans receive refinancing from the People's Bank of China within the established total annual limit of ¥800 billion (around $116 billion).[10] Azerbaijan integrated ESG factors into banking, specifically the Corporate Governance Standards in Banks and the Regulation for Credit Risk Management in Banks. The EU plans to release an updated version of guidelines by the end of 2026 that would enable supervisory authorities to take into account climate risks in the SyRB.

Regulators are introducing new requirements and enhancing current **requirements for climate disclosures** by the financial sector. **South Africa** released the related guidances for banks and insurers, New Zealand and Norway are planning to ease their current requirements, while Brazil and the Philippines are aligning their national laws with international standards IFRS S1 and IFRS S2 as well as the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision Pillar 3 regarding climate risk disclosure. The Taskforce on Nature-related Financial Disclosures published a set of recommendations for companies and financial institutions to improve the quality, accessibility, and timeliness of nature-related data, while the International Sustainability Standards Board issued targeted amendments to greenhouse gas emissions disclosure requirements in IFRS S2.

Countries **continue to introduce carbon tax and develop the carbon emissions trading system**. Thailand set out plans for new carbon taxes and an emissions trading system under the country's first formal climate change regulation. The EU suggested expanding the scope of the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism by including additional 180 steel and aluminium-intensive products. The UK released details on a carbon tax to be introduced as early as 1 January 2027. Concurrently, the Republic of Korea allowed securities firms to trade greenhouse gas allowances for the first time (previously only marketplaces and special purpose vehicles could trade directly through the Korea Exchange), while Singapore launched a number of government initiatives aiming to develop the carbon market (e.g. the introduction of a new grant to support financial institutions' participation in carbon markets).

[10] At the exchange rate as of 30 March 2026.

ABBREVIATIONS

AI – artificial intelligence

AML/CFT – anti-money laundering and countering the financing of terrorism

BIS – Bank for International Settlements

BNA – bank of non-core assets (National Bank TRUST)

BNPL – buy now, pay later

CAR – capital adequacy ratio

CASP – cryptoasset service provider

CCS – cross-currency swap(s)

CCyB – countercyclical buffer

CHB – credit history bureau

CMTPLI – compulsory motor third party liability insurance

DSTI – debt service-to-income ratio(s) calculated as the ratio of a borrower's average monthly payments on all loans and microloans, including on a newly issued loan (microloan), to the borrower's average monthly income

DTI – debt-to-income ratio

EBITDA – earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortisation

ECB – European Central Bank

EIR – effective interest rate

ELI – endowment life insurance

EME – emerging market economy

ENCO – expected net cash outflow

ESG – environmental, social, and corporate governance

EU – European Union

FSB – Financial Stability Board

FX – foreign exchange

GDP – gross domestic product

GSIB – global systemically important bank

ICL – irrevocable credit line

ICR – interest coverage ratio

IFRS – International Financial Reporting Standards

ILI – investment life insurance

IMF – International Monetary Fund

IRB approach – internal ratings-based approach

IT – information technology

LCR – liquidity coverage ratio

LLCR – loan life coverage ratio, which is a measure of the project's ability to repay an outstanding loan using free cash flows from housing sales over the life of the loan

LTI – loan-to-income ratio

LTM – last twelve months

LTV – loan-to-value ratio

MFO – microfinance organisation

MOB – months on book

MoM – month on month

MPL – macroprudential limit

NFCI – net fee and commission income

NBFI – non-bank financial institution

NII – net interest income

NIM – net interest margin

NPF – non-governmental pension fund

NPL – non-performing loan(s)

OFZ – federal government bond(s)

OPEC – Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries

PSMP – professional securities market participant

QoQ – quarter on quarter

RAS – Russian Accounting Standards

ROA – returns on assets

RWA – risk-weighted asset

SCPA – shared construction participation agreement

SIB – systemically important bank

SMEs – small and medium-sized enterprises

SyRB – systemic risk buffer

UIF – unit investment fund

US Fed – US Federal Reserve System

YoY – year on year

LIST OF CHARTS

Chart 1. IMF's scenario forecast of global GDP growth and inflation 10

Chart 2. Aviation fuel prices in Europe in 2026 11

Chart 3. Stock indices (early 2025 = 100%) 12

Chart 4. Prices for the top AI companies' shares and S&P 500 (January 2025=100) 14

Chart 5. Monthly net foreign currency sales for rubles by net sellers – non-financial companies and CNY/RUB monthly average exchange rate 18

Chart 6. Ratio of financial result of loss-making businesses to that of profitable ones, excluding financial and insurance sectors, according to Rosstat, over 2010–2025 19

Chart 7. Industries experiencing decline in net financial result in 2025 21

Chart 8. Industries with growth in net financial result in 2025 22

Chart 9. Share of overdue receivables, by industry, from 31 December 2024 to 31 December 2025 22

Chart 10. Aggregate debt indicators of certain industries in 2024–2025 23

Chart 11. Breakdown of companies' debts, by ICR, in 2025 H1–2026 24

Chart 12. Ratio of nine largest companies' outstanding debt to banking sector's capital 27

Chart 13. Macroprudential capital buffer for corporate credit claims 28

Chart 14. Share of loans of quality categories IV–V and provisioning ratio across banks, except BNA 29

Chart 15. Largest systemically important banks' loan portfolio, by risk zone 29

Chart 16. Biggest changes in share of 'green zone' loans in largest systemically important banks' portfolio, by industry 30

Chart 17. SME default ratio over 12 months 30

Chart 18. Ratio of corporate loans restructured over four weeks to legal entities' loan portfolio 31

Chart 19. Foreign currency claims on legal entities (foreign currency loans and bonds, yuan CCS) 32

Chart 20. Debt service ratio in retail lending 34

Chart 21. Unsecured consumer loan portfolio 35

Chart 22. Amount of issued unsecured consumer loans 35

Chart 23. Share of problem debts in unsecured consumer loan portfolio....36

Chart 24. Number of citizens whose labour income changed by specified value over year....36

Chart 25. NPL 30+ after three MOB for issued cash loans, by DSTI group....37

Chart 26. NPL 30+ after three MOB for issued credit cards, by DSTI group....37

Chart 27. Amount of consumer loans restructured over past six months....37

Chart 28. Number of individuals declared bankrupt....38

Chart 29. Share of loans to borrowers with high DSTI in cash loan segment....39

Chart 30. Share of loans to borrowers with high DSTI in credit card segment....39

Chart 31. Comparison of current MPLs and MPLs on an inclusion basis using cash loans as example....40

Chart 32. Structure of unsecured consumer loan portfolio, by DSTI group....40

Chart 33. Macroprudential buffer for unsecured loans (₽ bn)....41

Chart 34. Macroprudential buffer for unsecured loans (% of portfolio)....41

Chart 35. Consumer portfolio dynamics in MFO market....43

Chart 36. Structure of issued subsidised and market-based loans in money terms....46

Chart 37. NPL 90+ dynamics for all types of mortgage loans in vintages, by claim start date....47

Chart 38. NPL 90+ dynamics in mortgages issued from 2021, by mortgage programme....47

Chart 39. NPL 90+ dynamics in mortgages issued from 2021 for single-family home construction, by mortgage type as of reporting date....47

Chart 40. NPL 90+ dynamics in mortgages issued from 2021 for purchasing apartments, by mortgage type as of reporting date....48

Chart 41. Loans by DSTI (SCPA)....48

Chart 42. Loans by DSTI (non-SCPA)....48

Chart 43. Loans by LTV (SCPA)....48

Chart 44. Loans by LTV (non-SCPA)....48

Chart 45. Nominal housing prices....50

Chart 46. Cyclical component of HP-400000 filter-based index of real housing prices....50

Chart 47. Housing affordability index for mortgage in Russia 50

Chart 48. Housing area (down payment) that can be financed from deposits 51

Chart 49. New housing area, new projects for sale, and actual sales of new housing in Russia 52

Chart 50. Largest developers' financial performance 53

Chart 51. Coverage ratio for developers' loans with funds in escrow accounts and escrow account balances 54

Chart 52. Breakdown of project finance loan portfolio by LLCR, according to Bank of Russia survey 54

Chart 53. Banking sector's net profit after tax in real terms, cumulative year-to-date (January 2026 = 100%) 55

Chart 54. Structure of banking sector's profit 56

Chart 55. Factors of changes in banking sector's annual ROA from 1 October 2025 to 1 April 2026 56

Chart 56. Breakdown of banking sector's annual ROA 56

Chart 57. Quarterly NIM of banks 57

Chart 58. Quarterly NIM across groups of banks as of 1 April 2026 57

Chart 59. Quarterly NIM across groups of banks 58

Chart 60. Banks' capital adequacy from 1 October 2025 to 1 April 2026 59

Chart 61. Requirements for capital adequacy buffers and capital cushion 59

Chart 62. Distribution of actual capital cushion (above required capital), pp of N1.0 60

Chart 63. Ratio of risk-weighted assets to balance sheet risk assets 60

Chart 64. Systemically important banks' national LCR 61

Chart 65. Average maximum interest rate on retail deposits among largest banks 61

Chart 66. Accumulated but unrecognised revaluation (for HTM portfolio) and negative revaluation of banks' portfolio of bonds measured at fair value (cumulative) 62

Chart 67. Budget deficit / surplus in absolute terms and relative to Russia's GDP 64

Chart 68. OFZ offerings and key buyers at OFZ auctions by participant category 64

Chart 69. Regulatory equity-to-liabilities ratio in life insurance 66

Chart 70. Regulatory equity-to-liabilities ratio in non-life insurance....66

Chart 71. Financial performance in life insurance....67

Chart 72. Financial performance in non-life insurance....67

Chart 73. Structure of non-governmental pension funds' returns on pension savings....68

Chart 74. Structure of non-governmental pension funds' returns on pension reserves....68

Chart 75. Inflows of individuals' funds by security type....72

Chart 76. Individuals' net transfers to non-resident brokers (cumulative year-to-date)....72